文章基本信息

标题：Behavioral influences on strategic interactions outcomes in game theory models
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作者：Kuzmanović, Marija
期刊名称：Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research
印刷版ISSN：0354-0243
电子版ISSN：1820-743X
出版年度：2021
卷号：31
期号：1
页码：3-22
DOI：10.2298/YJOR191115023K
出版社：Faculty of Organizational Sciences, Belgrade, Mihajlo Pupin Institute, Belgrade, Economics Institute, Belgrade, Faculty of Transport and Traffic Engineering, Belgrade, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Belgrade
摘要：Traditional decision-making models assume full rationality of all actors. Nevertheless, the practice has shown that the behavior and choices of actors are influenced by many factors such as motives, beliefs, opinions, personal and social preferences, as well as cognitive biases. Moreover, it has already been proven that people have limitations in their ability to collect relevant information and respond to them, i.e., they are bounded rational. All this has contributed to the development of behavioral models in many disciplines including game theory. This paper provides a detailed review of the literature regarding behavioral models of strategic decision making. Bounded rationality and other cognitive biases in the strategic interactions are illustrated through the findings of numerous experimental studies.
关键词：behavioral game theory; cognitive biases; social preferences; bounded rationality; experimental games