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标题：Scientific realism without rigid designation in Kant's analogies
本地全文：下载
作者：David Landy
期刊名称：Kant e-Prints
印刷版ISSN：1677-1621
电子版ISSN：1677-163X
出版年度：2016
卷号：11
期号：1
页码：70-89
出版社：Campinas Section of Brasilian Kant Society
摘要：In Kant, Science, and Human Nature, Robert Hanna argues against a version of scientific realism founded on the Kripke/Putnam theory of reference, and defends a Kant-inspired manifest realism in its place. I reject Kriple/Putnam for different reasons than Hanna does, and argue that what should replace it is not manifest realism, but Kant's own scientific realism, which rests on a radically different theory of reference. Kant holds that we picture manifest objects by uniting manifolds of sensation using concepts-qua-inferential-rules. When these rules are demonstrated to be invalid, we replace the picture of the macroscopic world with a picture of the microscopic entities of theoretical science that unites the very same manifolds using different rules of inference. Thus, we refer to "unobservable" theoretical entities in the same way that we do manifest ones: by specifying both their determinate location in space and time and the concepts by which they are understood.
关键词：Scientific Realism;Reference;Analogies;Kant;Kripke;Inferentialism