出版社:Philosophy Department, University of Melbourne
摘要:Situation theory in general, and channel theory in particular, have been used to provide motivational accounts of the ternary relation semantics of relevant, substructural, and various non-classical logics. Among the constraints imposed by channel-theory, one must posit a certain existence criterion for situations which result from the composites of multiple channels (this is used in modeling information flow). In logics obeying a certain associativity condition, it is relatively straightforward to show that a certain such condition is met, but the problem is trickier in non-associative logics. Following Tedder (2017), where it was shown that the conjunction-conditional fragment of the logic B admits the existence of composite channels, I present a generalised version of the previous argument, appropriate to logics with disjunction, using the neighbourhood ternary relation semantic framework. I close by suggesting that the logic BB (∧I) , which falls in between Lavers’ system BB and the standard ‘minimal’ relevant logic B , satisfies the conditions for the general argument to go through.
其他摘要:Situation theory, and channel theory in particular, have been used to provide motivational accounts of the ternary relation semantics of relevant, substructural, and various non-classical logics. Among the constraints imposed by channel-theory, we must posit a certain existence criterion for situations which result from the composites of multiple channels (this is used in modeling information flow). In associative non-classical logics, it is relatively easy to show that a certain such condition is met, but the problem is trickier in non-associative logics. Following Tedder (2017), where it was shown that the conjunction-conditional fragment of the logic B admits the existence of composite channels, I present a generalised ver- sion of the previous argument, appropriate to logics with disjunction, in the neighbourhood ternary relation semantic framework. I close by suggesting that the logic BB (^I), which falls between Lavers' system BB and B , satisfies the conditions for the general argument to go through (and prove that it satisfies all but one of those conditions).