文章基本信息

标题：Delegated Stochastic Probing
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作者：Curtis Bechtel ; Shaddin Dughmi
期刊名称：LIPIcs : Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
电子版ISSN：1868-8969
出版年度：2021
卷号：185
页码：37:1-37:19
DOI：10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.37
出版社：Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik
摘要：Delegation covers a broad class of problems in which a principal doesn't have the resources or expertise necessary to complete a task by themselves, so they delegate the task to an agent whose interests may not be aligned with their own. Stochastic probing describes problems in which we are tasked with maximizing expected utility by "probing" known distributions for acceptable solutions subject to certain constraints. In this work, we combine the concepts of delegation and stochastic probing into a single mechanism design framework which we term delegated stochastic probing. We study how much a principal loses by delegating a stochastic probing problem, compared to their utility in the non-delegated solution. Our model and results are heavily inspired by the work of Kleinberg and Kleinberg in "Delegated Search Approximates Efficient Search." Building on their work, we show that there exists a connection between delegated stochastic probing and generalized prophet inequalities, which provides us with constant-factor deterministic mechanisms for a large class of delegated stochastic probing problems. We also explore randomized mechanisms in a simple delegated probing setting, and show that they outperform deterministic mechanisms in some instances but not in the worst case.
关键词：Delegation; Mechanism Design; Algorithmic Game Theory