文章基本信息

标题：Mergers with Structural Remedies in a Cournot Oligopoly
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作者：Dongyu Guo
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2020
卷号：10
期号：2
页码：366-383
DOI：10.4236/tel.2020.102025
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：In a Cournot oligopolistic market, we investigate the social welfare effects of a one-shot bilateral merger with efficiency gains and structural remedies. The optimal merger policy trades off efficiency gains against market power. We show that a special case of structural remedies, namely, the divestiture of differentiated brands to an existing competitor, can be a powerful tool to lessen the merged entity’s market power. As a consequence of the aforementioned trade-off, mergers with remedies can increase the scope for privately and socially desirable mergers, and lower efficiency gains from the merger require more divestitures to the competitor.
关键词：Merger Policy;Structural Remedies;Divestiture