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标题：Credibilidade e o projeto de agências reguladoras no Brasil
其他标题：Credibilidade e o projeto de agências reguladoras no Brasil
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作者：Mueller, Bernardo ; Pereira, Carlos
期刊名称：Revista de Economia Política
印刷版ISSN：0101-3157
电子版ISSN：1809-4538
出版年度：2002
卷号：22
期号：3
页码：449-472
DOI：10.1590/0101-31572002-1261
出版社：Centro de Economia Política
摘要：In this paper we model the process of regulatory agency design, focusing on the role of credibility. The government is constrained in the sense that it must create regulatory institutions that allow it to commit to not administratively expropriate investors. The model explains both the preference of the agency head chosen by the government as well as the optimal level of statutory control. We argue that in Brazil this trade-off between credibility and control of the agencies is key to understanding the specific regulatory institutions that have been chosen. Comparative static results are derived to examine how changes in some key variables affect the design of the agencies, providing us with a set of hypotheses for comparing the design of five different agencies created to regulate industries with very different characteristics. Although these agencies were initially created under very similar designs, they are expected to evolve in ways that accord with our theory.
关键词：Regulamentação;credibilidade;agências reguladoras;informações assimétricas
其他关键词：Regulation;credibility;regulatory agencies;asymmetric information