文章基本信息

标题：The Paradox of Unilateralism: Institutionalizing Failure In U.S.-Mexican Drug Strategies
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作者：Simon Reich ; Mark Aspinwall
期刊名称：Norteamérica
印刷版ISSN：1870-3550
电子版ISSN：2448-7228
出版年度：2013
卷号：8
期号：2
页码：7-39
DOI：10.1016/S1870-3550(13)71772-5
出版社：Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
摘要：Realism posits that strong states use compulsory power to influence the behavior of weaker ones. If true, then U.S. policy toward Mexico on a key national security issue such as drugs should illustrate that claim and policy outcomes should reflect U.S. preferences. Yet, in exploring a series of bilateral case studies, this article suggests that unilateral U.S. government initiatives do not achieve their specified goals. Rather, we argue that Mexico effectively employs a series of “strangulation strategies.” These derail U.S. initiatives and –under specific conditions– result in institutional agreements that proscribe certain forms of behavior and reduce future U.S. autonomy.
关键词：drugs; autonomy; institutionalism; unilateralism; bilateralism; strangulation strategies; United States; Mexico.