文章基本信息

标题：Transaction Costs and Overinsurance in Government Transfer Policy
本地全文：下载
作者：Alvaro Forteza
期刊名称：Journal of Applied Economics
印刷版ISSN：1514-0326
电子版ISSN：1667-6726
出版年度：1999
卷号：2
期号：2
页码：311-335
DOI：10.1080/15140326.1999.12040541
摘要：Benevolent governments lacking commitment ability provide too much insurance, if opportunistic private agents free ride on the government's concern and exert too little effort expecting government assistance. Yet, the costs of implementing the transfer policy work as a commitment device, alleviating the credibility problem. Indeed, despite of the lack of commitment capacity, the government might provide incomplete insurance because of these transaction costs. Therefore, transaction costs can increase welfare by resolving the dynamic inconsistency faced by a welfare maximizing policymaker.
关键词：D60 ; D82 ; H10 ; H30 ; I30 ; P16