文章基本信息

标题：Banking Instability and Deposit Insurance: The Role of Moral Hazard
本地全文：下载
作者：Harold Ngalawa ; Fulbert Tchana Tchana ; Nicola Viegi 等
期刊名称：Journal of Applied Economics
印刷版ISSN：1514-0326
电子版ISSN：1667-6726
出版年度：2016
卷号：19
期号：2
页码：323-350
DOI：10.1016/S1514-0326(16)30013-7
摘要：The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of moral hazard on the effectiveness of deposit insurance in achieving banking stability. If moral hazard explains banking instability arising from the adoption of deposit insurance, then deposit insurance will be associated with bank insolvency more than with bank runs. To test the hypothesis, we develop a new empirical framework distinguishing between banking instability initiated by panic withdrawals of deposits, and banking instability initiated by the insolvency problem of banks. Using a dataset covering 118 countries over the period 1980-2004, we find that deposit insurance per se has no significant effect either on bank insolvency or on bank runs. However, interacting deposit insurance with credit to the private sector, we observe a positive and significant effect on bank insolvency and bank runs, suggesting that moral hazard outweighs the positive effect of deposit insurance on banking stability.
关键词：G21 ; G28 ; E44 ; banking crises ; deposit insurance ; moral hazard