文章基本信息

标题：School choice under complete information: An experimental study
本地全文：下载
作者：Yan Chen ; Yingzhi Liang ; Tayfun Sönmez 等
期刊名称：Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
印刷版ISSN：2399-844X
电子版ISSN：2399-8458
出版年度：2016
卷号：1
期号：1
页码：45-82
DOI：10.22574/jmid.2016.12.002
摘要：We present an experimental study of three school choice mechanisms under complete information, using the designed environment in Chen & Sonmez ¨ (2006). We find that the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism outperforms both the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance (DA) and the Boston immediate acceptance (BOS) mechanism in terms of truth-telling and efficiency, whereas DA is more stable than either TTC or BOS. Compared to the incomplete information setting in Chen & Sonmez ¨ (2006), the performance of both TTC and BOS improves with more information, whereas that of DA does not.
关键词：School choice; experiment; mechanism design.