文章基本信息

标题：Does corruption affect cooperation? A laboratory experiment
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作者：Raymundo M. Campos-Vazquez ; Luis A. Mejia
期刊名称：Latin American Economic Review
印刷版ISSN：2198-3526
电子版ISSN：2196-436X
出版年度：2016
卷号：25
期号：1
页码：1-19
DOI：10.1007/s40503-016-0035-0
出版社：Springer Verlag
摘要：In this paper, we analyze the nature of cooperation in different corruption regimes.In a laboratory experiment with university students in Mexico, individuals play first a corruption game and then a public goods game.The corruption game is divided into three groups: high- and low-monitoring scenarios as well as a control group not exposed to the game.The public goods game is divided into three groups: the standard game, a game with centralized punishment executed by an exogenously assigned leader, and a game similar to the second one, but adding the possibility of counter-punishment.There are four key results.First, there is more corruption in the low-monitoring group.Second, in the public goods game there is less cooperation in the low-monitoring group than in the group with more intensive monitoring.Third, the option of punishment increases cooperation, but the sensitivity to punishment is greater in the high-monitoring (low-corruption) group.Fourth, the option of counter-punishment of the leader decreases cooperation.Our results highlight the importance of corruption in decreasing trust and social capital and show the diffi- culty of promoting cooperation when corruption is prevalent.
关键词：Corruption Cooperation Leader Public goods Laboratory experiment Ele