文章基本信息

标题：New Winning Strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
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作者：Philippe Mathieu ; Jean-Paul Delahaye
期刊名称：Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
印刷版ISSN：1460-7425
出版年度：2017
卷号：20
期号：4
页码：1-22
DOI：10.18564/jasss.3517
出版社：University of Surrey, Department of Sociology
摘要：In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, new successful strategies are regularly proposed especially outperforming the well-known tit_for_tat strategy. New forms of reasoning have also recently been introduced to analyse the game. They lead William Press and Freeman Dyson to a double infinite family of strategies that -theoretically- should all be eicient strategies. In this paper, we study and confront using several experimentations the main strategies introduced since the discovery of tit_for_tat. We make them play against each other in varied and neutral environments. We use the complete classes method that leads us to the formulation of four new simple strategies with surprising results. We present massive experiments using simulators specially developed that allow us to confront up to 6,000 strategies simultaneously, which had never been done before. Our results show without any doubt the most robust strategies among those so far identified. This work defines new systematic, reproductible and objective experiments suggesting several ways to design strategies that go a step further, and a step in the soware design technology to highlight eicient strategies in iterated prisoner’s dilemma and multiagent systems in general.
关键词：Game Theory; Group Strategy; Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD); Agent’s Behaviour; Memory; Opponent Identification