文章基本信息

标题：Infants Generalize Beliefs Across Individuals
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作者：Burnside, Kimberly ; Neumann, Cassandra ; Poulin-Dubois, Diane 等
期刊名称：Frontiers in Psychology
电子版ISSN：1664-1078
出版年度：2020
卷号：11
页码：1-11
DOI：10.3389/fpsyg.2020.547680
出版社：Frontiers Media
摘要：It has been argued that infants possess a rich, sophisticated theory of mind that is only revealed with tasks based on spontaneous responses. A mature theory of mind implies the understanding that mental states are person-specific. Previous studies on infants’ understanding of motivational mental states such as goals and preferences have revealed that, by 9 months of age, infants do not generalize these motivational mental states across agents. However, it remains to be determined if infants also perceive epistemic states as person-specific. Therefore, the goal of the present study was to use a switch agent paradigm with the classic false belief violation-of-expectation task. Results revealed that 16-month-old infants attributed true and false beliefs to a naïve agent—they did not perceive beliefs as person-specific. These findings indicate that infants’ understanding of beliefs is not as sophisticated as the rich mentalistic view suggests.
关键词：Theory of Mind; Infancy; Violation-of-expectation; false belief; True belief; INFANTS GENERALIZE BELIEFS