文章基本信息

标题：Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
其他标题：CONSELHO DIRETOR E EQUIPE DE ALTO NÍVEL ADMINISTRATIVO. PODER RELATIVO DO CEO E RETORNOS FINANCEIROS NO BRASIL
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作者：Beatriz Schalka ; gilberto sarfati
期刊名称：Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa - RECADM
印刷版ISSN：1677-7387
出版年度：2014
卷号：13
期号：3
页码：356-371
DOI：10.21529/RECADM.2014023
出版社：Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo - FACECLA
摘要：This article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance.
其他摘要：This article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance.
关键词：Corporate governance; control; board of directors
其他关键词：Governança corporativa, controle e conselho diretor.