文章基本信息

标题：Against Phenomenal Externalism
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作者：Elisabetta Sacchi ; Alberto Voltolini
期刊名称：Crítica
印刷版ISSN：1870-4905
电子版ISSN：0011-1503
出版年度：2017
卷号：49
期号：145
页码：25-48
DOI：10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.195
出版社：Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
摘要：We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see noreason to relinquish an idea that seems intuitive and appeals to many cognitive scientists: that phenomenology is narrow, i.e., that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of our experiences. This idea grounds the opposite philosophical position, phenomenal internalism (PI).
关键词：teleology; simplicity; normativity; intentionality; rational justification
其他关键词：teleology, simplicity, normativity, intentionality, rational justification