出版社:Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
摘要:In this paper I examine the argument by H.Beebee and N.Sabbarton-Leary that Brian Ellis’s scientific essentialism is based on the “abuse” of the necessary a posteriori.I will first briefly survey various attempts to resist what I will call the “Kripkean essentialist argument” to locate Beebee’s and Sabbarton-Leary’s position properly.After that I will argue that Beebee’s and Sabbarton-Leary’s argument is not successful;in particular,I will argue that under the most natural interpretation of their position it is not internally coherent,and that their argument is based on a superficial understanding of Kripkean necessity a posteriori.
关键词:Analyticity;Kripkean essentialist argument;natural kind;necessity a posteriori.