文章基本信息

标题：The Marginal Value of Cash and Agency Conflicts in Korean Firms*
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作者：Sang-Su Kim ; Jeong Hwan Lee
期刊名称：Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
印刷版ISSN：2288-4637
电子版ISSN：2288-4645
出版年度：2016
卷号：3
期号：4
页码：5-16
DOI：10.13106/jafeb.2016.vol3.no4.5
语种：English
出版社：Korean Distribution Science Association
摘要：Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms.We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013.To measure the quality of governance structures,we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services.The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash.Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score.This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores.However,this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores;a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure,auditing,dividend policies.Moreover,our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms,which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations.Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.
关键词：Cash Policy;Corporate Governance;Manager-Shareholder Conflicts;Marginal Value of Cash.