文章基本信息

标题：DOES PERCEIVED GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY IN MANAGING TAX MONEY DRIVE COMPLIANCE? EVIDENCE FROM A TAX GAME
本地全文：下载
作者：BĂTRÂNCEA LARISSA-MARGARETA ; NICHITA RAMONA-ANCA ; BĂTRÂNCEA IOAN 等
期刊名称：Analele Universităţii Constantin Brâncuşi din Târgu Jiu : Seria Economie
印刷版ISSN：1844-7007
出版年度：2012
期号：3
页码：34-44
语种：English
出版社：Academica Brâncuşi
摘要：Tax compliance,i.e.citizens’ disposition to pay taxes either voluntary or enforced,is an extremely important topic at any moment,but mostly when governments have to finance public goods with few tax money.In the light of these realities,governments have to find ways of providing public goods by boosting tax compliance.In order to achieve this goal,various factors influencing compliance have to be considered among which the efficiency of the government in managing tax money.In an experimental tax game preceded by a self-reported tax compliance attitudes questionnaire,we show that the information concerning government’s efficiency significantly influences tax payments.Moreover,tax compliance attitudes act as a mediator between the independent variable scenario (i.e.,information about government efficiency) and the dependent variable tax payments.
关键词：tax compliance attitudes;economic experiment;government efficiency.