文章基本信息

标题：KRIPKE’S WITTGENSTEIN,FACTUALISM AND MEANING
本地全文：下载
作者：Alexander Miller
期刊名称：Analiza i Egzystencja
印刷版ISSN：1734-9923
电子版ISSN：2300-7621
出版年度：2015
卷号：29
期号：6
页码：5-43
语种：English
出版社：Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
摘要：The paper provides a detailed discussion of George Wilson’s factualist interpretation of Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language and presents a new non-factualist interpretation. After exposition of Wilson’s construal of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument and sceptical solution, it is argued that this interpretation ultimately fails. Two possible interpretations of Wilson’s Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s meaning-fact are considered; one of them is based on Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s remarks on normative conditionals, and the other involves minimalism. It is claimed that on either of these interpretations the meaning-fact proposed by Wilson falls prey to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument. Regardless of this, it is admitted that Wilson’s factualist interpretation has important advantages. One of them is that it highlights the importance of distinguishing between basic sceptical conclusion and radical sceptical conclusion. In concluding sections a new non-factualist interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein is proposed that preserves this distinction and some other benefits claimed by Wilson for his interpretation.
关键词：Kripke;Kripke’s Wittgenstein;George Wilson;factualism about meaning;meaning fact
其他关键词：Kripke;Kripkeański Wittgenstein;George Wilson;faktualizm w kwestii znaczenia;fakt znaczeniowy