摘要:In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant points out that the inclusion of the inner representations of a subject in the form of time does not link them so as to produce the self-consciousness.To this end,a synthesis of the understanding — by means of the transcendental imagination — that affects the inner sense is necessary.Therefore the temporal succession of my inner states will appear to me until I draw implicitly an infinite line which is an image of time representing its succession on the space,thus inasmuch as I am conscious,at least implicitly,of my activity of the drawing.Using the example of the peculiar reflection of remembering,I will hypothesize the idea that a phenomenology of self-consciousness could readopt and renew Kant's theory of self-affection;however the limits of a phenomenological analysis of the reflection on my past and my past Self shall be set.Because of these limits,the reflection on my past I is always tainted with «substitutes» of my life-history,namely fluctuating representations of my experience in the past.Also,in this respect I am a passive subject facing the spontaneity of my phantasy while I remember myself.From a phenomenological point of view we can rearrange Kant's theory in this way: by reflection on my past,the I splits into a remembering-I and a phantasy-I that fills out the horizon of memory to some extent with substitutes.In this respect my life-history is never given to me without a mediation of phantasy and imagination.
其他摘要:В «Критике чистого разума» Кант утверждает,что объединение внутренних репрезентаций субъекта в форме времени не связывает их таким образом,чтобы само-сознание могло возникнуть.Для этой цели необходим синтез понимания,который посредством трансцендентальног