摘要:Utilizing a sample of large US banks,this study examines the benefits of bank transparency using several key perfor mance and stability measures over the 2001-2008 period. The market’s reactions to disclosure events are examined on a before-and-after comparison basis using a standard event study approach. Furthermore,the most and the least transparent banks are compared in terms of their relative performance and stability. In addition,a sample of both healthy and weak banks which are heavily involved in loan securitization and credit derivative activities are examined to iden?tify the extent to which greater transparency stabilizes (destabilizes) and/or increases (decreases) bank performance. Finally,a logit model is used to see if bank disclosure played a role in the recent financial crisis. Surprisingly the re?sults suggest that highly transparent banks are riskier than their less transparent peers. Specifically,greater disclosure regarding their securitization and credit derivative activities submitted on regulatory reports,as well as extensive cov?erage of credit derivatives in their annual report,increases the probability of an institution being classified as a "troubled” bank.