文章基本信息

标题：Conflict in the Shadow of Conflict
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作者：SE HOON BANG ; JAESOO KIM
期刊名称：KDI Journal of Economic Policy
印刷版ISSN：2586-2995
电子版ISSN：2586-4130
出版年度：2016
卷号：38
期号：4
页码：95-114
DOI：10.23895/kdijep.2019.41.4.25
语种：English
出版社：Korea Development Institute
摘要：We study how an advantage given to an interim winner in sequential conflicts characterizes dynamic competition between players and influences their payoffs.As the intensity of competition during each period is negatively correlated,perfect security is not necessarily desirable for contending parties.We present results which are widely applicable to various types of dynamic competition,where competition in each period is linked to the interim winner’s relative advantage. Policy implications are also discussed in a variety of areas,and several extensions are explored.
关键词：Sequential Conflicts;All–Pay Auctions; Sequential Innovations;Arms Race