期刊名称:Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
印刷版ISSN:2239-2629
出版年度:2015
卷号:6
期号:3
页码:474-479
DOI:10.4453/rifp.2015.0045
出版社:Mimesis Edizioni
摘要:By referring to two paradigm shifts - the passage from classical physics to relativistic physics on the one hand and the one from folk psychology to cognitive science on the other - Nannini aims at explaining “why neurological theories that reduce consciousness and the Self to aspects of brain dynamics appear implausible from a common sense perspective despite being sound from a scientific point of view”.In the comment I underline the importance of the articulated attempt made by Nannini, whilst asking at the same time for some clarifications regarding four epistemological aspects of the perspective he defends.
其他摘要:Abstract: By referring to two paradigm shifts - the passage from classical physics to relativistic physics on the one hand and the one from folk psychology to cognitive science on the other - Nannini aims at explaining “why neurological theories that reduce consciousness and the Self to aspects of brain dynamics appear implausible from a common sense perspective despite being sound from a scientific point of view”. In the comment I underline the importance of the articulated attempt made by Nannini, whilst asking at the same time for some clarifications regarding four epistemological aspects of the perspective he defends.