文章基本信息

标题：Veto players, policy change, and institutional design
本地全文：下载
作者：Tiberiu Dragu ; Hannah K. Simpson
期刊名称：Research & Politics
印刷版ISSN：2053-1680
电子版ISSN：2053-1680
出版年度：2017
卷号：4
期号：3
页码：1-6
DOI：10.1177/2053168017722704
摘要：What institutional arrangements allow veto players to secure maximal welfare when all agree on both the need for and the direction of policy change? To answer this question, we conduct a mechanism design analysis. We focus on a system with two veto players, each with incomplete information about the other’s policy preferences. We show that the unique welfare-maximizing mechanism is the mechanism that implements the preferred policy of the player whose ideal policy is closer to the status quo. We provide examples of institutional structures under which the unique equilibrium outcome of this two-player incomplete information game is the policy outcome implemented by this mechanism, and argue that our result can be used as a normative benchmark to assess the optimality of veto player institutions.
关键词：Institutional design ; mechanism design ; veto bargaining ; veto players