文章基本信息

标题：The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience
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作者：Elisabetta Sacchi
期刊名称：Phenomenology and Mind
印刷版ISSN：2280-7853
电子版ISSN：2239-4028
出版年度：2013
期号：4
页码：138-152
DOI：10.13128/Phe_Mi-19596
出版社：Firenze University Press
摘要：The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of providing either an inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of the content of the experience.
关键词：representationalism;particularity;phenomenological indistinguishability
其他关键词：representationalism;particularity;phenomenological indistinguishability