文章基本信息

标题：HUBUNGAN ANTARA GROWTH OPPORTUNITY DENGAN DEBT MATURITY DAN KEBIJAKAN LEVERAGE SERTA FUNGSI COVENANT DALAM MENGONTROL KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA SHAREHOLDERS DENGAN DEBTHOLDERS
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作者：Rhini Fatmasari
期刊名称：Bulletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan
印刷版ISSN：1410-8046
电子版ISSN：2460-9196
出版年度：2011
卷号：13
期号：3
页码：319-338
DOI：10.21098/bemp.v13i3.264
出版社：Bank Indonesia
摘要：Agency conflict is a phenomenon that occurs when a firm is doing its financing policies, especially of those related to the leverage strategies. Some of the former researches revealed some empirical evidence of the existence of a negative effect between growth opportunity, leverage, and debt maturity as one of the efforts in controlling the agency conflict between stockholders and bondholders. By using panel data regression model and data observation for over six years, this studies found that firms with high growth opportunity tend to use low leverage policies with short maturity to control the agency conflict between stockholders and bondholders. On the other hand, firms with low growth opportunity tend to use higher leverage policies with a longer period of debt maturity. Moreover, covenant as a moderating variable, could lower the negative relation between growth opportunity and leverage, but it could not diminish the negative relation between growth opportunity and debt maturity. Debt maturity and covenant also could not be use as substitution variable to lessen the agency conflict.