文章基本信息

标题：Campaign contributions and local Public goods in a federation
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作者：Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
期刊名称：Estudios Económicos
印刷版ISSN：0188-6916
出版年度：2018
卷号：33
期号：2
页码：283-311
出版社：El Colegio de México
摘要：I develop a voting model of decentralized provision of local public goods (LPGs) with campaign contributions. I compare an economy with and without campaign contributions: in the former economy, local governments do not provide Pareto eﬃcient LPGs and do not maximize the welfare gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences of voters. For the economy with campaign contributions, LPGs with and without spillovers are Pareto eﬃcient, and the system of local governments maximizes the gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences..
关键词：Local public goods; eﬃciency; externalities; federalism; elections and campaign contributions.
其他关键词：Bienes públicos locales; eficiencia; externalidades; federalismo; elecciones y contribuciones de campaña.