文章基本信息

标题：Cognitively differentiating between sharing games: inferences from choice and belief data of proposer participants
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作者：Werner Güth ; Charlotte Klempt ; Kerstin Pull 等
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2019
卷号：39
期号：1
页码：1-11
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：Proposer participants confront four sharing game types in a within subjects design, the symmetric demand, ultimatum, Yes-No and impunity game, varying the power structure from equal (symmetric demand game) to powerless recipients (impunity game). We additionally allow both types of participants to opt out of playing the game under consideration. Beside choice data we elicit action beliefs. Average demands choice and belief data) of proposer participants are significantly lower in symmetric demand than in Yes-No and impunity games. In Yes-No and impunity games the payoff demands of proposer participants react differently to recipients' outside option payoffs than in symmetric demand games, but not action beliefs. Ultimatum games are often seen as similar to symmetric demand games: When controlling for interaction effects between game type and outside option payoffs, actual demands and beliefs do not vary between symmetric demand and ultimatum games and they are not differently affected by outside option payoffs.