文章基本信息

标题：Is There Moral Hazard in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative Debt Relief Process?
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作者：JOSHUA C. HALL ; MINH TAM T. SCHLOSKY
期刊名称：Journal of Economic Development - Seoul
印刷版ISSN：0254-8372
出版年度：2018
卷号：43
期号：3
页码：1-24
出版社：Economic Research Institute
摘要：The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt ReliefInitiative (MDRI) were created by the IMF and World Bank to help low-income countriesreduce their debt burden and to facilitate reaching the Millennium Development Goals. Afterentering the decision point of the HIPC Initiative stage, countries receive interim aid whilefollowing a strategic path to improve their macroeconomic stability via structural reforms.Many countries reached the completion point of the HIPC Initiative stage within a few years,receiving a substantial amount of debt relief. Other countries remained in the interim periodfor almost a decade. We explore the relationship between the level of corruption in HIPCcountries and the length of time between the decision and the completion point. We usesurvival-time models to estimate the effect of various characteristics of the countries on theprobability that each country will exit the interim period. The results show that countrieswith lower corruption and better rule of law complete the HIPC process faster.
关键词：Debt Relief; HIPC; Moral Hazard; Survival Time Model; Foreign Aid