文章基本信息

标题：Bargaining over Monetary Policy and Optimal Committee Composition in a Currency Union
本地全文：下载
作者：Yuta Saito
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2018
卷号：38
期号：4
页码：1-12
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：Drawing on the Barro-Gordon framework, this paper investigates the design of the monetary policy committee in a currency union which implements the optimal time-consistent policy. The monetary policy is determined through Nash bargaining between member countries, where the outside options consist of non-cooperation within the union. It is shown that the member which experiences a higher output should have a greater bargaining power to reduce the inflationary bias. We also found that the richer member's optimal bargaining power, which induces the equilibrium policy time-consistent, is U-shaped with respect to the heterogeneity in the output shock.