文章基本信息

标题：On the Round Complexity of Randomized Byzantine Agreement
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作者：Ran Cohen ; Iftach Haitner ; Nikolaos Makriyannis 等
期刊名称：LIPIcs : Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
电子版ISSN：1868-8969
出版年度：2019
卷号：146
页码：1-17
DOI：10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2019.12
出版社：Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik
摘要：We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols, bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In particular, we prove that: 1) BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the end of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2+ o(1)]. 2) BA protocols resilient against n/4 corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most 1-Theta(1). 3) For a large class of protocols (including all BA protocols used in practice) and under a plausible combinatorial conjecture, BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2 + o(1)]. The above bounds hold even when the parties use a trusted setup phase, e.g., a public-key infrastructure (PKI). The third bound essentially matches the recent protocol of Micali (ITCS'17) that tolerates up to n/3 corruptions and terminates at the end of the third round with constant probability.
关键词：Byzantine agreement; lower bound; round complexity