文章基本信息

标题：Motivation, Human Capital Investment and Compensation in an Agency Problem
本地全文：下载
作者：Anthony M Marino
期刊名称：Journal of Management and Strategy
印刷版ISSN：1923-3965
电子版ISSN：1923-3973
出版年度：2019
卷号：10
期号：4
页码：37-58
DOI：10.5430/jms.v10n4p37
出版社：Sciedu Press
摘要：This paper considers a firm's optimal investment in training and motivation measures in a hidden action agency problem. We study how these strategies interact with each other and the contract in order to create value for the firm. Productivity enhancing training can be firm specific or non-firm specific and firm specific motivation can enhance utility or reduce effort cost. Whether these measures are complements or independents depends on the firm specificity of human capital and whether the participation constraint is binding. We characterize how a tighter labor market affects marginal profitabilities and examine the relative benefits of motivation measures which enhance utility versus those which decrease effort cost.
关键词：human capital; motivation; agency