文章基本信息

标题：Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality
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作者：Lawrence Ngo ; Meagan Kelly ; Christopher G. Coutlee 等
期刊名称：Scientific Reports
电子版ISSN：2045-2322
出版年度：2015
卷号：5
期号：1
DOI：10.1038/srep17390
语种：English
出版社：Springer Nature
摘要：Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about how intentionality serves as a critical input for morality and culpability, but the emerging field of experimental philosophy has revealed a puzzling asymmetry. People judge actions leading to negative consequences as being more intentional than those leading to positive ones. The implications of this asymmetry remain unclear because there is no consensus regarding the underlying mechanism. Based on converging behavioral and neural evidence, we demonstrate that there is no single underlying mechanism. Instead, two distinct mechanisms together generate the asymmetry. Emotion drives ascriptions of intentionality for negative consequences, while the consideration of statistical norms leads to the denial of intentionality for positive consequences. We employ this novel two-mechanism model to illustrate that morality can paradoxically shape judgments of intentionality. This is consequential for mens rea in legal practice and arguments in moral philosophy pertaining to terror bombing, abortion, and euthanasia among others.