JOBLESS RECOVERIES: STAGNATION OR STRUCTURAL CHANGE?
Burger, John D. ; Schwartz, Jeremy S.
JOBLESS RECOVERIES: STAGNATION OR STRUCTURAL CHANGE?
"They're closing down the textile mill across the
railroad tracks. Foreman says these jobs are going boys and they
ain't coming back ..." Bruce Springsteen, My Hometown
I. INTRODUCTION
Each of the last three U.S. recessions has been followed by a
period of declining employment during the early stages of recovery.
While policymakers and the popular press have focused significant
attention on jobless recoveries, economists have struggled to explain
their occurrence. Within the academic literature competing explanations
for jobless recoveries have emerged. On the one hand there are
explanations that emphasize a less dynamic economy with slower growth,
reduced labor market fluidity, a decline in startup activity, and even
economic stagnation; while other studies emphasize the importance of
dynamic structural change including offshoring and technological
advances that replace middle skill (routine) labor. Determining the
extent to which these various explanations contribute to jobless
recoveries has been hampered by the small sample size of national
business cycles. To overcome this obstacle our study utilizes U.S.
state-level data to assess the degree that reduced economic dynamism
and/or important structural changes in the economy contribute to the
recent phenomenon of jobless recoveries.
Inspired by the finding of Mendez, Reber, and Schwartz (2016) that
jobless recoveries are not a national phenomenon, we exploit variation
in the propensity and duration of jobless recoveries across U.S. states
and over time. The combination of cross-sectional and time series
evidence allows us to evaluate the explanatory power of a number of
competing hypotheses, and we find empirical evidence to support both the
stagnation and structural change theories of jobless recoveries. On the
stagnation side, we find that the rate of new business formation is a
significant predictor of jobless recoveries. Even after controlling for
the national downward trend in startup activity, we find that states
with a lower proportion of startup firms are significantly more likely
to experience a jobless recovery.
We also find evidence that links dynamic structural change to the
jobless recovery phenomenon. Contrary to the stagnation theories, we
find that states with higher trend productivity growth are more likely
to experience jobless recoveries. Further, our most robust result
suggests a link between jobless recoveries and labor market polarization
(as defined by Autor and Dorn 2013). More precisely, we find that states
experiencing a sharper trend decline in routine employment share are
more likely to experience a jobless recovery. Our results therefore
suggest that structural change in labor demand is causing certain types
of jobs to be disproportionately slashed during recessions, and to the
extent that these jobs are being automated, firms have less need to
rehire during the expansion thus yielding a jobless recovery.
The link between labor market polarization and jobless recoveries
is consistent with the national (United States) results of Jaimovich and
Siu (2012) and the importance of new business formation supports the
hypothesis of Pugsley and Sahin (2014), but our state-level data set
allows for important new insights. For example, we find that jobless
recoveries spread from a regional to a national phenomenon in a way that
mirrors the geographic spread of labor market polarization and declining
rates of business formation throughout the country. Each of these
factors contributes to the likelihood and length of a jobless recovery
and in combination have an economically significant, disruptive impact
on cyclical recoveries in employment. Given that routine-replacing
technological change is likely to continue to play a significant role in
the future, one implication of our results would be to consider policies
that reduce impediments to new business formation in the hopes that
aggressive hiring by startups could reduce the likelihood and length of
future jobless recoveries.
II. PROPOSED EXPLANATIONS FOR JOBLESS RECOVERIES
As an organizational framework we sort the proposed explanations
for jobless recoveries into two broad categories: (1) those associated
with reduced economic dynamism (stagnation) and (2) those associated
with dynamic structural or technological change. (1)
First, we should acknowledge that, within the family of
explanations involving a less dynamic economy, there is the school of
thought that suggests jobless recoveries are actually a misnomer and
would be better described as weak or slow recoveries (Gali, Smets, and
Wouters 2012). Proponents of the "slow recoveries" view argue
that the dominant characteristic of recent recoveries has been slow
output growth and this is the root cause of the weak employment
recoveries. One could even link the slow recovery view with concerns
about secular stagnation (Summers 2014).
Most studies, however, point to a change in cyclical employment
dynamics and seek to explore potential explanations. A prominent example
of the potential role of labor market frictions is traditional labor
hoarding theory. (2) During a recession firms may hoard labor if they
wish to avoid the costs of firing workers during a recession and then
rehire/retrain workers during the subsequent recovery. If firms retain
excess labor during a recession, this can postpone the need for hiring
during a subsequent recovery thereby generating a jobless recovery.
Somewhat related to the concept of labor hoarding is the reduction in
labor market fluidity documented by Davis and Haltiwanger (2014).
Although their study is primarily focused on longer-run trends in labor
force participation, the reduction in job creation and job destruction
rates reported by Davis and Haltiwanger could also be linked to the
phenomenon of jobless recoveries. A less dynamic labor market could be
reflected in reduced separations during recessions (consistent with
labor hoarding) and a slower pace of hiring during recoveries.
In a related literature, a number of studies have demonstrated the
importance of young firms for employment dynamics and document an
alarming decline in the rate of new business formation. Haltiwanger,
Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) establish that young firms exhibit higher
rates of job creation and destruction. Pugsley and Sahin (2014)
demonstrate that the trend decline in firm entry has reduced job
creation during recessions and recoveries thereby contributing to the
observation of jobless recoveries.
In a separate branch of the literature a number of studies have
suggested that jobless recoveries are not a symptom of reduced dynamism
but rather a side effect of ongoing structural change. Models proposed
by Berger (2015), Bachmann (2012), Koenders and Rogerson (2005), and
Foster, Grim, and Haltiwanger (2015) all propose that firms have a
tendency to grow fat during long expansions and then go through a period
of intense restructuring during recessions. If this restructuring period
is productivity enhancing it could delay the need for rehiring and
therefore contribute to jobless recoveries.
Other models emphasize reallocation across sectors rather than
restructuring within firms or industries. Garin, Pries, and Sims (2013)
emphasize an increase in the importance of reallocative shocks (relative
to aggregate shocks) and Groshen and Potter (2003) find evidence to
suggest structural change and reallocation of workers across industries
contributes to the phenomenon of jobless recoveries. One potential
source for this structural change and sectoral reallocation is the job
polarization trend documented by Autor and Dorn (2013). If technological
change is causing jobs in the middle of the skill distribution to be
disproportionately slashed during recessions and replaced by automation
as the economy rebounds, firms have less need to rehire during the
ensuing expansion, thus yielding a jobless recovery. Jaimovich and Siu
(2012) and Gaggl and Kaufmann (2014) each find evidence that jobless
recoveries can be traced to the polarization of U.S. labor markets, but
Graetz and Michaels (2016) fail to find evidence of this phenomenon
outside the United States.
III. DATA
A. Constructing State Business Cycle Data
One obstacle to analyzing the determinants of jobless recoveries is
the small sample of recessions available at the national level. To
overcome this limitation we exploit variation in business cycles among
U.S. states, as documented by Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2003) and Mendez,
Reber, and Schwartz (2016). While pursuing a state-level approach has
the potential to help distinguish between competing theories of jobless
recoveries, it comes with its own difficulties. First, the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) only maintains an extended time series for state
gross domestic product (GDP) at an annual frequency, which is
inappropriate for business cycle analysis. (3) Thus we need an
interpolation strategy, to create a quarterly series.
To generate an estimate of state-level quarterly GDP we first
obtain data on personal income for each state from the BEA. This series
is published at a quarterly frequency and is highly correlated with GDP.
We deflate personal income using the GDP deflator and seasonally adjust
using the X12 Census Bureau Method. Next, we assume that the proportion
of GDP that occurs during each quarter follows a similar quarterly
pattern to real personal income. It is well known, however, that
strictly following this procedure can lead to abrupt changes in the
interpolated series at the start of a new year. To ensure smooth
transitions from year to year, we use the Denton (1971) methodology,
which minimizes the transition from 1 year to the next, subject to the
quarterly interpolated GDP series summing to the actual annual series
reported by the BEA.
The next obstacle to using state-level data is the lack of a
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) equivalent source for dating
state business cycles, since state cycles may not conform to the
national economy's peaks and troughs. We adopt the following
procedure for determining the phases of state business cycles (4):
* Recessions are defined as all periods that include two or more
consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth. These periods extend to
earlier and later quarters, until two consecutive quarters of positive
GDP growth is reached.
* Expansions are non-recessionary periods that are at least eight
quarters long.
* Jobless recoveries begin when two quarters of negative job growth
immediately follow a recession. Jobless recoveries end with a quarter of
positive job growth or a recession. (5)
* Job growth recoveries begin immediately following a recession if
either of the first two quarters of the expansion have positive job
growth. Job growth recoveries end when the economy enters a recession.
* Short recoveries are non-recessionary periods that are shorter
than eight quarters. These short expansions represent the intermediate
periods between "double-dip" recessions and it is debatable
whether they represent recoveries at all. We therefore exclude short
recoveries from our primary analysis, although inclusion of these
periods does not materially impact our results.
To implement our definitions of jobless and job growth recoveries
we obtain state non-farm employment data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. (6)
Applying these definitions yields 165 state-level recessions, of
which slightly more than a third (64) end in jobless recoveries with an
average length of 3.3 quarters (see Table A1 for a complete list of the
state-level recession-recovery sample). Figure 1 illustrates the
importance of using state-level definitions of the business cycle by
documenting significant variation across states. The figure presents the
percentage of states during each quarter that are in a recession or
jobless recovery along with national NBER recessions shaded in gray. Our
sample period includes five NBER recessions starting in 1980. (7) The
1982 and 2008 recessions were nationally synchronized with 80%-90% of
states in a recession at the same time. By contrast, there was never a
majority of states in a recession during the 1990-1991 and 2001 national
recessions. Also noteworthy is the fact that during almost every quarter
of national NBER expansions there are some states that are in a
recession; and some NBER expansions include quarters where 40%-50% of
states are in recession. To further quantify the relationship between
state and national business cycles, we also examine the correlation
between state and national GDP growth. The average correlation between
state and national output growth is surprisingly low at 0.40, and ranges
from 0.01 and 0.64. Almost a quarter of states have a correlation below
0.30.
It is also apparent from Figure 1 that state-level jobless
recoveries are primarily clustered around national business cycle
troughs and although they have become more prominent during recent
recoveries they do not appear to be a broadly national phenomenon. For
example, the recovery from the 1990 to 1991 recession is generally
thought of as the first national jobless recovery (and would qualify
under our definition based on three quarters of negative job growth),
but the data in Figure 1 demonstrate that less than 20% of states
experienced jobless recoveries at this time. It appears that during 1991
a larger number of states had recessions that extended beyond the
official NBER trough. Some of the national jobless recoveries may
therefore be combinations of states truly in jobless recoveries along
with other states in the midst of an extended recession (more on the
relationship between state and national jobless recoveries in Section
V). It is abundantly clear that state business cycles are quite distinct
from NBER cycles, and the differences between the phases of state
business cycles provides variation that can be exploited to identify the
determinants of jobless recoveries.
B. Explanatory Variables
In the empirical work that follows (Section IV) we use probit
regressions to analyze the factors associated with an increased
probability of a state experiencing a jobless recovery and ordered
probits to analyze determinants of the length of a jobless recovery. In
each case the sample includes a maximum of 165 state-level recoveries as
detailed in Table A1. In order to test the various explanations of
jobless recoveries put forward in the academic literature we gather a
variety of empirical proxies at the state level. Table 1 organizes the
proposed explanations into the broad categories of stagnation (or
reduced dynamism) and structural change, as discussed in Section II, and
lists our empirical proxies. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for
our key variables. Each variable is measured in the first quarter of a
recovery with the exception of state and national GDP where we include
both the first and second quarter of a recovery. The table provides
statistics for all recoveries, as well as for jobless and job growth
recoveries separately.
We use four measures to test the theories that emphasize economic
stagnation as a source of jobless recoveries. First, to explore the
theory that jobless recoveries are simply a manifestation of weak output
growth, we include state GDP growth during the first two quarters of the
recovery. Not surprisingly, in Table 2 we observe that state output
growth is higher during job growth recoveries relative to jobless
recoveries. To control for the potential impact of national conditions
on state-level recoveries we also include national real GDP growth
during the first two quarters of each state recovery, and find that
aggregate conditions are also stronger during job growth recoveries.
Next, to determine whether the decline in labor market fluidity, as
documented by Davis and Haltiwanger (2014), has led to jobless
recoveries, we obtain the annual job reallocation rate by state from the
Census Bureau's Business Dynamic Statistics database. The job
reallocation rate is the sum of the job creation rate (the ratio of job
creation to total employment) and the job destruction rate (the ratio of
job destruction to total employment). Given that the measure is only
available on an annual basis we develop a quarterly series, by assuming
annual figures correspond to the first quarter of each year, and
interpolate values linearly for quarters two, three, and four. To focus
on longer term trends in job reallocation we follow Davis and
Haltiwanger (2014) and construct a 12 quarter moving average. In our
sample the average rate of job reallocation is about 30% and is lower
for states experiencing jobless recoveries.
Pugsley and Sahin (2014) emphasize the decline in new business
formation as a source of weak employment growth, so our final measure of
stagnation is the proportion of firms that are start-ups which is also
available from the Census Bureau's Business Dynamic Statistics
Database. Since these data are also only available on an annual basis,
we again utilize the same linear interpolation strategy to create a
quarterly series. In our sample there has been a significant downward
trend in the national startup rate but there is also significant
heterogeneity among states in the level of startup activity and the
extent and timing of its decline. For our empirical analysis we
separately include the national and state-level startup rate in order to
evaluate the extent to which variation in new business formation across
states can help explain jobless recoveries. In our sample we observe a
1.8 percentage point higher startup rate in states experiencing job
growth recoveries, which provides some initial evidence that fewer
startups may be related to jobless recoveries.
Turning to theories emphasizing dynamic structural change, we would
like to capture the extent of technological change, but this is a
challenging task--especially at the state level. As a proxy, we estimate
state-level productivity by dividing our interpolated GDP series by
state employment. We are interested in structural, long-run movements in
the technological environment of states, so we use the Hodrick Prescott
(HP) filtered trend of productivity growth and create an annual growth
rate by summing the current and last three quarters of the resulting HP
filtered series. (8) We find that productivity growth is on average
higher for states experiencing a jobless recovery which matches
international evidence from Burger and Schwartz (2015) and provides some
preliminary support for the structural change branch of the literature.
(9)
A number of the explanations involving structural change suggest
firms grow fat during long expansions and then go through a period of
intense restructuring during recessions. To test these hypotheses we
simply measure the length, in number of quarters, of the state expansion
that precedes each state recession. Prior expansions average almost 7
years leading up to jobless recoveries and just three and a half years
for job growth recoveries, suggesting there may be some merit to these
theories.
Perhaps the two most prominent examples of structural change in the
U.S. economy over the past few decades have been
globalization/offshoring and routine-replacing technological change
leading to a polarized labor market. Measures of vulnerability to
offshoring have been developed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemeiux (2011), who
start by taking the average of the Face-to-Face Contact and OnSite Job
variables from the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational
Information Network. These variables measure the degree an occupation
requires one to work in close contact with others and be in a particular
location. The sign of the mean of these variables is reversed, such that
an increase in the index corresponds to greater offshorability, and the
index is normalized to have a mean of zero.
To construct a measure of the potential of a state's workforce
to be offshored we weight the offshorability index for each occupation
by the proportion of a state's employment in each of the Census
Bureau's Major Occupation categories, which we obtain from the
Center of Economic Policy Research's (CEPR) outgoing rotation files
for the Current Population Survey (CPS). (10) To construct quarterly
measures we utilize all monthly files within the quarter. Similar to our
measure of productivity growth, we HP filter the offshorability series
to obtain the structural, or trend component, and then to eliminate any
remaining noise or seasonality in the series related to small CPS
samples we use a four quarter average. In our sample, offshorability is
significantly higher for states experiencing a jobless versus job growth
recovery.
Finally, we turn to the phenomenon of job polarization. Autor and
Dorn (2013) document a striking decline in middle-skill jobs with growth
at the high and low end of the skill spectrum. The leading explanation
for polarization is automation of routine tasks. Jaimovich and Siu
(2012) find evidence from national U.S. data that declines in routine
employment are concentrated in recessions and contribute to jobless
recoveries. Similar to our measure of offshorability we construct a
measure of routine employment share using the CPS's outgoing
rotation files. As in Jaimovich and Siu (2012) we use the following
occupations for routine employment: (1) Production and Craft, (2)
Transportation, Construction, Mechanic, Mining, and Farm, and (3)
Machine Operators and Assemblers. For each state we define the routine
employment share by summing the proportion of employment in the CPS
across these three categories. To develop a proxy for structural change,
as opposed to more transitory movements, we first HP filter the series,
and then utilize the year over year change in the proportion of
employment engaged in routine tasks in our analysis.
States which are experiencing a long-run downward trend in routine
employment share are interpreted as experiencing polarization of the
labor market. The routine employment share has been trending down
nationally for several decades, but there is significant state by state
variation in the pace and timing of polarization. In Figure 2 we see
that Pennsylvania begins our sample period with a high share of routine
employment but has seen it fall continuously for over 30 years. By
contrast Texas experienced a notable rebound in routine employment
during the 1990s and California began the period with far less routine
employment than the other two states, and subsequently experienced a
less dramatic decline during the sample period. The summary statistics
in Table 2 reveal that on average routine employment share is declining
more severely in states experiencing jobless recoveries, suggesting a
potentially important role for routine-replacing technological change.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our empirical analysis is focused on evaluating the factors
associated with an increased likelihood that a state will experience a
jobless recovery. We seek to distinguish between the candidate causes of
jobless recoveries using the empirical proxies listed in Table 1 and
documented in Section III.
We conduct probit analysis of the form:
Pr([Y.sub.i] = 1|[X.sub.i]) = [PHI]([X.sub.i][beta])
where [Y.sub.i] is a dummy variable indicating whether the state
recovery period, i, immediately following a state recession is jobless
(first two quarters following a recession have non-positive employment
growth) and [X.sub.i] is a vector of our independent variables measured
contemporaneously with the first quarter of the recovery or in the case
of state and national GDP the first two quarters of a recovery. (11)
Although our Sample includes variation across states and time, it
is important to note that it is not a traditional panel because the
units of analysis are state-level economic recoveries (as defined
above). Including state-level fixed effects is possible but would
significantly reduce the sample due to a handful of states having just
one recovery and other states lacking time variation in the state-level
experience with jobless recoveries (some states had no jobless
recoveries and for others every recovery was jobless). We therefore
choose not to include fixed effects in our estimated probit models.
Results from the probit analysis of the probability of a jobless
recovery are presented in Table 3. To ease interpretation, we present
the marginal effects for each variable at the means of our data set.
Throughout our analysis standard errors are clustered at the state level
and we exclude short expansions (less than eight quarters) as previously
defined.
In column (1) of Table 3 we find support for a number of the
proposed explanations for jobless recoveries. First, the negative and
highly statistically significant coefficient on state GDP growth during
the second quarter of a recovery indicates that "weak
recoveries" at the state level are in fact more likely to be
jobless recoveries. (12) The marginal effects reported in Table 3
indicate that state GDP growth that is 1 percentage point above average
would decrease the probability of a jobless recovery by 7 percentage
points. National conditions also matter as we estimate a highly
significant negative coefficient on national GDP growth during the first
quarter of a state-level recovery.
Additional evidence consistent with the reduced dynamism branch of
the literature is provided by the negative and statistically significant
coefficient on the state-level startup rate. Even after controlling for
the national downward trend in new business formation we find that a
state with a startup rate 1 percentage point lower than the national
average increases its likelihood of a jobless recovery by approximately
14 percentage points.
To evaluate theories emphasizing dynamic structural change, we
include the trend growth rate in labor productivity and find that states
experiencing productivity growth 1 percentage point greater than the
sample average are 22 percentage points more likely to experience a
jobless recovery. This positive link between higher productivity growth
and jobless recoveries runs counter to the stagnation theories and
provides evidence in favor of structural change. Finally, we fail to
find evidence that jobless recoveries are more likely following long
expansions, which runs counter to theories of firm-level restructuring
during recessions. In sum, the evidence from column (1) of Table 3 is
mixed with some evidence supporting links from economic stagnation to
jobless recoveries, but other results consistent with theories of
dynamic structural change as a driver of jobless recoveries.
In column (2) of Table 3 we take the analysis a step further and
include more specific proxies for the leading candidates of structural
change. To evaluate the extent to which labor market polarization might
be responsible for jobless recoveries we include the annual trend growth
rate in routine employment share. As a proxy for the impact of
globalization we include an index which measures the extent to which
jobs in a particular state are offshorable.
The results in column (2) are similar to column (1) but we also
estimate a negative and highly significant coefficient on trend growth
in routine employment share which suggests routine-replacing
technological change has contributed to the jobless recovery phenomenon.
To quantify the economic significance of our results we use the
estimates reported in column (2) of Table 3 to calculate the probability
of a jobless recovery occurring at the mean for all explanatory
variables, and if the growth rate in routine employment share were to
fall by one standard deviation. Our calculations indicate that such a
decline in routine employment growth would increase the probability of a
jobless recovery from 27.5% to 44.4%. Similarly we find that a state
with a startup rate one standard deviation below the sample average
would see its probability of a jobless recovery increase to 55%. Our
results clearly indicate that routine-replacing technological change and
diminished startup activity have exerted an economically significant
impact on the likelihood of jobless recoveries.
While our measures of productivity growth and polarization are each
calculated as the annual growth rate of an HP filtered series with the
intent of capturing long-run trends, one might still be concerned that
the proxies are influenced by contemporaneous business cycle effects. As
a robustness check we therefore include 1 year lags of the productivity
and polarization variables for the specification reported in column (3).
The results are quite similar suggesting that the link between
productivity and jobless recoveries is not simply a mechanical
relationship, but rather reflects the fact that higher long-run growth
rates of productivity are linked to jobless recoveries. We also find
that the impact of trend growth in routine employment share on the
likelihood of a jobless recovery continues to be highly significant in a
lagged specification.
To ensure our results are not driven by the limited sample sizes in
the CPS for smaller states, in column (4) of Table 3 we estimate the
same specification, but drop the five smallest states based on the
number of CPS respondents, and we find very similar results. (13) As a
further robustness check, in column (5) we exclude the top five
energy-producing states from the analysis which, due to their
sensitivity to world energy markets, may behave differently than other
states. Again we find evidence that routine-replacing technological
change and a decline in startup activity are robust predictors of
jobless recoveries.
In Table 4 we present results from an ordered probit where the
dependent variable is the number of quarters with negative job growth
following each recession (which ranges from 0 to 10 quarters). (14) The
results are remarkably similar to those from the binary probit reported
in Table 3. We continue to find robust support for explanatory variables
related to polarization and startups. In addition, the ordered probit
reveals some support for global factors as we find states with more
offshorable employment have significantly longer jobless recoveries.
Productivity growth is also a significant factor in determining the
length of a jobless recovery, but at a somewhat reduced significance
level in comparison to the binary probit results in Table 3.
Figure 3 uses the ordered probit results from column (2) of Table 4
to demonstrate the impact of declines in routine employment share and
startup activity, the two most robust and highly significant results, on
the probability of various lengths of jobless recoveries. In Figure 3
the thick solid line presents the actual proportion of recoveries that
were jobless for X quarters, while the dashed lines display the impact
of a one standard deviation increase in either the growth rate of
routine employment share or the startup rate on the probability of
jobless recoveries of various lengths. Figure 3 reveals that a
moderation in labor market polarization or more robust startup activity
would significantly increase the probability of job growth recoveries (0
or 1 jobless quarters), and almost eliminate the possibility of a state
experiencing a jobless recovery lasting four or more quarters. We
conclude that routine-replacing technological change and the reduction
in new business formation are important determinants of both the
likelihood and length of jobless recoveries.
V. EXPLAINING NATIONAL JOBLESS RECOVERIES
Our probit and ordered probit analysis reveals two factors that
appear to be the primary drivers of state-level jobless recoveries: the
decline in new firm creation and routine-replacing technological change.
In addition to being our most robust and highly significant findings,
these factors also appear to be the most promising explanations of
jobless recoveries in the existing literature. As a result, in this
section we focus exclusively on how these phenomena may help explain
national jobless recoveries.
Figure 4 compares national recoveries following the recessions of
the early 1990s, 2000s, and the Great Recession of 2008-2009. The first
column of Figure 4 classifies each state based on its business cycle
phase two quarters after the end of the last three national recessions,
the middle column displays the trend in the share of routine employment,
and the last column indicates the share of new firms in each state (the
same proxies we utilize in our regressions). Darker shades indicate
sharper declines in the proportion of routine employment or lower
startup rates, respectively.
Although the recovery in 1991 is generally thought of as the first
national jobless recovery, the first column of Figure 4 reveals that
jobless recoveries were concentrated in just a handful of eastern
states. The perception of a national jobless recovery appears driven in
part by California and the Northeast remaining in recession after the
official NBER trough. To further elaborate on this point Figure 5
decomposes national job losses into employment declines coming from
states that were in recession and those that were in jobless recoveries.
Job losses coming from states in jobless recoveries are further
decomposed into those coming from states with higher and lower than
sample median growth in routine employment share and higher and lower
than the mean startup rate. The figure shows that during quarter 3 of
1991 an overwhelming majority of job losses came from states that were
still in recession. Those job losses were more than offset by the
creation of 189,000 jobs in states that were experiencing job growth
recoveries. During this same period, labor market polarization had yet
to become a national phenomenon as routine employment share was growing
or declining only moderately in much of the country (middle column of
Figure 4). Stronger evidence of routine-replacing technological change
was evident primarily in the Northeast and did appear to contribute to
the handful of states experiencing jobless recoveries. The decomposition
in Figure 5 indicates that employment declined by 49,500 jobs in the
jobless recoveries of states with sharper drops in routine employment
and lower than median startup activity.
The observation of a national jobless recovery following the 2001
recession appears driven primarily by the Midwest where six states were
experiencing jobless recoveries and two others were still in recession.
It is also apparent from Figure 4 that by 2001 declines in routine
employment share had spread from the Northeast to the Midwest (and
beyond). The decomposition in Figure 5 indicates that job losses
associated with jobless recoveries were concentrated in states with
sharper declines in routine employment share.
Finally, the jobless recovery that occurred in the aftermath of the
Great Recession of 2008-2009 was truly a national phenomenon. In
addition, the right two panels of Figure 4 make it clear that sharp
declines in routine employment share and low startup rates had also
become widespread. The decomposition in Figure 5 indicates that during
quarter 4 of 2009 job losses were concentrated in states experiencing
jobless recoveries. In fact all 238,000 of the job losses associated
with state-level jobless recoveries occurred in states experiencing
sharp declines in routine employment and lower than average startup
rates.
Our investigation of the link between state and national jobless
recoveries yields a number of insights. First, we find that the
perception of a jobless recovery in the early 1990s was driven primarily
by a number of highly populous states remaining in recessions after the
NBER trough. Second, we find that sharp declines in routine employment
share started in the Northeast and then spread to the Midwest and
beyond. As the polarization phenomenon spread, so too did the
observation of state-level jobless recoveries. Finally, we find that
during the two most recent national jobless recoveries job losses were
concentrated in states with sharper declines in routine employment share
and lower startup rates.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
We find empirical evidence to support both the stagnation and
structural change theories of jobless recoveries. On the stagnation
side, we find evidence that the rate of new business formation is a
significant predictor of jobless recoveries. Even after controlling for
the national downward trend in startup activity, we find that states
with a lower startup share are significantly more likely to experience a
jobless recovery. However, we also find evidence that links dynamic
structural change to the jobless recovery phenomenon. Contrary to the
stagnation theories, we find that states with higher trend productivity
growth are more likely to experience jobless recoveries. Drilling deeper
we find evidence linking routine-replacing technological change to the
phenomenon of jobless recoveries: States experiencing a sharper trend
decline in routine employment share are more likely to experience a
jobless recovery. Our results linking labor market polarization to
jobless recoveries are consistent with the national (United States)
results of Jaimovich and Siu (2012), but our state-level data set allows
for important new insights by leveraging the heterogeneity of state
experiences with jobless recoveries and polarization (see Figures 1 and
4).
Our investigation of state-level conditions also reveals
significant heterogeneity in the national experience with jobless
recoveries over the past three business cycles. At the national level,
the recovery from the 1990 to 1991 recession began with three quarters
of negative job growth, which first inspired the term "jobless
recovery." Our disaggregated analysis reveals that the perception
of a national jobless recovery at this time was driven primarily by
California and several populous northeastern states remaining in
recession after the NBER trough. State-level jobless recoveries were
more prevalent following the 2001 recession and became truly widespread
following the Great Recession of 2008-2009. We also find that the spread
of jobless recoveries from a regional to a national phenomenon mirrors
the geographic spread of labor market polarization and declining rates
of business formation throughout the country.
Our analysis of the variety of state-level experiences with jobless
recoveries suggests that the onset of routine-replacing technological
change, along with a decline in new business formation, have both
generated a significant impact on labor markets during the early stages
of cyclical recoveries. Each of these factors contributes to the
likelihood and length of a jobless recovery, and in combination have an
economically significant, disruptive impact on cyclical recoveries in
employment. Given that routine-replacing technological change is
forecast to continue to play a significant role in the future, one
implication of our results would be to consider policies that reduce
impediments to new business formation in the hopes that aggressive
hiring by startups could reduce the likelihood and length of future
jobless recoveries.
APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Jobless and Job Growth Recoveries by State
Jobless Job Growth
State Recoveries Recoveries Recoveries
Alaska 3 0 3
Alabama 3 0 3
Arkansas 3 2 1
Arizona 3 0 3
California 3 2 1
Colorado 2 2 0
Connecticut 2 1 1
Delaware 5 2 3
Florida 1 0 1
Georgia 2 1 1
Hawaii 2 1 1
Iowa 4 2 2
Idaho 4 1 3
Illinois 4 2 2
Indiana 4 2 2
Kansas 5 1 4
Kentucky 4 2 2
Louisiana 3 1 2
Massachusetts 4 3 1
Maryland 3 3 0
Maine 2 1 1
Michigan 5 1 4
Minnesota 4 2 2
Missouri 5 0 5
Mississippi 5 2 3
Montana 4 1 3
North Carolina 3 1 2
North Dakota 1 0 1
Nebraska 5 1 4
New Hampshire 2 1 1
New Jersey 2 1 1
New Mexico 5 1 4
Nevada 1 0 1
New York 3 2 1
Ohio 4 2 2
Oklahoma 2 1 1
Oregon 4 2 2
Pennsylvania 4 3 1
Rhode Island 3 1 2
South Carolina 3 2 1
South Dakota 6 1 5
Tennessee 4 3 1
Texas 4 1 3
Utah 3 1 2
Virginia 1 1 0
Vermont 3 0 3
Washington 5 2 3
Wisconsin 4 2 2
West Virginia 3 0 3
Wyoming 1 0 1
Total 165 64 101
ABBREVIATIONS
BEA: Bureau of Economic Analysis
CEPR: Center of Economic Policy Research
CPS: Current Population Survey
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
HP: Hodrick Prescott
NBER: National Bureau of Economic Research
doi: 10.1111/ecin.12535
Online Early publication December 4, 2017
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(1.) Although we readily admit that not every proposed theory in
the literature falls neatly into one of these two broad categories.
Furthermore, it may be that structural changes in the economy are
causing the reduced dynamism observed in the U.S. economy. This link,
however, has yet to be established in the literature and we leave
establishing such causality to future research.
(2.) Biddle (2014) traces the labor hoarding concept back to Okun
(1963) and the "labor hoarding" label to Solow (1964).
(3.) State GDP data at a quarterly frequency have recently become
available from the BEA, but the series only goes back to 2005.
(4.) As a robustness check we also utilize the Bry and Boschan
(1971) business cycle dating algorithm, which has been extended to
quarterly data by Harding and Pagan (2002). Our results are
qualitatively similar when using this alternative method for dating
recessions.
(5.) In an earlier version of the paper we obtain similar results
using a definition of jobless recoveries based on a single quarter of
negative job growth, but upon further reflection we decided that a more
restrictive definition requiring multiple quarters of negative job
growth better matches the popular notion of jobless recoveries. In fact,
at the national level the jobless recoveries of 1991, 2001, and 2009
each began with three or more quarters of negative job growth. We also
consider alternatives to negative employment growth including employment
growth lower than population growth and less than trend employment
growth. These alternative definitions yield many more jobless recoveries
and may also be influenced by demographic factors, consequently, we only
report results defining jobless recoveries using negative employment
growth.
(6.) Since the Bureau of Labor Statistics seasonally adjusts this
series on a monthly frequency, we obtain quarterly non-seasonally
adjusted data for this series and then perform a seasonal adjustment
using the X12 Census Bureau program.
(7.) We are only able to construct time consistent routine
employment and offshoring variables back to 1980. As a result we explore
a sample from 1980 to 2012.
(8.) Throughout our work we use the standard smoothing parameter of
1,600 when HP filtering data.
(9.) Within a particular quarter one would expect higher
productivity growth during a jobless recovery, essentially by
definition. But we find the long-run trend in productivity growth, which
does not have a mechanical relationship with job growth, is higher for
states experiencing a jobless recovery.
(10.) Proportions in each occupation are calculated using CPS
weights.
(11.) As a robustness check, in some specifications we lag the
explanatory variables.
(12.) The significance of second quarter state GDP growth is
logical given our requirement of two quarters of nonpositive job growth
to qualify as a jobless recovery.
(13.) As additional robustness checks we estimated one probit where
observations were weighted by the square root of the number of CPS
respondents and another where each state received equal weight
regardless of the number of recessions they experience and in each case
we found qualitatively similar results.
(14.) Note that one quarter of jobless growth would not count as a
jobless recovery based on our definition, but for the ordered probit
analysis we are analyzing the number of jobless quarters in a continuous
fashion. Approximately 95% of the state-level recoveries have between
zero and four jobless quarters.
JOHN D. BURGER and JEREMY S. SCHWARTZ*
* The authors would like to thank Zhen Cui, James DeNicco, John
Duca, Amy Guisinger, Fabio Mendez, Michael Owyang, Irina Panovska, and
two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Schwartz acknowledges a
summer research grant from the Sellinger School of Business.
Burger: Professor and Research Impact Fellow, Sellinger School of
Business, Loyola University Maryland, Baltimore, MD 21210, Phone (410)
617-5831, Fax (410) 6172118, E-mail
[email protected]
Schwartz: Associate Professor, Sellinger School of Business, Loyola
University Maryland, Baltimore, MD 21210, Phone (410) 617-2919, Fax
(410) 617-2118, E-mail
[email protected]
Caption: FIGURE 1 Percentage of States in Recession or Jobless
Recovery
Caption: FIGURE 2 Routine Employment Share for Select States
Caption: FIGURE 3 Probability of Jobless Recoveries by Length in
Quarters
Caption: FIGURE 4 Jobless Recoveries, Change in Routine Employment
and Firm Startup Rates by State
Caption: FIGURE 5 Decomposition of National Job Losses during Last
Three Recoveries
TABLE 1
Proposed Explanations for Jobless
Recoveries and Their Empirical Proxies
Proposed Explanation Empirical Proxy
Stagnation 1. Weak recoveries State GDP growth
2. Labor market Job reallocation rate
frictions, adjustment
costs (hoarding)
3. Reduced labor Ratio of startups
fluidity to total firms
4. Decline in
startups
Dynamic 1. Firm-level Length of previous
structural restructuring expansion, trend
productivity growth
change 2. Labor market Trend growth in routine
polarization employment share
3. Globalization/ Index of employment
offshoring vulnerability to
offshoring
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
All Recoveries
(N = 155)
Mean SD
Length of jobless recovery
Stagnation variables
State GDP growth Q1 ([double dagger]) 0.031 0.026
State GDP growth Q2 0.035 0.030
National GDP growth Q1 0.020 0.028
National GDP growth Q2 0.030 0.024
Job reallocation rate 0.290 0.035
State startup firm share 0.096 0.019
National startup firm share 0.105 0.015
Structural change variables
Growth in routine employment -0.004 0.003
Offshorability 0.038 0.063
Productivity growth 0.012 0.010
Length of prior expansion 19.667 20.564
Jobless
Recoveries
(N = 64)
Mean SD
Length of jobless recovery 3.297 1.411
Stagnation variables
State GDP growth Q1 ([double dagger]) 0.028 0.024
State GDP growth Q2 0.027 0.020
National GDP growth Q1 0.005 0.023
National GDP growth Q2 0.023 0.022
Job reallocation rate 0.276 0.027
State startup firm share 0.085 0.016
National startup firm share 0.094 0.015
Structural change variables
Growth in routine employment -0.005 0.002
Offshorability 0.024 0.057
Productivity growth 0.016 0.008
Length of prior expansion 26.375 25.537
Job Growth
Recoveries
(N = 101)
Mean SD
Length of jobless recovery
Stagnation variables
State GDP growth Q1 ([double dagger]) 0.032 0.027
State GDP growth Q2 0.040 0.033
National GDP growth Q1 0.029 0.026
National GDP growth Q2 0.034 0.025
Job reallocation rate 0.298 0.038
State startup firm share 0.103 0.017
National startup firm share 0.111 0.012
Structural change variables
Growth in routine employment -0.004 0.003
Offshorability 0.046 0.065
Productivity growth 0.009 0.010
Length of prior expansion 15.416 15.350
Note: ([double dagger]) Means for jobless and job growth
recoveries subsamples are not significantly different at
the 10% level. For all remaining variables we reject
equality of the means at the 5% level.
TABLE 3 Jobless Recovery Probit--Marginal Effects
Full Full Lagged
Sample (1) Sample (2) Variables (3)
Length of prior expansion 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Trend productivity growth 0.224 *** 0.198 ***
(0.066) (0.073)
State GDP growth (Q1) -0.007 0.002 0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
State GDP growth (Q2) -0.071*** -0.075 *** -0.076 ***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
National GDP growth (Q1) -0.084 *** -0.083 *** -0.089 ***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
National GDP growth (Q2) 0.021 0.021 0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
State startup rate -0.137 *** -0.130 *** -0.143 ***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.052)
National startup rate -0.085 * -0.121 ** -0.121 **
(0.048) (0.052) (0.053)
Job reallocation rate 0.037 * 0.026 0.026
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Offshorability 0.015 * 0.018 **
(0.009) (0.009)
Trend routine share -0.539 ***
(0.207)
Lagged routine share -0.659 ***
(0.184)
Lagged productivity 0.212 ***
(0.055)
Number of observations 167 165 163
Drop Small Drop Energy
States (4) States (5)
Length of prior expansion -0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Trend productivity growth
State GDP growth (Q1) -0.001 0.005
(0.020) (0.024)
State GDP growth (Q2) -0.094 *** -0.077 ***
(0.027) (0.022)
National GDP growth (Q1) -0.107 *** -0.084 ***
(0.022) (0.020)
National GDP growth (Q2) 0.007 0.013
(0.023) (0.022)
State startup rate -0.142 ** -0.155 ***
(0.064) (0.052)
National startup rate -0.165 *** -0.102 *
(0.056) (0.056)
Job reallocation rate 0.028 0.031
(0.029) (0.022)
Offshorability 0.022 0.014
(0.014) (0.010)
Trend routine share
Lagged routine share -0.579 *** -0.658 ***
(0.188) (0.188)
Lagged productivity 0.285 *** 0.212 ***
(0.049) (0.056)
Number of observations 144 149
Notes: The dependent variable for each probit regression
is an indicator variable for jobless recoveries. Constants
are included but not reported. For Length of prior expansions
marginal effects are presented as the effect of the one quarter
change in the length of the prior expansion on the probability
of a jobless recovery at the mean of the all variables.
The remaining variables are presented as the marginal effect
of a percentage point (0.01) change on the probability of a
jobless recovery at the mean of all variables. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses.
Column (3) drops observations from the five smallest states
based on number of CPS respondents and column (4) drops the
five highest energy-producing states based upon 2014 data
from the U.S. Energy Information Agency.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 4
Jobless Recovery Length Ordered Probit
Full Full
Sample (1) Sample (2)
Length of prior expansion 0.006 * 0.007 *
(0.003) (0.004)
Trend productivity growth 39.222 *** 24.885 *
(12.706) (14.551)
State GDP growth (Q1) -4.778 -3.934
(3.909) (3.987)
State GDP growth (Q2) -6.720 ** -7.353 **
(3.158) (2.865)
National GDP growth (Q1) -24.679 *** -23.515 ***
(5.518) (4.959)
National GDP growth (Q2) 0.115 -1.339
(4.174) (4.195)
State startup rate -35.035 *** -32.866 ***
(9.779) (10.178)
National startup rate -10.649 -19.487 **
(7.913) (8.609)
Job reallocation rate 12.627 *** 9.520 **
(4.678) (4.648)
Offshorability 4.446 ***
(1.664)
Trend routine share -121.889 ***
(41.079)
Lagged routine share
Lagged productivity
Number of observations 167 165
Lagged Drop Small
Variables (3) States (4)
Length of prior expansion 0.007 * 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Trend productivity growth
State GDP growth (Q1) -3.106 -2.959
(3.907) (3.338)
State GDP growth (Q2) -7.576 ** -10.088 ***
(3.005) (3.601)
National GDP growth (Q1) -23.015 *** -24.867 ***
(5.031) (6.058)
National GDP growth (Q2) -2.599 -5.048
(4.607) (4.842)
State startup rate -36.092 *** -43.840 ***
(10.839) (13.193)
National startup rate -21.018 ** -20.038 **
(8.787) (9.818)
Job reallocation rate 10.753 ** 16.009 **
(5.089) (6.276)
Offshorability 4.628 *** 3.114 *
(1.662) (1.821)
Trend routine share
Lagged routine share -126.354 *** -115.196 ***
(35.471) (37.763)
Lagged productivity 23.211 * 34.033 **
(13.720) (14.378)
Number of observations 163 144
Drop Energy
States (5)
Length of prior expansion 0.005
(0.004)
Trend productivity growth
State GDP growth (Q1) -2.461
(4.439)
State GDP growth (Q2) -8.346 ***
(3.114)
National GDP growth (Q1) -22.454 ***
(4.856)
National GDP growth (Q2) -2.912
(4.574)
State startup rate -36.219 ***
(11.338)
National startup rate -18.546 **
(9.426)
Job reallocation rate 11.822 **
(5.238)
Offshorability 4.240 **
(1.832)
Trend routine share
Lagged routine share -130.266 ***
(35.618)
Lagged productivity 22.516 *
(13.562)
Number of observations 149
Notes: The dependent variable for each ordered probit
regression is jobless recovery length, which is a categorical
variable measuring the number of jobless quarters following each
state-level recession. In our sample, jobless recovery length
ranges from 0 (in the case of a job growth recovery) to a maximum
of 10 quarters. Constants are included but not reported. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level and reported in
parentheses. Column (4) drops observations from the live smallest
states based on number of CPS respondents and column (5) drops the
five highest energy-producing states based upon 2014 data from the
U.S. Energy Information Agency.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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