CLASSROOM DIVERSITY AND ACADEMIC OUTCOMES.
Dills, Angela K.
CLASSROOM DIVERSITY AND ACADEMIC OUTCOMES.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social scientists agree that peers affect one's learning
although debate continues on the nature of classroom peer effects. (1)
Identification of peer effects is complicated by the reflection problem:
just as one student is affected by his classmates, so does that student
affect his classmates (Manski 1993). Recent evidence relies on
experimental and quasi-experimental assignment of peers to avoid this
reflection problem. Sacerdote (2014) concludes from his review of the
literature that the evidence on peer effects remains too inconclusive to
inform policy choices.
Part of the peer effects literature explores the role of the racial
composition of one's peers in elementary and secondary schools. I
expand this discussion of racial peer effects to higher education, at a
time when many colleges and universities are striving to increase the
diversity of their student bodies. The analysis employs data from a
selective, private, Catholic liberal arts college. Students at this
college take a team-taught four-semester course series on the
development of western civilization (DWC). Upon matriculation, students
are preregistered into their course section without regard to their
race, ethnicity, sex, or ability. Unique features of the course allow
for the inclusion of team fixed effects. Within a faculty team, some
sections end up with a higher proportion of students of color than other
sections. Using this variation in student characteristics, I estimate
the effects of having more classmates of color on academic outcomes,
allowing the effects to differ for white students and students of color.
The results provide evidence of racial peer effects that differ for
white students and students of color. Students of color earn lower
grades when enrolled in sections with a greater proportion of students
of color; these effects occur exclusively for students of color with
lower SAT scores. Allowing for nonlinear effects displays important
nonlinearities for white students. At above average fractions of
classmates of color, white students earn higher grades in sections with
more students of color.
This paper contributes to two strands of the education literature.
First, it expands the racial peer effects discussion to higher
education. Second, it broadens the analyses of higher education
galvanized by affirmative action. Much of this evidence relies on
cross-institutional variation in racial composition. By identifying
racial peer effects within an institution, this paper directly considers
a policy lever available to colleges and universities: class
assignments. The results suggest that white students are more successful
in sections with more students of color. Lower test score students of
color may be less successful in more racially diverse classrooms,
although these effects are not always statistically significant.
II. RACIAL PEER EFFECTS
Racial peer effects may stem from a variety of sources. First,
students may be more heavily influenced by peers of their own race. For
example, some results in Hoxby (2000) imply stronger ability peer
effects intrarace; Fruehwirth (2013) also finds that the strength of
ability peer effects differs by race. Second, teachers may modify their
expectations as their students' racial and ethnic composition
changes. Third, black students may feel pressured to avoid "acting
white" and underachieve to conform to their peers (Austen-Smith and
Fryer 2005; Fordham and Ogbu 1986; Ogbu 2003). Fourth, in psychology,
the concept of "stereotype threat" (e.g., Steele and Aronson
1995) implies a protective role arising from students sharing a
classroom with peers of their own race. With stereotype threat,
individuals worry that their actions may confirm negative stereotypes
held about one's social identity; this worry inhibits performance,
substantiating the negative stereotype. (2) The stereotype threat
literature suggests that a critical mass of peers who look like you may
reduce the threat of being stereotyped, improving performance (Kanter
1977). (3)
The K-12 peer effects literature indicates that an increased
proportion of black peers may lower academic performance, although the
magnitude of this effect differs between black students and nonblack
students (Billings, Deming, and Rockoff 2014; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin
2009). (4) The magnitude of racial peer effects in K-12 also appears to
differ for high-achieving and low-achieving black students (Hanushek and
Rivkin 2009) with larger effects for higher achievers. In contrast,
Fryer and Torelli (2010) find that attending a school with a high
proportion of black students protects against the acting white
phenomenon, reducing the negative relationship between popularity and
achievement among black students.
The relevant literature in higher education tends to focus on the
potential benefits of attending a more diverse college. The results are
mixed. Papers comparing the outcomes of students attending more diverse
colleges find higher earnings for white men (Daniel, Black, and Smith
2001), possibly lower earnings for whites and Asians once one controls
for student's major (Arcidiacono and Vigdor 2010), and no effect
once accounting for selection on unobservables (Hinrichs 2011). At all
levels of schooling, racial peer effects may affect outcomes through
learning, grades, or both.
My paper improves upon the existing evidence in two ways. First,
unlike higher education studies that rely on differences across
institutions, my paper relies on variation across classes at the same
institution. It is most similar to Hoxby (2000) which uses natural
population variation in K-12 or the ability peer-effect research at the
military academies that relies on random assignment (e.g., Carrell,
Fullerton, and West 2009). Second, I add to the peer effects literature
by estimating the role of the racial and ethnic composition of
one's classmates in college, in a more typical, although still
selective, higher educational setting. The students reside in a policy
environment relevant to a large variety of educational institutions
where the class composition could be manipulated.
III. BACKGROUND AND DATA
All students at this selective, Catholic, and liberal arts college
are required to take a four-semester sequence studying the DWC. (5) Upon
matriculation to the college, Enrollment Services registers students for
the first semester of DWC, DWC 101, as well as the suggested courses for
their declared major or the major in which they indicated an interest.
Enrollment in DWC 101 is made without regard to the student's
background, race, ethnicity, or gender. There are, however, some
sections that would conflict with the freshman biology sequence or other
courses required for one's major. To the extent that majors
correlate with demographic characteristics, this may produce some of the
variation in the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of sections. (6)
The identification strategy, however, mitigates most of this concern by
relying on variation between two sections that share a lecture time and
faculty team but differ in their seminar time.
Students have two potential opportunities to change their first
semester schedule. First, students attend an advising day prior to
starting classes, typically in the summer. At that time, students can
adjust their schedule as needed as long as seats are available. Second,
students can adjust their schedule during the first several days of
class. Changing DWC sections tends to be difficult as the scheduled
times overlap many other course time slots and the program does not
overenroll students into the classes. Students and advisors are
encouraged to build the remainder of a student's schedule around
DWC 101. I assume students are assigned to their first semester section
without regard to their race or ethnicity and show evidence below that
assignments appear random.
DWC has two unique features that combine to help identify plausibly
exogenous variation in the racial composition of classes. First,
students are assigned to a team of two to five faculty members. Second,
the course each semester consists of two parts: a large lecture and a
smaller seminar section. All students assigned to a faculty team attend
their team's lectures. Each faculty member then leads two separate
seminar sections of a fixed, smaller group of students.
Administratively, this shows up as though students in the large lecture
are split into two sections: one half assigned to one seminar time and
the other half assigned to a different seminar time. Students with the
same faculty team operate under the same syllabus and share assessment
methods and grading weights but potentially differ in instructors'
grading of participation.
As an example, in Fall 2011, the same team of faculty members
taught sections 5 and 6 of DWC 101. The lecture for both sections
occurred Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Fridays from 10:30 to 11:20 a.m. in
the same room. The seminar for section 5 occurred on Mondays from 8:30
to 10:20 a.m.; the seminar for section 6 occurred on Fridays from 12:30
to 2:20 p.m. In the data, students appear as either enrolled in section
5 or section 6 even though these sections share a lecture and a team of
faculty members. This is the variation on which I rely. The estimation
method compares students' performances between sections 5 and 6
based on the differences in the racial and ethnic composition between
sections 5 and 6. Effectively, the racial composition of that half of
the class is a proxy for the racial composition of the student's
seminar. The same faculty team assigns grades for both sections 5 and 6.
The rules charge each team to determine grades together. In practice,
some teams have faculty members determine their seminar students'
grades alone. The empirical approach assumes that a faculty member uses
similar metrics to grade both sections of his or her seminar students.
Continuing the example, I assume that each member of the faculty team
of, say, Professors A, B, and C, grade each of their two seminars using
the same standards. In other words, Professor A grades her section 5
seminar using the same standard as her section 6 seminar.
One thousand freshmen matriculate each fall. Of these, roughly 10%
are honors students. Because honors students take a separate honors
version of DWC, I omit them from the analysis. The sample used below
consists of 4,435 nonhonors students over five entering cohorts, from
Fall 2009 to Fall 2013. Summary statistics for these students appear in
Table 1 by race and ethnicity.
The student body is predominantly white: 85% of nonhonors students
are white. I characterize students as white or nonwhite. (7) Students
who report their race but do not report their race as white are defined
as nonwhite. This includes students who are American Indian/Alaskan
Native (0.3%), Asian (1.5%), black/African American (4.5%),
Hispanic/Latino (6.9%), Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
(0.2%), or two or more races (1.8%). I separately consider those
students identifying as black/African American and those identifying as
Hispanic. Almost 9% of students do not identify their race. I count
these students as white students. (8) During the five observed years,
the fraction of students who are nonwhite increases from 12% to 19%.
White students earn higher grades in DWC 101 than do nonwhite
students. The average grade point average (GPA) for white students is
2.88, slightly below B; nonwhite students earn lower grades. White
students also enter the college with higher high school GPAs and SAT
test scores. Twenty percent of students are first generation college
students; 44% are males; 11 % are National Collegiate Athletic
Association Division I athletes; 1% are international students; and 16%
received Pell grants their first semester, an indicator of family
income. Nonwhite students are more likely to be first generation,
female, athletes, international students, and Pell grant recipients.
Nonwhite students are more likely to have switched roommates at least
once in their first year.
The college is an SAT-optional school. Although students who have
taken the SAT are required to submit their scores for advising, about
14% of students in the sample are not linked to SAT scores. I generate
two indicators for missing SAT verbal and math scores to retain these
students in the sample. (9)
The sample contains 54 sections of DWC 101 over five cohorts.
Although the average student experiences a DWC 101 section that is 15%
nonwhite, this percentage varies from 0% to 30%. One student is the sole
nonwhite member of her 45-person section; four sections contain three or
fewer nonwhite students (with class sizes of 34, 37, 45, and 68).
Ninety-five percent of students are in a section with 5 or more students
of color; half are in a section with 14 or more students. The average
section size is 67 students.
I provide three empirical tests of whether the percent of nonwhite
students in each section is credibly distributed randomly. First, I use
the population of matriculating students in each cohort to assign
students randomly to sections. For each cohort, I use the number of
observed sections so that the simulated sections are similar in size to
the observed sections. (10) The section is randomly assigned 10,000
times. I then calculate the fraction of simulated sections with values
below each observed section's values. Under randomization, these
calculated p values are distributed uniformly. 1 use a one-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test whether the distribution of calculated p
values differs significantly from a uniform distribution. The one-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no
difference in the distributions for the proportion of students in each
group: nonwhite, black, and Hispanic. (11) In addition, I test the
section's average SAT verbal score for nonwhites, blacks, and
Hispanics. I fail to reject equality of distribution for each of these
variables.
Second, I consider whether DWC 101 section characteristics differ
by race and ethnicity. I regress each section characteristic, such as
the average SAT math score of the section, on indicators for whether a
student is white, black, or Hispanic; the omitted category is
"other." Because the racial composition and characteristics of
each cohort differ, I include cohort fixed effects and a set of ten
variables capturing the days and times that the section meets. Table 2
presents these results. Average SAT scores, the racial and ethnic
composition of the section, as well as the percent of the section who
are males, international students, first generation students, or Pell
grant recipients does not differ for white, black, and Hispanic
students. These estimates are consistent with a credibly exogenous
allocation of students across sections. (12) Table 2 presents 30
statistical tests; at the 10% level, we would expect three of these
tests to be statistically significant even if the null hypothesis of no
correlation is true. There are two statistically significant estimates
in Table 2: black students appear in sections with fewer classmates who
are black and in sections with more athletes. (13)
The third empirical test examines how white students'
characteristics correlate with the percent minority in their section.
(14) If students are assigned to sections without regard to their race
and ethnicity, then white students' SAT scores and high school GPAs
should be uncorrelated with the fraction minority. I regress SAT scores
on the percent minority for the sample of white students. During the
observed 5 years, matriculating students' SAT scores and high
school GPAs are falling and the percent minority is increasing. To
account for these trends, the regressions also include indicators for
each matriculating cohort.
Results from this third empirical test appear in Table 3. Most
estimates on percent minority are positive and statistically
insignificant, supporting the claim that variation in racial diversity
is uncorrelated with a variety of student characteristics. One exception
is that white students' high school GPAs are significantly lower in
sections with a greater percentage of black classmates. (15) More
caution in interpreting results for the percent black in the analysis
that follows may be warranted. Note, however, that given the number of
estimates considered, this one significant estimate may have occurred by
chance. (16)
Statistical tests support Enrollment Services' claim of
assigning students into sections without regard to their race,
ethnicity, or SAT scores.
IV. EMPIRICAL METHOD
This paper considers students enrolled in the first semester of a
required, four-semester sequence, assuming that students are assigned to
their first semester section without regard to their race or ethnicity.
The focus of the analysis is how the fraction of classmates who are
students of color affects one's outcomes. Two primary outcomes are
analyzed: grades in the first semester course and the likelihood of not
persisting to the second semester. The specification allows the
magnitude of the effect to differ for white and nonwhite students. The
basic specification is an estimate of the following for student i in
cohort c enrolled in section s with team t:
[outcome.sub.icts] - [[beta].sub.1][pctminority.sub.icts] +
[[beta].sub.2][minority.sub.i] x ([pct.sub.minorityicts]) +
[[beta].sub.3][minority.sub.i] + X'[delta] + [[rho].sub.ct] +
[[tau].sub.c] + [[epsilon].sub.icts].
The coefficients of interest are [[beta].sub.1] and [[beta].sub.2].
The coefficient on the interaction term allows this effect to differ for
minority students. If having peers of one's own race is protective
for minority students, as with stereotype threat, we would expect
[[beta].sub.2] to be positive. If having more peers of one's own
race negatively impacts academic outcomes, as with existing evidence in
K-12, we would expect [[beta].sub.2] to be negative. I measure percent
minority in three ways: the percent nonwhite, the percent black/African
American, and the percent Hispanic. For specifications considering the
effect of the percent black/African American and the percent Hispanic, I
omit other students of color from the sample; the comparison group
becomes, only white students and students of unknown race. The
specification includes indicators for the student's racial and
ethnic identification.
The vector X controls for a variety of student characteristics
including indicators for whether the student is a first generation
college student, male, a student athlete, an international student, or
received a Pell grant. In addition, the specification controls for the
student's high school GPA, SAT math, and verbal scores, whether
they commute or live on campus, and if they changed roommates their
first year. (17) A set of variables capturing the days and meeting times
of the section capture potential differences in academic outcomes based
on time of day. (18)
Fixed effects control for the cohort-faculty team, [[rho].sub.ct].
DWC is a team-taught course; teams range in size from two to five
professors. Many teams appear as teaching two sections of DWC 101 with a
shared large lecture and two separate seminar times, one for each
section. The team fixed effects compare outcomes for students between
these two sections based on the diversity of their classmates. With
these fixed effects, the source of identification on the percent
minority is the variation in the proportion of students of color in the
half of the lecture who share the same seminar time compared to the
other half of the lecture with a different seminar time. The syllabus is
common to the lecture and each member of the faculty-team teaches one
seminar in each section (i.e., one at each of the two seminar times).
The cohort-team fixed effects thus capture many potential sources of
bias such as professor quality, grading standards, and the like. Any
remaining bias requires differential sorting within lecture and faculty
team into seminar times by achievement level and the racial composition
of one's classmates. For example, if higher grade-earning students
enroll in a seminar time with more racially diverse classmates, this
biases the results upward; if lower grade-earning students enroll in a
seminar time with more racially diverse classmates, this biases the
results downward. Tests of distribution of students into sections by SAT
verbal scores, however, indicate that SAT scores are distributed
randomly across sections, even by race and ethnicity. As another
example, consider a faculty team whose two seminars meet at Monday 8:30
a.m. and Friday 12:30 p.m. where the Monday 8:30 seminar half has fewer
students of color. Bias could arise if the students of color in the
Monday seminar sort into the easier grading professor while the students
of color in the Friday seminar (with more students of color) sort into
the harder grading professor. This would appear as though having more
students of color led to lower grades. However, this requires a
complicated, differential sorting of students within a lecture and
faculty team.
Year dummies control for the possibility of grade inflation over
time. Because percent minority is measured at the section level,
standard errors are clustered by the student's section of DWC 101.
The empirical method tests how changing the racial and ethnic
composition of a class affects academic outcomes. Note that the
specification does not include controls for other section average
characteristics; this method of analysis asks how adding more students
of color, along with their academic characteristics, affects students.
V. RESULTS
Table 4 presents estimates of the baseline specification. (19)
Column 1 displays estimates using the percent of students who are
students of color. The point estimates imply that the fraction of
nonwhite students in one's section has statistically insignificant
effects on the grades of white and nonwhite students. Column 2 considers
the percent of students who are black. Here, the results suggest that
grades are lower in sections with more black students. This effect is
stronger for black students themselves, although the interaction term is
not statistically significant. Column 3 uses the variation in the
percent of students who are Hispanic. For white students, the fraction
of the class who is Hispanic results in higher grades; a 10 percentage
point increase in Hispanic classmates raises grades by 0.045 grade
points. This effect reverses for Hispanic students: grades are lower for
Hispanic students enrolled in sections with a higher proportion of
Hispanic students. A 10 percentage point increase in Hispanic classmates
lowers grades by 0.16 grade points. These results do not support the
idea of a protective critical mass, although the fraction of students of
color in a section tops out at 30%. (20)
Previous evidence in elementary and secondary schools suggests that
the effect of the percent of classmates who are minority students may
differ for lower and higher ability students. In Table 5, I allow the
effects to differ by including interaction terms of the percent minority
with an indicator for whether a student has an above median verbal SAT
score. (21) Column 1 displays the results for percent nonwhite. For
white students, having more nonwhite classmates slightly raises grades,
with an even smaller effect on higher SAT students. The effects for
nonwhite students differ significantly from those for white students.
Nonwhite students with below median SAT scores earn lower grades when
enrolled in sections with more students of color, although this effect
is small and statistically insignificant. Below median nonwhite students
receive grades 0.08 grade points lower when in a section with 10
percentage points more students of color (p value = .177). For nonwhite
students with above median SAT scores, the sign switches: a 10
percentage point increase in the percent nonwhite raises grades by 0.06
grade points (p value = .331).
Much of the existing literature focuses on black students. In
column 2, the pattern of results differs somewhat, although the limited
number of African American students on campus leads to less precise
estimates. Specifically, we observe lower grades in sections with more
black students for all but high SAT black students. Above median SAT
black students in a section with 10 percentage points more black
classmates earn grades that are half a letter higher. None of these
effects are statistically different from zero.
The results in column 3 for the percent Hispanic correspond with
the results for the percent nonwhite in column 1. A higher percent of
classmates who are Hispanic raises grades for white students and for
above median SAT score Hispanic students. However, for below median SAT
Hispanic students, having more Hispanic classmates leads to lower
grades: a 10 percentage point increase lowers grades by about 0.23 grade
points (p value = .058).
Having more classmates of color results in higher grades for
students of color with high SAT scores but lower grades for students of
color with low SAT scores. Grades are higher for white students with
more classmates of color. Racial peer effects differ for white and
nonwhite students.
Joecks, Pull, and Vetter (2013), on the critical mass of women on
corporate boards, find that the direction of the effect of the
proportion female changes above 30%. In my sample, the proportion of
students in a section who are not white tops out at 30%; it may be that
higher proportions of students of color would lead to different results
on students' grades and retention. Table 6 examines the possibility
of nonlinear effects.
The effect of the percent of classmates of color on grades appears
strongly nonlinear. Column 1 presents estimates using all nonwhite
students. Allowing for the quadratic term in percent minority, the
estimates show no statistical difference in effects for whites and for
nonwhites. At low levels of diversity, the effect of increasing the
percent minority is negative; the sign of this effect turns positive
with about 18% of classmates being students of color. For a class with
25% students of color, the effect of a 10 percentage point increase is a
positive and statistically significant increase of about 0.1 grade
points (p value = .003). The pattern of estimates using the percent of
students who are black, in column 2, is similar although less precisely
estimated. The estimates using the percent of students who are Hispanic,
in column 3, are again similar to those in column 1. At low levels of
diversity, the effect of increasing the percent Hispanic is negative;
the sign of this effect turns positive with about 8% of classmates being
Hispanic. For a class with 10% Hispanic students, the effect of a 10
percentage point increase is a positive and statistically significant
increase of about 0.1 grade points (p value = .007). The effect for
Hispanic students is not statistically different than that for white
students.
Table 7 presents results for a second academic outcome: whether
students drop out of the college after the first semester. I find no
statistically significant effects of the percent nonwhite, percent
black, or percent Hispanic on the probability of dropping out,
controlling for one's grade in DWC 101. Point estimates are small
and statistically insignificant. For example, 10 percentage points more
classmates of color reduces the likelihood of dropping out by 0.0008
percentage points (column 1) for students of color. In columns 4 through
6, I allow the effects to differ for students with above and below
median SAT scores. These estimates show no statistical differences
between these groups; effects are small and statistically insignificant.
I observe one additional, potentially relevant outcome: whether
students switched teams for their second semester. Enrollment Services
automatically rolls students over to the same team for the second
semester in the sequence, DWC 102. (22) However, students can and do
switch sections: about 33% of students switch teams. During the first
semester, students become more savvy about how the institution works and
learn how their team compares to other students' teams.
To conduct the analysis, I create two variables: a dummy variable
indicating whether the student switched DWC teams and a measure of team
grading easiness. To generate the grading easiness measure, I regress
students' DWC 101 grades on the cohort-team fixed effects. The
estimated fixed effects measure the average student grade for that team.
I standardize the estimated fixed effects to a mean zero, standard
deviation one, variable.
Table 8 presents the estimated effects of racial composition on
whether a student switched teams. Students in sections with more
classmates of color are more likely to switch sections. In the more
basic specification, this effect is only statistically significant for
Hispanic students (column 3). When I allow the effects to differ by
above and below median verbal SAT score, the effect of more Hispanic
classmates is statistically significant for both lower and higher SAT
score white students. A 10 percentage point increase in Hispanic
classmates increases the probability of switching teams by 0.3. This
stands somewhat in contrast to the findings in Carrell, Hoekstra, and
West (2016). They find that freshmen at the U.S. Air Force Academy who
are assigned to more and higher performing black squadron mates are more
likely to pair with a black roommate as sophomores.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Racial peer effects continue to be an important topic in education
research and policy. A primary difficulty in identifying peer effects
stems from the nonrandom assignment of peers. Much of the economics
literature for higher education relies on peers as defined by freshman
year roommates in institutions where roommates are randomly assigned.
Using data from a selective, private, Catholic liberal arts college, I
use the assignment of students to a first semester core course as a
source of credibly exogenous variation in classmates'
characteristics. The questions are whether students perform better in a
classroom with a larger number of students of color and whether this
effect differs for students of color.
Controlling for faculty team fixed effects and a wide variety of
student characteristics, I find evidence of racial peer effects that
differ significantly for white students and students of color. Students
of color enrolled in classes with greater fractions of students of color
earn lower grades. These effects occur exclusively for those with lower
SAT verbal scores; grades of nonwhite students with above median SAT
scores increase, although the effect is statistically insignificant.
Effects on white students are nonlinear: white students with
sufficiently large fractions of classmates of color earn higher grades.
There are no observed effects on retention for the second semester.
These estimates suggest that increasing classroom diversity may
improve many students' grades. White students and higher test score
nonwhite students perform better when classroom diversity increases.
Students of color with lower SAT scores may experience lower grades when
enrolled in sections with more students of color. Policymakers, however,
would be wise to heed the warning of Carrell, Sacerdote, and West
(2013), who found that military students reassigned to
"optimal" squadrons formed different kinds of peer groups with
unintended consequences.
ABBREVIATIONS
DWC: Development of Western Civilization
GPA: Grade Point Average
APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Are Other-Race Students' Characteristics Correlated
with Their Section's Percent Minority?
(1) (2) (3)
SAT Math
Mean = 490
% minority 267.30
(320.79)
% black 59.21
(406.97)
% Hispanic 613.06
(509.75)
[R.sup.2] 0.03 0.02 0.04
(4) (5) (6)
SAT Verbal
Mean = 486
% minority 187.37
(282.99)
% black 18.90
(420.98)
% Hispanic 474.08
(429.71)
[R.sup.2] 0.04 0.04 0.05
(7) (8) (9)
High School GPA
Mean = 3.3
% minority 0.01
(0.48)
% black -0.86
(0.77)
% Hispanic -0.16
(0.91)
[R.sup.2] 0.03 0.03 0.03
Notes: The sample comprises 168 other-race students.
Regressions also include indicators for each entering
cohort. Robust standard errors clustered by section
in parentheses.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
TABLE A2
Are Black and Hispanic Students' Characteristics
Correlated with Their Section's Percent Hispanic and Black?
(1) (2) (3)
Sample of Hispanic
Students (N = 305)
SAT Math SAT Verbal High School GPA
% black 550.1 588.0 -0.1
(400.4) (392.1) (0.8)
% Hispanic
[R.sup.2] 0.029 0.035 0.013
Outcome mean 441 440 3.3
(4) (5) (6)
Sample of Black Students (N = 203)
SAT Math SAT Verbal High School GPA
% black
% Hispanic -296.0 -328.4 0.8
(464.7) (461.6) (0.8)
[R.sup.2] 0.068 0.070 0.094
Outcome mean 374 376 3.1
Notes: Regressions also include indicators for each
entering cohort. Robust standard errors clustered
by section in parentheses.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
TABLE A3
Effect of Racial Composition of DWC
101 on Grades in DWC 101
(1) (2) (3)
Nonwhite Black Hispanic
% minority for whites 0.144 -1.366 * 0.450
(0.481) (0.771) (0.644)
% minority * minority -0.763 -0.881 -2.042 *
(0.575) (1.926) (1.043)
Monday -0.477 -0.606 -0.594
(0.330) (0.467) (0.405)
Tuesday -0.210 ** -0.196 ** -0.237 ***
(0.088) (0.084) (0.084)
Wednesday -1.549 *** -0.735 -0.737
(0.266) (0.540) (0.491)
Thursday -0.535 *** -0.626 *** -0.458 **
(0.194) (0.223) (0.176)
Friday -0.531 -0.784 ** -0.640 **
(0.320) (0.299) (0.256)
Monday time 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tuesday time 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wednesday time 0.002 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Thursday time 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Friday time 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
First generation -0.074 ** -0.063 * -0.064 **
(0.030) (0.033) (0.030)
High school GPA 0.693 *** 0.697 *** 0.714 ***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036)
Male -0.039 ** -0.037 ** -0.031
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Asian -0.322
(0.244)
Black/African American -0.241
(0.261)
Hispanic -0.206 0.005
(0.251) (0.076)
Native Hawaii/Other -0.273
Pacific Islander (0.358)
Race/ethnicity unknown -0.172 0.190 *
(0.263) (0.104)
Two or more races 0.135
(0.245)
White -0.171 0.193 * 0.004
(0.260) (0.110) (0.035)
Athlete? -0.217 *** -0.209 *** -0.220 ***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.034)
SAT verbal score 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sat math score -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SAT verbal missing 1.273 *** 1.161 *** 1.246 ***
(0.122) (0.119) (0.124)
SAT math missing 0.039 0.154 0.056
(0.131) (0.133) (0.146)
International? 0.132 * 0.042 0.185 **
(0.071) (0.086) (0.079)
Pell Grant recipient? -0.007 0.015 -0.023
(0.032) (0.037) (0.038)
Assigned on campus -0.171 *** -0.112 * -0.138 **
room (0.055) (0.062) (0.059)
Switched to a different -0.216 *** -0.126 -0.154 **
room (0.078) (0.077) (0.074)
Switched more than once 0.283 0.330 * 0.287
(0.190) (0.194) (0.258)
Observations 4,435 3,969 4,066
[R.sup.2] 0.353 0.346 0.346
Notes: Regressions also include fixed effects for each
DWC 101 team-cohort. The omitted room category is whether
the student commutes. Robust standard errors clustered by
DWC 101 section in parentheses.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
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(1.) See Sacerdote (2011, 2014) for reviews.
(2.) Dee (2014) provides an example in economics. Student athletes,
particularly males, may be stereotyped as "dumb jocks." Dee
paired student athletes and nonathletes with similar math SAT scores. He
then randomly assigned the pairs to treatment groups. Treated groups
were asked a series of questions about their student-athlete status,
priming these participants to think about their social identity as a
student athlete or a nonathlete. All students then took a difficult
academic assessment. Nonathletes performed similarly in both groups.
Athletes in the treated group, however, answered fewer questions
correctly than athletes in the control group, consistent with stereotype
threat.
(3.) For example, Joecks, Pull, and Vetter (2013) find that the
fraction of women sitting on a corporate board affects firms'
performance. Initially, having more women on a board reduces
performance. As the board reaches a critical mass of 30% females, firm
performance increases with the fraction of women. The argument is that,
when the share of the underrepresented group is large enough, diversity
within that group dispels stereotypes.
(4.) In contrast, Angrist and Lang (2004) analyze Metco, the
Boston-area program busing black students to predominantly white
schools, and find no impact of the program on white students.
(5.) Professors are primarily faculty members in English, History,
Philosophy, or Theology.
(6.) Majors differ in their racial composition. A chi squared test
shows statistically significant differences. For example. 23% of the 13
physics majors are Hispanic and 10% of the 156 political science majors
are black. Art History and Music, both small majors, have no nonwhite
majors. However, I do not observe students' majors or the other
classes in which they are enrolled.
(7.) Although "nonwhite" may not be the term of art, it
more clearly illustrates how I separate students into categories based
on their self-reported race and ethnicity.
(8.) Treating these students as nonwhite students makes the results
for the effect of the percent nonwhite appear more like the results for
the percent Hispanic.
(9.) All students who are missing their SAT verbal scores are also
missing their SAT math scores; 23 students report their math but not
their verbal score.
(10.) In order, there are 10, 14, 12, 9, and 9 sections in entering
cohorts for 2009 to 2013.
(11.) The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics and exact p values for the
percent nonwhite, percent black, and percent Hispanic are 0.0854 (p
value = .863), 0.1143 (p value = .529), and 0.1053 (p value = .637). The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics and exact p values for the average SAT
verbal scores for all students, for nonwhites, for blacks, and for
Hispanics are 0.101 (p value = .688), 0.0726 (p value = .592), 0.1089 (p
value = .592), and 0.0968 (p value = .738).
(12.) Results are similar when students' own characteristics
are included in the regression.
(13.) The estimates of racial peer effects are qualitatively
similar when the controls for percent athlete, percent male, percent
international, percent first generation, and percent Pell grant
recipients are included.
(14.) I thank the editor for this useful suggestion.
(15.) In specifications controlling for students' own
characteristics, none of the coefficients on the percent minority are
statistically significant.
(16.) I estimate similar specifications for students reporting a
race other than white, black, or Hispanic. These estimates are in
Appendix Table Al. The percent of their section who are minority
students is uncorrected with SAT math scores, SAT verbal scores, and
high school GPAs. I repeat the exercise for the sample of black students
using the percent Hispanic and for the sample of Hispanic students using
percent black. Appendix Table A2 presents these results. His panic
students' characteristics are uncorrelated with the percent black;
black students' characteristics are uncorrelated with the percent
Hispanic. Controlling for students' own characteristics generates
similar results for Appendix Tables Al and A2.
(17.) The specifications also include indicators for whether the
SAT scores are missing to retain observations. I do not observe the
student's major or other coursework.
(18.) Dills and Hernandez-Julian (2008) demonstrate effects of time
of day and frequency of meeting on college students' grades.
(19.) The full set of results appears in Appendix Table A3.
(20.) Instead of the faculty team fixed effects, I could control
for the sex and race of the professor. Of the 71 professors who teach
DWC 101 during this time, 8 are nonwhite and 13 are females. Including
these indicators instead of the faculty team fixed effects suggests
little to no effect of professors' characteristics on the students,
even allowing the effects to vary by sex or whether the student is
nonwhite.
(21.) Results are qualitatively similar using math scores. Given
the intensive reading and writing in the course, verbal scores seems a
more appropriate choice.
(22.) The teams themselves are also not fully stable. In many
cases, one professor replaces another because of sabbaticals, parental
leaves, or differences in the area of expertise.
ANGELA K. DILLS, I thank Melanie Sullivan for her hard work
extracting, merging, and compiling the anonymized student records and
Gina DeBarnardo for explaining the enrollment process. I thank Laurie
Grupp, Rey Hernandez-Julian, Kurt Rotthoff, and participants at Western
Carolina University and the 2016 Eastern Economic Association meetings
for their helpful comments.
Dills: Gimelstob-Landry Distinguished Professor, Department of
Economics, Management, and Project Management, Western Carolina
University, Cullowhee, NC 28723. Phone 828-227-3309, Fax 828-227-7075,
E-mail
[email protected];
[email protected]
doi: 10.1111/ecin.12481
TABLE 1
Variable Means for Nonhonors Students
by Race and Ethnicity
White Nonwhite
(N = 3,766) (N = 669)
Grade in DWC 101 2.88 2.52 ***
High school GPA 3.32 3.24 ***
SAT verbal 585 523 ***
SAT math 578 522 ***
Did not persist 0.033 0.034
Missing SAT verbal 0.141 0.169 **
Missing SAT math 0.135 0.166 **
First generation 0.146 0.517 ***
Male 0.446 0.400 **
Athlete 0.113 0.130 *
International 0.008 0.033 ***
Pell recipient 0.099 0.507 ***
No roommate switching 0.953 .930 ***
Black Hispanic
(N = 203) (N = 300)
Grade in DWC 101 2.29 *** 2.56 ***
High school GPA 3.11 *** 3.29 *
SAT verbal 480 *** 534 ***
SAT math 478 *** 533 ***
Did not persist 0.059 ** 0.020
Missing SAT verbal 0.217 *** 0.167
Missing SAT math 0.217 *** 0.163 *
First generation 0.640 *** 0.537 ***
Male 0.384 ** 0.413
Athlete 0.217 *** 0.087 *
International 0.030 *** 0.027 ***
Pell recipient 0.635 *** 0.533 ***
No roommate switching 0.961 .907 ***
Notes: Means of SAT scores do not include zeros
for missing observations. The number of observations
is smaller for these variables. Asterisks indicate the
significance of a t test of means between minority
group and white students.
*** p <.01, ** p <.05, * p <.1.
TABLE 2
Do Classmates' Characteristics Differ by Race and Ethnicity?
(1) Avg (2) Avg (3) %
Math SAT Verbal Minority
SAT
White 0.399 0.288 0.002
(0.752) (0.754) (0.004)
Black 0.211 -0.363 0.003
(0.992) (0.994) (0.005)
Hispanic 0.810 1.344 -0.000
(0.917) (0.920) (0.004)
[R.sup.2] 0.121 0.132 0.376
(4) % (5) % (6) %
Black Hispanic Athlete
White -0.003 -0.000 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Black -0.005 ** -0.000 0.018 **
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009)
Hispanic -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
[R.sup.2] 0.143 0.420 0.101
(7) % (8) % (9) % (10) %
Male International First Pell
Generation Recipients
White -0.004 0.002 -0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Black 0.006 0.002 -0.006 -0.005
(0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Hispanic -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
[R.sup.2] 0.135 0.187 0.196 0.188
Notes: There are 4,435 observations. Regressions
include indicators for each cohort and ten variables
capturing the section meeting times.
*** p< .01, ** p < .05, * p <.l.
TABLE 3
Are White Students' Characteristics Correlated
with Their Section's Percent Minority?
(1) (2) (3)
SAT Math
Mean = 500
% minority 44.5
(72.0)
% black 61.6
(117.9)
% Hispanic 29.4
(89.6)
[R.sup.2] 0.017 0.017 0.017
(4) (5) (6)
SAT Verbal
Mean = 502
% minority 28.7
(68.5)
% black -77.2
(121.6)
% Hispanic 83.1
(87.9)
[R.sup.2] 0.023 0.023 0.023
(7) (8) (9)
High School GPA
Mean = 3.3
% minority -0.2
(0.1)
% black -0.6 ***
(0.2)
% Hispanic 0.1
(0.2)
[R.sup.2] 0.004 0.006 0.004
Notes: The sample comprises 3,769 observations of
white students. Regressions also include indicators
for each entering cohort. Robust standard errors
clustered by section in parentheses.
*** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .1.
TABLE 4
Effect of Racial Composition of DWC 101 on
Grades in DWC 101
(1) (2) (3)
Nonwhite Black Hispanic
% minority for whites 0.144 -1.366 * 0.450
(0.481) (0.771) (0.644)
% minority*minority -0.763 -0.881 -2.042 *
(0.575) (1.926) (1.043)
Observations 4,435 3,969 4,066
[R.sup.2] 0.353 0.346 0.346
% minority for nonwhites -0.619 -2.247 -1.592
(0.576) (2.262) (1.193)
Notes: Regressions also include fixed effects for each
DWC 101 team and indicators for whether the student is a
first generation student, male, an athlete. Pell grant
recipient, or international student. Additional control
variables are the student's SAT verbal score, SAT math
score, high school GPA, meeting days and times, and
indicators for whether the student lived on campus,
commuted, the number of times a student changed
roommates during the first year, and whether their
SAT math or SAT verbal scores are missing. Robust
standard errors clustered by DWC 101 section
in parentheses.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p <. 1.
TABLE 5
Effects of the Diversity of DWC 101 on Grades
in DWC 101, Allowing Different Effects for
Students with Above Median SAT Scores
(1) (2) (3)
Nonwhite Black Hispanic
% minority 0.336 -1.497 0.658
(0.465) (0.902) (0.656)
% minority * minority -1.152 ** -0.756 -2.985 ***
(0.533) (1.958) (0.919)
% minority * above -0.284 0.216 -0.192
median SAT (0.418) (0.685) (0.584)
% minority * above 1.719 *** 7.024 4.441 ***
median SAT * minority (0.355) (5.259) (0.831)
Above median SAT -0.0235 -0.0544 -0.0302
(0.0680) (0.0457) (0.0496)
Observations 4,435 3,969 4,066
[R.sup.2] 0.356 0.347 0.350
% minority for -0.816 -2.252 -2.327 *
nonwhites, low SAT (0.594) (2.325) (1.194)
% minority for 0.619 4.987 1.922
nonwhites, high SAT (0.629) (6.326) (1.293)
% minority for whites, 0.336 -1.497 0.658
low SAT (0.465) (0.902) (0.656)
% minority for whites, 0.0520 -1.281 0.466
high SAT (0.552) (0.785) (0.747)
Notes: Regressions also include team fixed effects and the
full set of control variables from Table 4. Robust standard
errors clustered by DWC 101 section in parentheses.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
TABLE 6
Effects of the Diversity of DWC 101 on Grades
in DWC 101, Allowing for Nonlinear Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Nonwhite Black Hispanic
% minority -2.658 ** -1.817 -3.755 ***
(1.073) (1.275) (1.388)
% [minority.sup.2] 7.265 *** 4.297 24.634 ***
(2.210) (13.449) (6.654)
% minority * minority -0.292 -5.658 4.419
(2.892) (5.499) (3.949)
% [minority.sup.2] * -0.938 46.282 -34.272
minority (8.389) (39.498) (20.774)
Observations 4,435 3,969 4,066
[R.sup.2] 0.353 0.346 0.348
% minority for nonwhites -2.950 -7.475 0.664
(level) (3.021) (5.613) (4.124)
% minority for nonwhites 6.327 50.58 -9.638
(squared) (8.359) (41.010) (21.310)
Notes: Regressions also include team fixed effects and the
full set of control variables from Table 4. Robust standard
errors clustered by DWC 101 section in parentheses.
*** p <.01, ** p <.05, * p <.1.
TABLE 7
Effects of the Diversity of DWC 101 on
Dropping Out after First Semester
(1) (2)
Nonwhite Black
% minority -0.0427 0.1860
% minority * minority (0.093) (0.297)
0.0342 -0.0190
% minority * above median SAT (0.131) (0.558)
% minority * above median SAT * minority
Above median SAT
Grade in DWC 101
-0.047 *** -0.047 ***
Observations (0.007) (0.008)
4,435 3,969
[R.sup.2] 0.055 0.058
% minority for nonwhites -0.00849 0.167
(0.130) (0.589)
% minority for nonwhites, low SAT
% minority for nonwhites, high SAT
% minority for whites, low SAT
% minority for whites, high SAT
(3) (4)
Hispanic Nonwhite
% minority -0.1392 -0.0066
% minority * minority (0.116) (0.119)
0.1993 0.0142
% minority * above median SAT (0.208) (0.151)
-0.0574
(0.0953)
% minority * above median SAT * minority 0.0184
Above median SAT (0.0963)
0.0150
Grade in DWC 101 (0.0163)
-0.045 *** -0.047 ***
Observations (0.008) (0.007)
4,066 4.435
[R.sup.2] 0.054 0.055
% minority for nonwhites 0.0601
(0.201)
% minority for nonwhites, low SAT 0.00757
% minority for nonwhites, high SAT (0.125)
-0.0315
% minority for whites, low SAT (0.174)
-0.00661
% minority for whites, high SAT (0.119)
-0.0640
(0.093)
(5) (6)
Black Hispanic
% minority 0.243 -0.166
% minority * minority (0.301) (0.173)
-0.0610 0.213
% minority * above median SAT (0.556) (0.229)
-0.102 0.048
(0.175) (0.168)
% minority * above median SAT * minority -0.384 0.009
Above median SAT (0.809) (0.265)
0.0143 -0.0002
Grade in DWC 101 (0.0139) (0.0138)
-0.047 *** -0.045 ***
Observations (0.008) (0.008)
3,969 4,066
[R.sup.2] 0.058 0.054
% minority for nonwhites
% minority for nonwhites, low SAT 0.182 0.0469
% minority for nonwhites, high SAT (0.587) (0.190)
-0.304 0.104
% minority for whites, low SAT (0.930) (0.355)
0.243 -0.166
% minority for whites, high SAT (0.301) (0.173)
0.141 -0.118
(0.316) (0.114)
Notes: Regressions also include team fixed effects
and the full set of control variables from Table 4.
Robust standard errors clustered by DWC 101
section in parentheses.
*** p< .01, ** p < .05, * p<.1.
TABLE 8
Effect of Racial Composition of DWC 101 on
Probability of Switching Teams for DWC 102
(1) (2)
Nonwhite Black
% minority 2.076 2.386
(1.357) (2.254)
% minority * minority -0.284 -0.426
(0.367) (0.891)
% minority * above median SAT
% minority * above median SAT * minority
Above median SAT
Grade in DWC 101 -0.069 *** -0.069 ***
(0.012) (0.012)
DWC 101 grade easiness 1.402 *** 1.315 ***
(0.176) (0.318)
Observations 4,435 3,969
[R.sup.2] 0.385 0.376
% minority for nonwhites 1.792 1.960
(1.245) (2.457)
% minority for nonwhites, low SAT
% minority for nonwhites, high SAT
% minority for whites, low SAT
% minority for whites, high SAT
(3) (4)
Hispanic Nonwhite
% minority 3.243 * 2.159
(1.796) (1.319)
% minority * minority -0.394 -0.341
(0.726) (0.376)
% minority * above median SAT -0.148
(0.167)
% minority * above median SAT * minority 0.0248
(0.225)
Above median SAT 0.00248
(0.0313)
Grade in DWC 101 -0.070 *** -0.069 ***
(0.010) (0.0118)
DWC 101 grade easiness 1.752 *** 1.405 ***
(0.166) (0.176)
Observations 4,066 4,435
[R.sup.2] 0.396 0.385
% minority for nonwhites 2.849
(1.974)
% minority for nonwhites, low SAT 1.818
(1.222)
% minority for nonwhites, high SAT 1.695
(1.350)
% minority for whites, low SAT 2.159
(1.319)
% minority for whites, high SAT 2.011
(1.386)
(5) (6)
Black Hispanic
% minority 2.113 3.205 *
(2.219) (1.749)
% minority * minority -0.213 -0.372
(0.893) (0.739)
% minority * above median SAT 0.516 0.0586
(0.492) (0.256)
% minority * above median SAT * minority -1.950 -0.0107
(1.569) (0.619)
Above median SAT -0.0415 -0.0224
(0.0299) (0.0230)
Grade in DWC 101 -0.069 *** -0.070 ***
(0.0124) (0.0103)
DWC 101 grade easiness 1.311 *** 1.753 ***
(0.317) (0.166)
Observations 3,969 4,066
[R.sup.2] 0.377 0.396
% minority for nonwhites
% minority for nonwhites, low SAT 1.900 2.833
(2.451) (1.954)
% minority for nonwhites, high SAT 0.466 2.881
(3.004) (2.123)
% minority for whites, low SAT 2.113 3.205 *
(2.219) (1.749)
% minority for whites, high SAT 2.629 3.263 *
(2.297) (1.831)
Notes: Regressions also include team fixed effects
and the full set of control variables from Table 4.
Robust standard errors clustered by DWC 101
section in parentheses.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.
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