The Economic Impact of Olympic Games: Effects of Host Country Announcements on Stock Market Returns.
Engelhardt, Bryan ; Matheson, Victor ; Yen, Alex 等
The Economic Impact of Olympic Games: Effects of Host Country Announcements on Stock Market Returns.
Introduction
The average costs of a Summer and Winter Olympic Games are $5.2
billion and $3.1 billion, respectively, with some event price tags
running well over $10 billion (Flyvb-jerg, Stewart, and Budzier, 2016).
Furthermore, they overrun their budgets by 156% on average. These costs
have large and important implications for local governments hosting the
games as most recently noted in the popular press regarding the 2016
Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro (Worstall, 2016; Kennedy, 2016).
In defense of such expenditures, boosters and governments argue the
Olympic Games bring economic benefits to the community, as well as jobs
to the area. The argument for such large government outlays is often an
ex-ante one put forth during the bidding process using macroeconomic
multipliers or input-output models (Centre for South Australian Economic
Studies and KPMG Peat Marwick, 1993; Papanikos, 1999). However, ex-post
academic studies provide evidence of only a small economic gain (Baade
and Matheson, 2016; Baumann, Engelhardt, and Matheson, 2012).
To provide a better understanding of the effects of hosting the
Olympic Games, and more specifically to weigh in on the debate on the
benefits of hosting the Games, we test for whether the prospect of
hosting the Olympics impacts a host country's stock market. We
evaluate this impact in the context of the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) host city/country bidding process, where
cities/countries submit bids and compete to host an Olympics,
culminating in the IOC announcement of who has won (and lost) the right
to host an Olympic Games. In our analysis, we conduct an "event
study," as described by MacKinlay (1997) among others, with the
triggering "event" being the announcement by the International
Olympic Committee. Our analysis examines market-level stock price data
of the prospective host countries around the time of the IOC
announcement to see if abnormally positive or negative returns occur
around the time of the announcement. Using the returns results, we can
empirically test whether a host country's stock market rises, and
by extension, whether hosting the Olympics increases the profits of its
companies and the wealth of its citizens, consistent with the typical
economic arguments made in support of hosting an Olympics.
The results provided below extend the current literature on the
topic of IOC announcements on stock prices. Our results are in line with
Berman, Brooks, and Davidson (2000), who use an event study approach to
find no general impact of the announcement of the Sydney games on
Australia. In contrast to the earlier study, Veraros, Kasimati, and
Dawson (2004) find a positive impact of winning the bid for the summer
2004 Olympics on the Athens Stock Exchange, using an event study
approach. However, both early studies focus on a single event. In the
literature looking at multiple announcements, in particular Dick and
Wang (2010) and Mirman and Sharma (2010), they find statistically
significant effects. The former study finds it for winners and the
latter for losers of the bids. All the studies use standard parametric
event study techniques in finding their effects.
We extend the event study literature on the impact of IOC
announcements by (i) adding additional data (through the Chinese win of
the 2022 Winter Olympics bidding process), (ii) analyzing stock market
effects prior to the announcements to check for leakage of the
announcement, and (iii) running non-parametric tests in addition to the
standard parametric tests. Although our study contains more data, larger
windows of analysis, and more robust estimates, we find little to no
impact of the IOC announcements on the stock exchanges of the host
countries. In other words, our results are in line with Berman, Brooks,
and Davidson (2000), but in general fail to replicate the remaining
literature even when taking a larger, longer, and more varied look at
the data.
That being said, we see several rather large abnormal returns in
the stock markets of countries who either won or lost their bid to host
the Olympics. However, only one was large enough to reject a hypothesis
of no effect after controlling for the fact so many tests were run. To
test for an aggregate effect, we run on the order of 150 tests across
multiple event windows using parametric and non-parametric approaches.
We find only three could potentially reject the null at a 5% type 1
error threshold. Overall, given the event study approach, our results
suggest a weak to non-existent effect that the IOC announcement affects
a bidding country's stock market.
Model
To test for whether the Olympics have an economic impact on the
country who hosts the games, we analyze whether the Olympics increase
profits of publicly traded companies in the host countries. To measure
whether there is an impact on profits, we exploit the theory that stock
prices increase in value when expected future profits of firms increase.
In other words, if firm ABC suddenly has an increase in expected future
profits of $1 billion, then the value of the firm increases on the order
of $1 billion, after adjusting for a variety of factors, such as the
discount rate of the future earnings. Given the theory, it is key to
pinpoint when expected profits of firms would likely increase as a
result of hosting the Olympic games. If those times can be pinpointed,
then measuring changes in the value of the firms in a host country, or
their market capitalization as measured through their stock prices,
provides evidence of an economic impact from hosting. In the case of the
Olympic games, prior research suggests the point in time when companies
are affected is when the IOC announces a country will host an Olympic
games. It is at that point that firms can expect to get future business
and profits by providing goods and services to the Games. As a result,
we analyze the change in stock prices around the time of the IOC
announcement.
To put it differently, we are using the event study approach
following Berman, Brooks, and Davidson (2000), Veraros, Kasimati, and
Dawson (2004), Dick and Wang (2010), and Mirman and Sharma (2010).
Event and Estimation Window
We take our notation and discussion of the event study model we use
from MacKinlay (1997). In the context of event studies, our "event
date" is the day of the IOC's announcement of who won the
bidding process and will host the Olympics. To ensure we do not miss the
potential impact of the announcement, we analyze a battery of event
windows around the event date, investigating whether the announcement
could have affected the stock market prior to the announcement, during
the announcement, and after the announcement. In particular, we
investigate eight different event windows, [[[tau].sub.1],
[[tau].sub.2]], including [0,1], [0,2], [0,5], [0,9], [-2,2], [-5,5],
[-5,-1], and [-2,-1] where t = 0 is the day of the announcement,
[[tau].sub.1] is the start of the event window, and [[tau].sub.2] is the
end of the window being analyzed. The days are counted as the change
relative to the previous day and all windows are inclusive.
We analyze a wide range of windows for a variety of reasons. First,
we are attempting to replicate previous studies. As a result, we include
their windows. In particular, Dick and Wang (2010) include [0,1], [0,2],
[0,5], and [0,9]. However, we fail to replicate their results.
Therefore, we investigate windows that start prior to the announcement
date, or [-2,2] and [-5,5], which is fairly common in the literature
where information may be leaked. For completeness, we also provide
estimates for windows [-5,-1] and [-2,-1] to be able to consider pre-
and post-announcement effects separately and to ensure the effect
isn't lost to changes in expectations right before the
announcement.
Whatever the window, the objective is to capture whether host
countries had abnormal returns during these event windows. In other
words, do we see a country's stock market index, or a their
firms' profits, increase unexpectedly around the time of the
announcement? Central to our analysis is the assumption that the news
contained in the IOC announcement is unexpected. Otherwise, the
announcement would be priced into the market in advance of the
announcement. However, as noted above, we utilize eight different event
windows, to help in identifying and isolating market effects, even when
there is leakage of the otherwise unexpected announcement result.
Furthermore, we note the announcements are often a surprise to the
general public, as documented in the news; refer to Magnay (2011) and
BBC (2013) for the Pyeongchang and Tokyo games, respectively. Note that
in a scenario where a city is expected to win, such as Beijing's
winning bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics (Rauhala and Birnbaum, 2015),
this would bias against finding a country-level stock market effect.
To estimate what is normal, we estimate returns of a country's
stock market over an estimation window of -241 [less than or equal to] t
[less than or equal to] -41. For comparison, we use the same estimation
window as Dick and Wang (2010). All measures of t are trading days.
Estimating Abnormal Returns
In determining what is abnormal, we use the estimation window to
calculate normal returns using a market model. Specifically, we use
ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the linear relationship
[R.sub.it] = [[alpha].sub.i] + [[beta].sub.i][R.sub.mt] +
[[epsilon].sub.t] (1)
for each announcement date, or observation, i, where [R.sub.it] is
the one-day return on the stock market for country i. As noted above, t
represents the date relative to the announcement. [R.sub.mt] is the
market return as measured by the MSCI World Index. All returns are
calculated using closing prices. The estimated parameters from OLS are
[[??].sub.j], [[??].sub.j], and [mathematical expression not
reproducible] by announcement i. Note in our context, the country level
index is the individual announcement return, while the global market is
used as the overall market return. Normally, a country's stock
market index is used as the overall market return relative to a specific
firm's stock price return.
Given the OLS estimates of the linear relationship and error by
country and announcement, we estimate whether a stock market has
experienced something abnormal by calculating the error in the linear
prediction, or
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (2)
where [mathematical expression not reproducible] is the sample of
abnormal returns for firm i on day t.
Note the sample of abnormal returns for country i stock market, or
[mathematical expression not reproducible], is calculated relative to
the global market in period t. The market term controls for systemic
risk. The abnormal returns are normally distributed given standard
assumptions with a mean zero and variance [[sigma].sup.2]. The normality
assumption will be used and then relaxed when testing for an effect of
host announcements on stock market indices.
Estimation of the Cumulative Abnormal return
Our objective is to test the effect of the IOC host announcement on
a bidder's stock market. To increase the power of the test, we
aggregate abnormal returns over several days and announcements. The
cumulative abnormal returns by event are calculated as
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (3)
and across events as
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (4)
where N is the total number of announcements/events and
[[[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]] is the event window. Under the standard
assumptions as discussed in MacKinlay (1997) and elsewhere, the variance
of the statistics in equations 3 and 4 are estimated as
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (5)
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (6)
respectively.
Again, as discussed in MacKinlay (1997) and elsewhere, the
estimates can be normalized and assumed to be normal, or
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (7)
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (8)
under the hypothesis of a mean of zero. The hypothesis can be
rejected with a specified level of confidence. These tests are referred
to as parametric test statistics where normality and a constant variance
in returns across time are assumed. These tests represent the standard
event study approach to testing whether the announcements had an effect.
If an effect had not occurred, then we would expect to fail to reject
the null. However, if the null is rejected, then the alternative is that
the event had a positive or negative impact on stock prices. As a
result, we are able to speculate that the abnormal return was due to the
event, i.e., the IOC announcement increased or decreased the future
profitability of companies in those countries.
To summarize, we are testing whether there are abnormal returns
over the event window. We calculate abnormal returns using parameters
from an estimation window. If the abnormal returns are large, then we
hypothesize it is due to the announcements. In calculating each abnormal
return, we aggregate over several days around the event to ensure the
impact of the information is not lost due to timing. Furthermore, we
aggregate across events to improve the power of the test.
The above test for abnormal returns is a standard parametric
approach, and is the approach followed in earlier work, including
Berman, Brooks, and Davidson (2000), Veraros, Kasimati, and Dawson
(2004), Dick and Wang (2010), and Mirman and Sharma (2010).
The potential issue with the standard approach described above is
that it relies on several potentially incorrect assumptions. In
particular, the data may not be normally distributed and the variance in
the data may have changed between the estimation window and event
window. As a result, we extend the prior literature by further analyzing
our tests using two nonparametric tests. Specifically, we use a sign and
sign rank test.
The sign test is used to determine whether more than half of the
announcements result in a positive or negative abnormal return. In using
the sign test, we are able to ignore the normality assumptions and
variance estimate from the estimation window. We simply test whether the
abnormal return is a "fair coin flip." To conduct the test, we
count the number of countries with a positive cumulative abnormal
return, calling it N+, and the total number of announcements N. Again,
following MacKinlay (1997), the test statistic for the sign test is
calculated as
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (9)
An issue with the sign test relates to the fact it does not account
for the size of each effect. As a result, we further analyze the data
using the Wilcoxon sign rank test. Specifically, we take the absolute
values of all the cumulative abnormal returns, or [mathematical
expression not reproducible], and rank them. Let [mathematical
expression not reproducible] be the ranking and [mathematical expression
not reproducible] be the rank if the cumulative abnormal return is
greater than zero, and zero otherwise. Given the ranking, the test
statistic is calculated as
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (10)
As before, the test statistic does not require an assumption about
the normality of the abnormal returns or an estimate of the variance
using the estimation window. Note, W ranges between [0, N(N + 1)/2].
Furthermore, if W is significantly large or small, then the test
statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the average cumulative
abnormal return, or CAR([[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]), is zero. For
sufficiently large N, the test statistic becomes
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (11)
We only use the asymptotic results for the full sample of losers.
Otherwise, the critical values must be determined through a counting
process. We take the critical values of W for small N from Wilcoxon and
Wilcox (1964). In other words, for a given type 1 error and N, which
determine the low and high critical values [C.sub.L] and [C.sub.H], if W
< [C.sub.L] or [C.sub.H] < W, we then evaluate the null that the
average cumulative abnormal return is zero.
Data
To run the event study, we require two types of data. Specifically,
the analysis requires the IOC announcement dates, as well as stock index
data for each winning and losing country in the bidding process.
To acquire the dates of the announcements as well as the winners
and losers, Gras-so, Mallon, and Heijmans (2015) provides information on
an Olympics by Olympics basis. More recent winning bids can be found on
the official Olympics.org website under each Olympic year's
documentation. To ensure transparency, the complete lists of winners and
losers, as well as the announcement dates, are provided in Tables 1 and
2.
The stock data of the winners and losers comes from country stock
market data for the days -241 to +9, where the announcement date is t =
0. Data between -241 and -41 is used as the estimation window, and the
data between -5 and 9 is used for the event window. To reiterate, the
days are trading days. When available, the data was acquired from Yahoo
Finance API. When unavailable on Yahoo Finance, the data was acquired
through Thomson Reuters Datastream. Note several decisions had to be
made regarding what index should be used to represent a country, as
multiple indices exist. For transparency, the list of indices used in
the analysis is provided in Tables 1 and 2. The MSCI World Index, the
index used to calculate market returns, was collected from Yahoo
Finance.
Results
We analyze the results along several dimensions--parametrically and
non-parametrically, winning and losing bids, and varying event size
windows. To allow for replication, and because the number of events is
relatively small, we provide the cumulative abnormal [[epsilon].sub.i]
returns and associated error estimates, or [mathematical expression not
reproducible] and [mathematical expression not reproducible], for
winners and losers in Tables 3 and 4.
By dividing the cumulative abnormal returns by [mathematical
expression not reproducible], one can see the number of standard
deviations away from the mean a particular stock market had during a
particular event window. The Canadian stock market during its 9/30/1981
winning bid saw a 4.3 standard deviation abnormal return during the
event window [[tau].sub.1] = -2 and [[tau].sub.2] = -1. The next highest
was the USA's losing 10/17/1986 bid with a 3.76 standard deviation
abnormal return during the event window [[tau].sub.1] = -5 and
[[tau].sub.2] = 5. However, this later event, as well as several others
with a z-statistic above 2.5, cannot be used to reject a null of no
effect because of the large number of tests. In particular, one is not
able to use these later individual cases to reject a null of no effect
once a Bonferroni correction is made. However, the large shocks do
suggest further analysis is necessary.
Rather than looking at abnormal returns by announcement, we analyze
the aggregate effect. The results for the winners, first losers (those
ranked in second place in the last round of the competition), and losers
of the bidding process are in Tables 5-7. For the winning bids, the
cumulative abnormal returns are generally positive post announcement.
However, this is also true for the first losers and all losers, with the
exception of the summer games. In other words, if the analysis is
aggregated and one ignores the distinction between summer and winter
games, then it seems countries are positively impacted no matter the
outcome. Furthermore, the impacts are relatively large, at around 0.5%
for post announcement windows. Note however that once the summer games
are analyzed separately, the losers are generally negative and winners
are generally positive. Although informative, this type of analysis
ignores the statistical properties of the statistics.
Relying on the statistical properties of the estimated average
effects, we fail to reject that the cumulative abnormal return is
different from zero for nearly every cumulative return, as determined by
the test statistic described in Equation 8. The top two average
cumulative return test statistics are 1.76 and 2.06 for the winners of
the summer games when using the interval [[tau].sub.1] = 0 and
[[tau].sub.2] = 1, and the losers of the winter games when using the
interval [[tau].sub.1] = 0 and [[tau].sub.2] = 1, respectively. However,
the latter would be expected to be negative. Furthermore, they
aren't particularly large. As in the individual test cases, any
observed statistical significance across any of the tests must be
weighted with the fact that so many tests are being run.
Relative to the closest study, Dick and Wang (2010) (DW), the
estimates of the variation of the cumulative abnormal returns are very
similar. For instance, we find the standard deviation of the cumulative
abnormal return for the winning countries to be the same (up to three
decimal places) for both the summer and winter games. Our estimates for
the losers are slightly smaller, or 0.003 versus 0.004 in DW. What
differentiates our results, i.e., we fail to reject a null of no effect,
is our estimated impacts are significantly smaller. For instance, our
estimated cumulative abnormal return for winning bids in the [0,1] event
window is 0.0007 versus 0.011 in the case of DW. Therefore, our results
are consistent in terms of the variation in the data. However, the
estimated cumulative abnormal return statistics do not coincide.
Although our results are markedly different, we note the key difference
is we have additional data and have potentially used different country
stock market indexes.
As our results run relatively contrary to prior evidence, in
particular DW, we perform two additional non-parametric tests not in the
previous literature. The results of our first non-parametric test, the
sign test, are provided in Tables 8-10. For the winning bids, as in the
CAR case, we find abnormal returns on average happened more than 50% of
the time after the announcement date. However, only one provides
sufficient evidence to support rejection at the 5% significance level
following the statistic defined in equation 9. The only other test
statistic above 2, and only slightly above, should arguably be the
opposite sign, i.e., negative. In particular, the winter Olympic losers
for the [0, 1] event window are similar to the parametric results. On
aggregate, the results show little to arguably no evidence regarding the
idea that the IOC announcement has a statistically significant impact on
stock markets. This is especially true after the consideration of
implementing a Bonferroni correction for the number of tests being run.
As our final non-parametric test, we run the Wilcoxon sign rank
test described in equations 10 and 11. The results are provided in
Tables 11-13. The only test statistic in the entire group to be outside
of the critical values, based on a 5% type 1 error threshold, is the
"all games" under the [0, 2] event window. The remaining
results fail to reject the null of no cumulative effect.
Small Country Analysis
As a potential critique of the analysis, winning a bid to host the
Olympic Games can have a large monetary benefit to the country, but the
effect could be small relative to the size of the country's economy
or stock market. As a result, our analysis might simply be trying to
find a "needle in a haystack." Given this issue, we analyze
the effect of the announcements conditional on the host country's
size. In other words, we control for how important the bid can be
relative to the country's stock market.
We take two approaches to answer the critique. In the first, we
follow the approach of Dick and Wang (2010) by analyzing the correlation
between a country's [bar.CAR](0,5) (and [[theta].sub.0](0, 5)) and
its size using a simple linear regression, or
[y.sub.i] = [[beta].sub.0] + [[beta].sub.1] share of GDP +
[[beta].sub.2] Summer Games + [[epsilon].sub.i], (12)
As in Dick and Wang (2010), we focus on the winners, and where the
size variable is "taken as the percentage of the individual country
GDP relative to the world GDP in the announcement year." The GDP
data was taken from the United States Department of Agriculture ERS
International Macroeconomic Data Set. The results are in Table 14. As
before, we fail to find any meaningful impact of the bid on a
country's stock market even when controlling for size.
The second approach bifurcates the dataset into a group of the
large cities and a set of the small cities as defined by the size of the
cities hosting the games, where a "win" by a large city within
a country might be viewed as a "win" for the country as a
whole, resulting in more extensive national stock market effects. Given
this split, we re-run the parametric results. The results are provided
in Table 15. The results fail to reject a null hypothesis of no
announcement effect under any reasonable significance level with the
exception of the [0,2] event window for the winners (as seen before).
Difference in Winners and Losers
As an additional robustness check of the results, we calculate the
difference in the stock market returns between winners and losers using
both the parametric and non-parametric approaches. In other words, we
work to improve the power of the test under the assumption that winning
the bid to host the Olympics would positively affect the future profits
of that country's companies, while it would hurt countries who lose
the bidding process.
Under standard assumptions, the difference in the cumulative
abnormal returns, or the parametric approach, is estimated as
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (13)
where L = 1 if observation i was a losing bid, and zero otherwise.
Its estimated variance is
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (14)
and the test statistic can be estimated as
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (15)
under the hypothesis of a mean of zero. In terms of the
non-parametric test, we calculate the test statistic as
[mathematical expression not reproducible] (16)
where N is the number of winners and losers, [mathematical
expression not reproducible] is the number of winners with a positive
abnormal return in the event window, and [mathematical expression not
reproducible] is the number of losers with a negative abnormal return in
the event window.
The results of the difference between winners and losers are
provided in Table 16 for the parametric test and Table 17 for the
non-parametric test. Unlike before, none of the test results show a test
statistic above 2. In other words, we fail to reject the hypothesis that
the difference in the returns, which would be expected to be positive if
a winning announcement was good and a losing announcement was bad, is
zero.
Conclusion
Cities who host the Olympic Games spend substantial sums of public
funds to prepare and host the event. Boosters and governments of bidding
countries argue the economic benefits of hosting outweigh the costs.
However, the argument for such large government outlays is often an
ex-ante one put forth during the bidding process using macroeconomic
multipliers or input-output models.
To analyze the actual benefits rather than predictions, researchers
have used a variety of methods based on measured outcomes in the host
city and country after the Olympics have taken place. We take one of
these approaches by testing for the impact that hosting the games has on
the profits of the firms in the host country. To test for an impact on
firm profits, we follow the literature by using an "event
study" approach, which measures stock prices right around the time
of the IOC announcement of the winning bid, and if stock prices
(expected profits) rise during that period, then researchers can
conclude there are substantial economic profits for the country hosting
the games.
The literature we refer to and follow includes Veraros, Kasimati,
and Dawson (2004), Dick and Wang (2010), and Mirman and Sharma (2010).
In these studies, the researchers have found some statistically
significant evidence that announcements impact stock markets, and by
extension, hosting the Olympic Games has an economic benefit.
In following the earlier work, we have failed to find any
statistically significant impact of the announcements on stock prices.
In other words, we find that an argument for a positive economic impact
from the Games cannot be justified using an event study approach.
Given our findings run contrary to previous results, we have
extended the event study approach along several dimensions. In
particular, we have (i) used additional data, (ii) investigated a larger
range of event windows (time around the announcement), (iii) tested for
an effect using two additional non-parametric tests in addition to the
standard parametric tests, and (iv) considered the difference in impact
between winners and losers using both the parametric and non-parametric
approaches. Furthermore, we have worked to make our findings
transparent. In particular, we have provided the announcement dates,
stock indexes, and individual cumulative abnormal returns used in
determining our findings. As a result, researchers can analyze and
replicate our work.
The debate regarding the economic benefits of the Olympic Games is
important. As part of the debate, we hope our results provide a
transparent and empirically driven analysis that informs the public on
the benefits of hosting, and by extension, whether they should or should
not host an Olympic Games.
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place: Rio De Janeiro declares financial disaster." Forbes.
Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/tim-worstall/2016/06/18/hosting-olympics-bankrupts-another-place-rio-de-janeiro-de-clares-financial-disaster/
Bryan Engelhardt, (1) Victor Matheson, (2) Alex Yen, (3) and
Maxwell Chisolm (2)
(1) University of Wisconsin--Oshkosh
(2) College of the Holy Cross
(3) Stonehill College
Bryan Engelhardt is an associate professor of economics at the
University of Wisconsin--Oshkosh. He earned his PhD in economics at the
University of Iowa where he studied macroeconomics and labor. Dr.
Engelhardt previously worked at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
and the College of the Holy Cross.
Victor Matheson is a professor of economics at the College of the
Holy Cross. He is president of the North American Association of Sports
Economists and a coauthor of The Economics of Sports, 6th ed. He has
worked as professional referee in top soccer leagues in the US.
Alex Yen is an associate professor of accounting in the Leo J.
Meehan School of Business at Stonehill College. He earned his PhD at the
University of Texas at Austin, and previously worked at Price Waterhouse
LLP, Suffolk University, and the College of the Holy Cross.
Maxwell Chisolm is a sales and trading analyst at UBS. He earned
his BA in economics at the College of the Holy Cross where he was a
research assistant in the Department of Economics & Accounting
Summer Research Program.
Table 1. Data Description: Winning Bids
Olympics Announcement Country Name Stock Index
Winter 1988 09/30/1981 Canada S&P/TSX Composite
Summer 1988 09/30/1981 South Korea KOSPI Composite
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 France CAC General Index
Summer 1992 10/17/1986 Spain Madrid SE General (IGBM)
Winter 1994 09/15/1988 Norway OSEBX.OL
Summer 1996 09/18/1990 USA S&P 500
Winter 1998 06/15/1991 Japan Nikkei 225
Summer 2000 09/23/1993 Australia All Ordinaries
Winter 2002 06/16/1995 USA S&P 500
Summer 2004 09/05/1997 Greece Athens Index Composite
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Italy FTSE MIB Index
Summer 2008 07/13/2001 China SSE Composite
Winter 2010 07/02/2003 Canada S&P/TSX Composite
Summer 2012 07/06/2005 UK FTSE 100
Winter 2014 07/04/2007 Russia RSF EE MT (RUR) INDEX
Summer 2016 10/02/2009 Brazil IBOVESPA
Winter 2018 07/06/2011 South Korea KOSPI Composite
Summer 2020 09/07/2013 Japan Nikkei 225
Winter 2022 07/31/2015 China SSE Composite
Olympics Source of Index
Winter 1988 Yahoo Finance
Summer 1988 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 1992 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Summer 1992 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 1994 Yahoo Finance
Summer 1996 Yahoo Finance
Winter 1998 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2000 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2002 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2004 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2006 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2008 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2010 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2012 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2014 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Summer 2016 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2018 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2020 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2022 Yahoo Finance
Table 2. Data Description: Losing Bids
Olympics Announcement Country Name Stock Index
Winter 1988 09/30/1981 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX
Winter 1988 09/30/1981 Italy ITALY-DS Market
Summer 1988 09/30/1981 Japan NIKKEI 225 STOCK AVERAGE
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 Norway OSEBX.OL
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 Italy ITALY-DS Market
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 USA S&P 500
Winter 1992 10/17/1986 Germany DAX 30 PERFORMANCE
Summer 1992 10/17/1986 France CAC General
Summer 1992 10/17/1986 Australia All Ordinaries
Summer 1992 10/17/1986 UK FTSE 100
Summer 1992 10/17/1986 Netherlands AEX INDEX (AEX) DS-CALC
Winter 1994 09/15/1988 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX
Winter 1994 09/15/1988 USA S&P 500
Summer 1996 09/18/1990 Greece Athens Composite Index
Summer 1996 09/18/1990 Canada S&P/TSX Composite
Summer 1996 09/18/1990 Australia All Ordinaries
Summer 1996 09/18/1990 UK FTSE 100
Winter 1998 06/15/1991 USA S&P 500
Winter 1998 06/15/1991 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX
Winter 1998 06/15/1991 Spain IBEX 35
Winter 1998 06/15/1991 Italy ITALY-DS Market
Summer 2000 09/23/1993 China SSE Composite
Summer 2000 09/23/1993 UK FTSE 100
Summer 2000 09/23/1993 Germany Dax
Summer 2000 09/23/1993 Turkey BIST NATIONAL 100
Winter 2002 06/16/1995 Switzerland Swiss Market Index
Winter 2002 06/16/1995 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX
Winter 2002 06/16/1995 Canada S&P/TSX Composite
Summer 2004 09/05/1997 Italy ITALY-DS Market
Summer 2004 09/05/1997 South Africa FTSE/JSE ALL SHARE
Summer 2004 09/05/1997 Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX
Summer 2004 09/05/1997 Argentina ARGENTINA MERVAL
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Switzerland Swiss Market Index
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Finland OMX HELSINKI (OMXH)
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Austria ATX
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Slovakia SLOVAKIA SAX 16
Winter 2006 06/19/1999 Poland WARSAW GENERAL INDEX 20
Summer 2008 07/13/2001 Canada S&P/TSX Composite
Summer 2008 07/13/2001 France CAC 40
Summer 2008 07/13/2001 Turkey Borsa Istanbul 100
Summer 2008 07/13/2001 Japan NIKKEI 225
Winter 2010 07/02/2003 South Korea KOSPI
Winter 2010 07/02/2003 Austria ATX
Summer 2012 07/06/2005 France CAC 40
Summer 2012 07/06/2005 Spain IBEX 35
Summer 2012 07/06/2005 USA S&P 500
Summer 2012 07/06/2005 Russia RSF EE MT (RUR) INDEX
Winter 2014 07/04/2007 South Korea KOSPI
Winter 2014 07/04/2007 Austria ATX
Summer 2016 10/02/2009 Spain IBEX 35
Summer 2016 10/02/2009 Japan NIKKEI 225
Summer 2016 10/02/2009 USA S&P 500
Winter 2018 07/06/2011 Germany Dax
Winter 2018 07/06/2011 France CAC 40
Summer 2020 09/07/2013 Turkey Borsa Istanbul 100
Summer 2020 09/07/2013 Spain IBEX 35
Olympics Source of Index
Winter 1988 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 1988 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Summer 1988 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 1992 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 1992 Yahoo Finance
Winter 1992 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 1992 Yahoo Finance
Winter 1992 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Summer 1992 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Summer 1992 Yahoo Finance
Summer 1992 Yahoo Finance
Summer 1992 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 1994 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 1994 Yahoo Finance
Summer 1996 Yahoo Finance
Summer 1996 Yahoo Finance
Summer 1996 Yahoo Finance
Summer 1996 Yahoo Finance
Winter 1998 Yahoo Finance
Winter 1998 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 1998 Yahoo Finance
Winter 1998 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Summer 2000 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2000 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2000 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2000 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 2002 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 2002 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 2002 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2004 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Summer 2004 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Summer 2004 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Summer 2004 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 2006 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2006 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 2006 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2006 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 2006 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Summer 2008 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2008 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2008 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2008 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2010 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2010 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2012 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2012 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2012 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2012 Thomson Reuters Datastream
Winter 2014 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2014 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2016 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2016 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2016 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2018 Yahoo Finance
Winter 2018 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2020 Yahoo Finance
Summer 2020 Yahoo Finance
Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Country: Winning Bids
[mathematical expression
not reproducible]
[[tau].sub.1] = 0,
Country Announcement [mathematical [[tau].sub.2] = 1
expression not
reproducible]
Canada 09/30/1981 0.0064 0.0035
South Korea 09/30/1981 0.0135 -0.0238
France 10/17/1986 0.0134 -0.0326
Spain 10/17/1986 0.0135 -0.0178
Norway 09/15/1988 0.0203 0.0264
USA 09/18/1990 0.0081 0.0088
Japan 06/15/1991 0.0138 0.0026
Australia 09/23/1993 0.0074 0.0118
USA 06/16/1995 0.0048 0.0102
Greece 09/05/1997 0.0176 0.0742
Italy 06/19/1999 0.0154 -0.0023
China 07/13/2001 0.0089 -0.0096
Canada 07/02/2003 0.0064 -0.0054
UK 07/06/2005 0.0046 -0.0033
Russia 07/04/2007 0.0135 0.0118
Brazil 10/02/2009 0.018 0.0317
South Korea 07/06/2011 0.0081 0.0054
Japan 09/07/2013 0.0161 0.0236
China 07/31/2015 0.0168 -0.0306
[mathematical expression not reproducible]
[[tau].sub.1] = 0, [[tau].sub.1] = 0, [[tau].sub.1] = 0,
Country [[tau].sub.2] = 2 [[tau].sub.2] = 5 [[tau].sub.2] = 9
Canada 0.0108 -0.0066 -0.0142
South Korea 0.0073 0.0522 -0.0137
France -0.0332 0.0064 -0.0083
Spain -0.026 -0.0518 -0.12
Norway 0.0321 0.0405 0.0371
USA 0.0025 0.0041 0.0354
Japan -0.0104 -0.0114 -0.0154
Australia 0.0079 0.0158 0.0365
USA 0.0093 0.01 0.008
Greece 0.0861 0.0614 0.0663
Italy 0.0072 -0.0022 -0.0319
China -0.0123 0.0049 -0.0369
Canada -0.0038 0.0049 0.0057
UK 0.0051 -0.0002 -0.0106
Russia 0.0122 0.0198 0.0322
Brazil 0.0126 0.0132 0.0315
South Korea 0.0076 -0.0106 -0.0117
Japan 0.0187 0.0049 0.0213
China 0.0019 -0.0123 0.027
[mathematical expression not reproducible]
[[tau].sub.1] = -2, [[tau].sub.1] = -5,
Country [[tau].sub.2] = 2 [[tau].sub.2] = 5
Canada 0.0498 -1.0135
South Korea -0.0141 -0.0072
France -0.0648 -0.03
Spain -0.0327 -0.0676
Norway 0.0431 0.0542
USA 0.0048 -0.001
Japan 0.0029 0.0001
Australia 0.0058 0.0237
USA 0.0085 0.0182
Greece 0.0756 0.0428
Italy 0.0056 -0.014
China -0.0232 -0.0044
Canada -0.0036 0.0057
UK 0.0082 0.019
Russia 0.0167 0.0162
Brazil 0.0219 0.0362
South Korea 0.0224 0.0172
Japan -0.0022 0.0153
China 0.0046 -0.1387
[mathematical expression not reproducible]
[[tau].sub.1] = -5, [[tau].sub.1] = -2,
Country [[tau].sub.2] = -1 [[tau].sub.2] = -1
Canada -0.0069 0.0390
South Korea -0.0594 -0.0214
France -0.0364 -0.0317
Spain -0.0158 -0.0068
Norway 0.0137 0.0111
USA -0.0052 0.0023
Japan 0.0114 0.0133
Australia 0.0078 -0.0021
USA 0.0081 -0.0009
Greece -0.0186 -0.0105
Italy -0.0118 -0.0016
China -0.0093 -0.0109
Canada 0.0008 0.0002
UK 0.0191 0.0031
Russia -0.0036 0.0045
Brazil 0.0231 0.0093
South Korea 0.0278 0.0149
Japan 0.0104 -0.0209
China -0.1264 0.0028
Table 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Country: Losing Bids
[mathematical expression
not reproducible]
[[tau].sub.1] = 0,
Country Name Announcement [mathematical [[tau].sub.2] = 1
expression not
reproducible]
Sweden 09/30/1981 0.0086 0.0131
Italy 09/30/1981 0.0282 0.0149
Japan 09/30/1981 0.0056 -0.0001
Sweden 10/17/1986 0.0116 -0.0033
Norway 10/17/1986 0.0097 0.0112
Italy 10/17/1986 0.0199 0.0107
USA 10/17/1986 0.0055 0.0032
Germany 10/17/1986 0.0141 -0.014
France 10/17/1986 0.0134 -0.0326
Australia 10/17/1986 0.0085 0.0047
UK 10/17/1986 0.0079 -0.0006
Netherlands 10/17/1986 0.0091 0.0009
Sweden 09/15/1988 0.0148 -0.0049
USA 09/15/1988 0.0172 0.0009
Greece 09/18/1990 0.0244 -0.0576
Canada 09/18/1990 0.0056 0.0138
Australia 09/18/1990 0.0095 -0.0072
UK 09/18/1990 0.008 -0.0041
USA 06/15/1991 0.0087 -0.0027
Sweden 06/15/1991 0.0122 0.0236
Spain 06/15/1991 0.0132 -0.0051
Italy 06/15/1991 0.0115 0.0239
China 09/23/1993 0.0502 -0.0092
UK 09/23/1993 0.0061 -0.002
Germany 09/23/1993 0.0079 -0.0066
Turkey 09/23/1993 0.0246 0.0286
Switzerland 06/16/1995 0.0077 -0.0015
Sweden 06/16/1995 0.0079 0.0109
Canada 06/16/1995 0.0047 0.0058
Italy 09/05/1997 0.0101 0.004
South Africa 09/05/1997 0.0056 0.0056
Sweden 09/05/1997 0.0079 -0.0005
Argentina 09/05/1997 0.0106 -0.0057
Switzerland 06/19/1999 0.0137 0.0008
Finland 06/19/1999 0.0187 0.0374
Austria 06/19/1999 0.0148 0.0223
Slovakia 06/19/1999 0.0161 0.0072
Poland 06/19/1999 0.0264 0.0109
Canada 07/13/2001 0.0117 -0.0016
France 07/13/2001 0.0101 0.0143
Turkey 07/13/2001 0.0444 -0.0038
Japan 07/13/2001 0.0158 -0.0029
South Korea 07/02/2003 0.0203 0.0169
Austria 07/02/2003 0.0089 0.0061
France 07/06/2005 0.0061 -0.0033
Spain 07/06/2005 0.0058 -0.0136
USA 07/06/2005 0.0037 0.0011
Russia 07/06/2005 0.0141 0.0269
South Korea 07/04/2007 0.0079 0.0229
Austria 07/04/2007 0.0079 0.0056
Spain 10/02/2009 0.0133 0.0051
Japan 10/02/2009 0.0278 -0.0309
USA 10/02/2009 0.0115 0.0137
Germany 07/06/2011 0.0054 -0.0005
France 07/06/2011 0.0054 -0.0041
Turkey 09/07/2013 0.0159 0.0528
Spain 09/07/2013 0.0094 -0.0039
[mathematical expression not reproducible]
[[tau].sub.1] = 0, [[tau].sub.1] = 0,
Country Name [[tau].sub.2] = 2 [[tau].sub.2] = 2
Sweden 0.0086 0.0274
Italy 0.0013 -0.0407
Japan -0.0025 0.0128
Sweden -0.0153 -0.0063
Norway 0.0103 0.0083
Italy 0.0105 -0.0057
USA 0.012 0.0401
Germany -0.0034 0.0165
France -0.0332 0.0064
Australia 0.0124 0.0031
UK 0.0045 0.0042
Netherlands 0.005 0.014
Sweden 0.0053 0.0345
USA -0.0057 0.0056
Greece -0.0605 -0.1483
Canada 0.0151 0.0095
Australia -0.0026 -0.0295
UK -0.0202 -0.0199
USA -0.0058 -0.0156
Sweden 0.0347 0.0373
Spain -0.0132 -0.0056
Italy 0.0189 -0.0198
China -0.0097 -0.0004
UK 0.0029 0.0059
Germany 0.0048 0.0032
Turkey 0.0507 0.0153
Switzerland -0.0005 0.0066
Sweden 0.0138 0.0188
Canada 0.0025 -0.0046
Italy -0.0032 -0.0181
South Africa -0.0015 -0.025
Sweden 0.0045 -0.0152
Argentina -0.011 -0.0179
Switzerland -0.003 -0.017
Finland 0.0278 0.0111
Austria 0.0205 0.0065
Slovakia 0.0134 -0.0143
Poland 0.0082 0.036
Canada -0.0065 0.0091
France 0.0051 -0.0172
Turkey -0.0485 0.057
Japan -0.0199 -0.0585
South Korea 0.0281 0.0462
Austria 0.0103 0.008
France 0.0078 0.0082
Spain -0.0054 -0.0003
USA 0.0015 -0.0029
Russia 0.0358 0.0366
South Korea 0.0265 0.0443
Austria 0.008 -0.0091
Spain 0.0103 -0.01
Japan -0.0434 -0.0237
USA 0.0058 0.0052
Germany -0.0031 -0.0048
France -0.0123 -0.0218
Turkey 0.0494 0.0783
Spain -0.0002 0.0073
[mathematical expression not reproducible]
[[tau].sub.1] = 0, [[tau].sub.1] = -2
Country Name [[tau].sub.2] = 9 [[tau].sub.2] = 2
Sweden 0.0466 -0.0218
Italy -0.0996 -0.0208
Japan 0.0147 -0.006
Sweden 0.0059 -0.028
Norway 0.0061 -0.0003
Italy -0.0381 0.0204
USA 0.0383 0.0345
Germany -0.0048 -0.0112
France -0.0083 -0.0648
Australia 0.0027 0.0134
UK 0.0161 0.0146
Netherlands 0.0045 0.0105
Sweden 0.0205 0.0057
USA -0.0021 0.0009
Greece -0.2289 -0.0049
Canada 0.0094 0.0192
Australia -0.026 -0.0096
UK 0.0031 -0.032
USA -0.0111 0.002
Sweden 0.0476 0.0239
Spain -0.0049 -0.0486
Italy 0.0018 0.0108
China -0.0252 0.0091
UK 0.0201 0.0073
Germany 0.0314 -0.0052
Turkey 0.0493 0.0566
Switzerland 0.0161 -0.0021
Sweden 0.0291 0.0019
Canada -0.0002 0.0063
Italy 0.0153 -0.0105
South Africa -0.0274 0.0063
Sweden -0.0004 -0.0157
Argentina -0.0359 -0.0147
Switzerland -0.0132 0.0001
Finland 0.0252 0.0267
Austria 0.0328 0.0209
Slovakia -0.026 0.0175
Poland 0.0008 0.024
Canada 0.0082 -0.0077
France -0.0162 -0.0084
Turkey 0.0803 -0.0953
Japan -0.0435 -0.0152
South Korea 0.0634 0.027
Austria 0.0189 0.0087
France 0.025 0.001
Spain 0.0077 -0.0108
USA 0.0007 0.0098
Russia 0.0201 0.0415
South Korea 0.0553 0.0508
Austria -0.0276 -0.0008
Spain -0.0212 -0.0008
Japan -0.009 -0.0428
USA 0.0045 0.0004
Germany -0.0126 -0.002
France -0.0423 -0.0201
Turkey 0.1178 0.0504
Spain 0.0159 0.0155
[mathematical expression not reproducible]
[[tau].sub.1] = -5, [[tau].sub.1] = -5,
Country Name [[tau].sub.2] = 5 [[tau].sub.2] = -1
Sweden -0.0066 -0.034
Italy 0.0055 0.0462
Japan -0.0003 -0.013
Sweden -0.0404 -0.0341
Norway 0.0142 0.006
Italy 0.012 0.0176
USA 0.0684 0.0283
Germany 0.0049 -0.0116
France -0.03 -0.0364
Australia 0.0116 0.0084
UK 0.0078 0.0036
Netherlands -0.003 -0.0171
Sweden 0.0458 0.0113
USA 0.0123 0.0068
Greece -0.1545 -0.0063
Canada 0.0098 0.0003
Australia -0.0368 -0.0073
UK -0.04 -0.0201
USA -0.0083 0.0072
Sweden 0.0373 0.0000
Spain -0.0333 -0.0276
Italy -0.0123 0.0075
China 0.0221 0.0225
UK 0.0182 0.0123
Germany 0.0198 0.0166
Turkey 0.0183 0.003
Switzerland 0.0052 -0.0014
Sweden 0.01 -0.0088
Canada 0.005 0.0096
Italy 0.0071 0.0252
South Africa -0.0323 -0.0073
Sweden -0.0196 -0.0044
Argentina -0.0758 -0.0579
Switzerland -0.0148 0.0022
Finland 0.0098 -0.0014
Austria 0.0047 -0.0018
Slovakia -0.0452 -0.0309
Poland 0.0402 0.0041
Canada 0.002 -0.007
France -0.0416 -0.0244
Turkey -0.1416 -0.1986
Japan -0.0673 -0.0088
South Korea 0.0699 0.0237
Austria 0.0124 0.0044
France 0.0228 0.0146
Spain 0.0116 0.0119
USA 0.0047 0.0075
Russia 0.0663 0.0297
South Korea 0.0579 0.0135
Austria -0.0156 -0.0066
Spain -0.0101 -0.0001
Japan -0.07 -0.0464
USA 0.0078 0.0026
Germany -0.005 -0.0002
France -0.0299 -0.008
Turkey 0.0763 -0.002
Spain 0.0292 0.0219
[mathematical expression not reproducible]
[[tau].sub.1] = -2
Country Name [[tau].sub.2] = -1
Sweden -0.0304
Italy -0.0221
Japan -0.0035
Sweden -0.0127
Norway -0.0106
Italy 0.01
USA 0.0225
Germany -0.0078
France -0.0317
Australia 0.001
UK 0.0101
Netherlands 0.0055
Sweden 0.0004
USA 0.0066
Greece 0.0556
Canada 0.004
Australia -0.007
UK -0.0118
USA 0.0078
Sweden -0.0109
Spain -0.0354
Italy -0.0081
China 0.0188
UK 0.0044
Germany -0.0101
Turkey 0.0059
Switzerland -0.0015
Sweden -0.0119
Canada 0.0038
Italy -0.0073
South Africa 0.0077
Sweden -0.0202
Argentina -0.0037
Switzerland 0.0031
Finland -0.0011
Austria 0.0004
Slovakia 0.0041
Poland 0.0158
Canada -0.0012
France -0.0135
Turkey -0.0468
Japan 0.0047
South Korea -0.0012
Austria -0.0016
France -0.0068
Spain -0.0054
USA 0.0082
Russia 0.0057
South Korea 0.0243
Austria -0.0088
Spain -0.0111
Japan 0.0006
USA -0.0054
Germany 0.001
France -0.0078
Turkey 0.001
Spain 0.0157
Table 5. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Winning Bids
Event Window
([[[tau].sub.1],
[[tau].sub.2]]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5]
All Games
[bar.CAR] 0.0045 0.0071 0.0075 0.0020 0.0068 -0.0015
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0042 0.0051 0.0072 0.0093 0.0066 0.0098
Test statistic 1.0698 1.3988 1.044 0.2178 1.0337 -0.1507
Summer Games
[bar.CAR] 0.0106 0.0113 0.0116 0.0011 0.0049 0.0063
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0060 0.0074 0.0105 0.0135 0.0096 0.0142
Test statistic 1.7576 1.5309 1.1101 0.0813 0.5135 0.4444
Winter Games
[bar.CAR] -0.0011 0.0034 0.0039 0.0029 0.0085 -0.0085
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0058 0.0070 0.0100 0.0129 0.0091 0.0135
Test statistic -0.1889 0.4779 0.3874 0.2228 0.9369 -0.6272
Event Window
([[[tau].sub.1],
[[tau].sub.2]]) [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
[bar.CAR] -0.0090 -0.0003
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0066 0.0042
Test statistic -1.3671 -0.0788
Summer Games
[bar.CAR] -0.0053 -0.0064
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0096 0.0060
Test statistic -0.5569 -1.0630
Winter Games
[bar.CAR] -0.0123 0.0052
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0091 0.0058
Test statistic -1.3546 0.8960
Table 6. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns: First Losing Bids
Event Window
([[tau].sub.1],
[[[tau].sub.2]]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2]
All Games
[bar.CAR] 0.0007 0.0012 0.0044 0.0051 0.0015
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0057 0.0069 0.0098 0.0127 0.009
Test statistic 0.1204 0.1758 0.4438 0.4008 0.1693
Summer Games
[bar.CAR] -0.0047 -0.0053 -0.0069 -0.0114 -0.0038
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.01 0.0122 0.0173 0.0223 0.0158
Test statistic -0.4746 -0.4362 -0.3983 -0.5106 -0.2412
Winter Games
[bar.CAR] 0.0061 0.0078 0.0156 0.0216 0.0068
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0054 0.0066 0.0094 0.0121 0.0085
Test statistic 1.1299 1.1753 1.6684 1.7856 0.8012
Event Window
([[tau].sub.1],
[[[tau].sub.2]]) [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
[bar.CAR] 0.005 0.0006 0.0003
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0133 0.009 0.0057
Test statistic 0.3732 0.0673 0.0523
Summer Games
[bar.CAR] -0.0072 -0.0003 0.0015
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0234 0.0158 0.0100
Test statistic -0.3061 -0.0178 0.1529
Winter Games
[bar.CAR] 0.0171 0.0015 -0.0009
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0127 0.0085 0.0054
Test statistic 1.3497 0.1743 -0.1726
Table 7. Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Losing Bids
Event Window
([[tau].sub.1],
[[tau].sub.2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2]
All Games
[bar.CAR] 0.0035 0.0026 0.0013 0.0023 0.0007
St.dev. (CAR) 0.0030 0.0036 0.0051 0.0066 0.0047
Test statistic 1.1690 0.7085 0.2449 0.3472 0.1407
Summer Games
[bar.CAR] -0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0037 0.0002 -0.003
St.dev. (CAR) 0.0044 0.0054 0.0077 0.0099 0.007
Test statistic -0.1125 -0.3196 -0.478 0.0168 -0.4212
Winter Games
[bar.CAR] 0.0079 0.0074 0.0067 0.0047 0.0047
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0038 0.0047 0.0066 0.0085 0.006
Test statistic 2.0600 1.5743 1.0206 0.5466 0.7765
Event Window
([[tau].sub.1],
[[tau].sub.2]) [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
[bar.CAR] -0.0032 -0.0045 -0.0019
St.dev. (CAR) 0.0069 0.0047 0.0030
Test statistic -0.4647 -0.9576 -0.6453
Summer Games
[bar.CAR] -0.0129 -0.0092 -0.0012
St.dev. (CAR) 0.0104 0.007 0.0044
Test statistic -1.2379 -1.3126 -0.2747
Winter Games
[bar.CAR] 0.0075 0.0008 -0.0027
St.dev. ([bar.CAR]) 0.0089 0.006 0.0038
Test statistic 0.844 0.1339 -0.7004
Table 8. Non-Parametric Sign Test: Winning Bids
Event Window ([[tau].sub.1] [[[tau].sub.2]]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5]
All Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.58 0.74 0.63
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.69 2.06 1.15
Summer Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.56 0.78 0.78
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.33 1.67 1.67
Winter Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.6 0.7 0.5
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.63 1.26 0.00
Event Window ([[tau].sub.1] [[[tau].sub.2]]) [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5]
All Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.53 0.68 0.58
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.23 1.61 0.69
Summer Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.56 0.56 0.56
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.33 0.33 0.33
Winter Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.5 0.8 0.6
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.00 1.90 0.63
Event Window ([[tau].sub.1] [[[tau].sub.2]]) [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.47 0.53
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) -0.23 0.23
Summer Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.44 0.33
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) -0.33 -1.00
Winter Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.5 0.7
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.00 1.26
Table 9. Non-Parametric Sign Test: First Losing Bids
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1] [[tau].sub.2]]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5]
All Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.44 0.44 0.61
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) -0.47 -0.47 0.94
Summer Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.33 0.33 0.56
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) -1.00 -1.00 0.33
Winter Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.56 0.56 0.67
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.33 0.33 1.00
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1] [[tau].sub.2]]) [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5]
All Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.61 0.50 0.56
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.94 0.00 0.47
Summer Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.56 0.33 0.56
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.33 -1.00 0.33
Winter Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.67 0.67 0.56
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 1.00 1.00 0.33
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1] [[tau].sub.2]]) [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.44 0.44
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) -0.47 -0.47
Summer Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.33 0.33
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) -1.00 -1.00
Winter Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.56 0.56
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.33 0.33
Table 10. Non-Parametric Sign Test: Losing Bids
Event Window ([[tau].sub.1] [[[tau].sub.2]]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5]
All Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.54 0.58 0.54
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.66 1.19 0.66
Summer Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.4 0.5 0.53
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) -1.1 0 0.37
Winter Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.7 0.67 0.56
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 2.12 1.73 0.58
Event Window ([[tau].sub.1] [[[tau].sub.2]]) [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5]
All Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.6 0.54 0.58
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 1.46 0.66 1.19
Summer Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.63 0.47 0.53
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 1.46 -0.37 0.37
Winter Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.56 0.63 0.63
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.58 1.35 1.35
Event Window ([[tau].sub.1] [[[tau].sub.2]]) [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.49 0.47
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) -0.13 -0.4
Summer Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.47 0.5
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) -0.37 0
Winter Games
Positive Abnormal Return ([N.sup.+]/N) 0.52 0.44
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.1]) 0.19 -0.58
Table 11. Wilcoxian Sign Rank Test: Winning Bids
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5]
All Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 107 150 111
Critical Values
Summer Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 21 38 33
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H])
Winter Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 35 40 26
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H])
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]]) [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5]
All Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 90 131 104
Critical Values (46,144)
Summer Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 24 26 20
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H]) (6,39)
Winter Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 26 45 36
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H]) (8,47)
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]]) [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 95 102
Critical Values
Summer Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 19 20
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H])
Winter Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 30 36
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H])
Critical values are determined by a two-sided test with a type 1 error
threshold of 5%. The critical values are from Wilcoxon and Wilcox
(1964) with N equal to 19, 9, and 10 for the All, Summer, and Winter
games, respectively.
Table 12. Wilcoxian Sign Rank Test: First Losing Bids
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5]
All Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 60 56 96
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H])
Summer Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 13 12 27
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H])
Winter Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 18 16 23
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H])
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]]) [0,9] [-2,2] [-5,5]
All Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 92 89 85
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H]) (40,131)
Summer Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 28 14 26
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H]) (6,39)
Winter Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 21 31 19
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H]) (6,39)
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]]) [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 59 81
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H])
Summer Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 9 13
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H])
Winter Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 22 28
Critical Values ([C.sub.L], [C.sub.H])
Critical values are determined by a two-sided test with a type 1 error
threshold of 5%. The critical values are from Wilcoxon and Wilcox
(1964) with N equal to 18, 9, and 9 for the All, Summer, and Winter
games, respectively.
Table 13. Wilcoxian Sign Rank Test: Losing Bids
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5]
All Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 738 898 897
Critical Values (CL, CH)
Summer Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 157 235 280
Critical Values (CL, CH)
Winter Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 218 215 176
Critical Values (CL, CH)
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]]) [0,9] [-2,2]
All Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 995 892
Critical Values (CL, CH) (579.81,1073.19)
Summer Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 326 218
Critical Values (CL, CH) (137,328)
Winter Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 190 232
Critical Values (CL, CH) (107,271)
Event Window ([[[tau].sub.1], [[tau].sub.2]]) [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 1064 813 885
Critical Values (CL, CH)
Summer Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 300 228 258
Critical Values (CL, CH)
Winter Games
W-statistic ([[theta].sub.2]) 244 183 190
Critical Values (CL, CH)
Critical values are determined by a two-sided test with a type 1 error
threshold of 5%. The critical values for the Summer and Winter games
are from Wilcoxon and Wilcox (1964) with N equal to 30 and 27,
respectively. The critical values for the All games case is determined
by equation 11 with N = 57.
Table 14. Regression of Impact vs. Size
[bar.CAR](0,5) [bar.CAR](0,5) [[theta].sub.0](0, 5)
Share of GDP -0.065 -0.06 -0.223
(0.066) (0.064) (2.147)
Summer Games - -0.007 -
- (0.012) -
[R.sup.2] 0.035 0.055 0.000
[[theta].sub.0](0, 5)
Share of GDP -0.062
(2.186)
Summer Games -0.237
(0.344)
[R.sup.2] 0.028
Note: The regression run [y.sub.i] = [[beta].sub.0] + [[beta].sub.1]
share of GDP + [[beta].sub.2] Summer Games + [[epsilon].sub.1] where
[mathematical expression not reproducible] for a bid of a particular
host country in a particular year is represented by the subscript "i,"
[[beta].sub.0], [[beta].sub.1], and [[beta].sub.2] are estimated using
OLS, and the Summer Games is included in a subset of years following
Dick and Wang (2010).
Table 16. Difference in Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Event Window
([[[tau].sub.1],
[[tau].sub.2]]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2]
All Games
[bar.xDCAR] -0.0015 -0.0001 0.0009 -0.0012 0.0012
St.dev. ([bar.xDCAR]) 0.0025 0.0030 0.0042 0.0055 0.0039
Test statistic -0.6033 -0.0466 0.2222 -0.2216 0.3121
Summer Games
[bar.xDCAR] 0.0028 0.0040 0.0055 0.0001 0.0034
St.dev. ([bar.xDCAR]) 0.0037 0.0045 0.0064 0.0083 0.0058
Test statistic 0.7673 0.8735 0.8615 0.0151 0.5839
Winter Games
[bar.xDCAR] -0.0060 -0.0045 -0.0039 -0.0026 -0.0011
St.dev. ([bar.xDCAR]) 0.0032 0.0039 0.0055 0.0071 0.0050
Test statistic -1.8903 -1.1410 -0.7018 -0.3684 -0.2206
Event Window
([[[tau].sub.1],
[[tau].sub.2]]) [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
[bar.xDCAR] 0.0020 0.0011 0.0013
St.dev. ([bar.xDCAR]) 0.0057 0.0039 0.0025
Test statistic 0.3566 0.2855 0.5506
Summer Games
[bar.xDCAR] 0.0114 0.0059 -0.0005
St.dev. ([bar.xDCAR]) 0.0087 0.0058 0.0037
Test statistic 1.3141 1.0055 -0.1467
Winter Games
[bar.xDCAR] -0.0078 -0.0039 0.0033
St.dev. ([bar.xDCAR]) 0.0075 0.0050 0.0032
Test statistic -1.0427 -0.7778 1.0486
Table 17. Difference in Returns with Non-Parametric Sign Test
Event Window
([[tau].sub.1],
[[tau].sub.2]) [0,1] [0,2] [0,5] [0,9] [-2,2]
All Games
Expected Abnormal return
[mathematical expression
not reproducible] 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.51
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.4]) -0.23 0.00 0.00 -1.15 0.23
Summer Games
Expected Abnormal return
[mathematical expression
not reproducible] 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.41 0.54
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.4]) 1.12 0.8 0.48 -1.12 0.48
Winter Games
Expected Abnormal return
[mathematical expression
not reproducible] 0.38 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.49
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.4]) -1.48 -0.82 -0.49 -0.49 -0.16
Event Window
([[tau].sub.1],
[[tau].sub.2]) [-5,5] [-5,-1] [-2,-1]
All Games
Expected Abnormal return
[mathematical expression
not reproducible] 0.46 0.50 0.53
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.4]) -0.69 0.00 0.46
Summer Games
Expected Abnormal return
[mathematical expression
not reproducible] 0.49 0.51 0.46
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.4]) -0.16 0.16 -0.48
Winter Games
Expected Abnormal return
[mathematical expression
not reproducible] 0.43 0.49 0.59
Test statistic ([[theta].sub.4]) -0.82 -0.16 1.15
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