文章基本信息

标题：Negotiable Votes
本地全文：下载
作者：Umberto Grandi ; Davide Grossi ; Paolo Turrini 等
期刊名称：Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
印刷版ISSN：1076-9757
出版年度：2019
卷号：64
页码：895-929
DOI：10.1613/jair.1.11446
出版社：American Association of Artificial
摘要：We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their ballots with the other participants. We analyse the voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game when ballots are aggregated via non-manipulable rules and, more specifically, quota rules. We show under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed and desirable ones sustained as a consequence of the pre-vote phase.
关键词：Knowledge representation;game theory;preferences;negotiation;multiagent systems;social choice;judgment aggregation
其他关键词：Knowledge representation;game theory;preferences;negotiation;multiagent systems;social choice;judgment aggregation