文章基本信息

标题：Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model
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作者：Zhang Tao ; Xin Li ; Xinquan Liu 等
期刊名称：Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
印刷版ISSN：1026-0226
电子版ISSN：1607-887X
出版年度：2019
卷号：2019
页码：1-7
DOI：10.1155/2019/3646097
出版社：Hindawi Publishing Corporation
摘要：The signal gaming model based on incomplete information is used to analyze the decisions of commercial banks and medium-sized and small enterprises (SMEs) in supply chain finance business. It is found that the returns of banks are closely relied on the probability of good SMEs join which is proportional to θ (the probability of “good” SMEs in the market) and p (the probability of “good” SMEs chosen to join the supply chain finance) in supply chain finance business, and the default cost is an important constrain for determining the strategies adopted by the SMEs and the banks. To achieve higher returns, SMEs and banks should make effects to create a better supply chain finance business environment to achieve the separation equilibrium.