期刊名称：IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science
印刷版ISSN：1755-1307
电子版ISSN：1755-1315
出版年度：2018
卷号：199
期号：2
页码：022042
DOI：10.1088/1755-1315/199/2/022042
语种：English
出版社：IOP Publishing
摘要：This paper is to analyze the game behaviors of production and emission reduction between government and manufacturing enterprise under different carbon emission policies. To start with, based on different enterprises' behaviors of production and emission reduction under carbon policies of carbon tax and carbon cap and trade, cost-benefit functions for the enterprise and government are constructed respectively. Through the dynamic replication method, an evolutionary game model between enterprises and the government based on limited rationality is built. After that, the problem how participants' behaviors affect evolutionary stable strategies has been discussed. At last, the game analysis results show that both emission reduction cost of enterprise and government penalties on over emission as well as carbon cap would affect not only the government choice of carbon policy, but also the implementation of enterprises' production and emissions reduction.
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