Accommodating trinity: a brief note on Ibn 'Arabi's views.

Shahzad, Qaiser

Introduction

In response to Seyyed Hossein Nasr's suggestion that the spiritual adventures of saints and mystics should facilitate Muslim-Christian dialogue, (1) Leonard Lewisohn has pointed out that the "subject-centricism of the mystics is a world apart from the categories of theologians and philosophers and the abstract moral hypotheses of priests and mullahs." (2) He added that the dialogue of mystics "operates on a higher level" and is engaged with "the poetically ambiguous insights and the imaginal realities of spiritual perception within the heart." (3)

Lewisohn has referred to works of Miguel Asin Palacios, Henry Corbin, (4) and William Chittick. (5) Of these three authors the last two did not discuss the treatment of trinity by Abu 'Abdillah Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240). However, in Palacios's Islam and the Divine Comedy one finds a brief but insightful comparison of Ibn 'Arabi's circular triadic symbolism of emanation with Dante's attempt to explain trinity by means of the same symbol. In a footnote Palacios mentioned Ibn 'Arabi's analogical reference to three persons of trinity in connection with three divine names and the unity of divine essence. (6)

Another of Lewisohn's sources is Dom Sylvester Houedard, (7) who quoted numerous passages fi'om lbn 'ArabT's works in order to show how his views on religious pluralism--or what Houedard called "wider ecumenism"--were grounded in his understanding of divine nature and its relationship to the world. It seems, however, that to discuss Ibn 'Arabi's treatment of other religions and certain of their specific dogmas always from the vintage point of "pluralism" or "mysticism" obscures a very important dimension of his teachings, namely, their putative scriptural grounding. It can even be argued that his pluralistic tendencies themselves were based on the peculiar way he understood the holy book of Islam. This is not to deny that his views on trinity were also connected to certain others of his theological, philosophical, and mystical positions.

The case of Ibn 'Arabi seems to be a limiting one as far as Lewisohn's observation regarding the "subject-centricism" and "poetical ambiguity" of the mystics is concerned. As we know, Ibn 'Arabi was a grand syntheziser with respect to both the contents and the method of his works. While reading, for instance, al-Futahat al-Makiyyah, one comes across not only esoteric comments on the qur'anic passages or sayings attributed to the Prophet or saints, and accounts of his own dreams and spiritual experiences but also rational and logical arguments. At one point he became quite syllogistic, in fact. (8) To make his point Ibn 'Arabi could bring in absolutely anything. Consequently, his work becomes much more interesting from the point of view of Christian-Muslim dialogue than that of the regular mystics.

Ibn 'Arabi on the Definition of "God"

Ibn 'Arabi did not usually deal with particular dogmas of other religions; the doctrine of the Holy Trinity seems to be one of the few exceptions. The issue of trinity in Ibn 'Arabi's thought can be taken up at two levels: first, on the theological or religious level where the Christian Trinity itself is discussed; second, on the metaphysical level where instead of trinity he discussed the issue in terms of multiplicity. For this analysis to proceed on both levels it is necessary first to look into the way Ibn 'Arabi understood divinity.

Ibn 'Arabi's work has a multilayered concept of God. While referring to God at one place he used the phrase "the Divine presence" (al-hadhrah al-ilahiyyah), saying, "There is nothing in existence save Divine presence, i.e., His essence (dhat), His attributes (sifat) and His actions (afal)." (9) This definition obviously does not tell us what the characteristics distinctive of divine reality are but only to what the term refers. What is more important about this definition is the fact that it does not limit divinity to divine essence but includes divine attributes, signified by so many divine names and actions that Ibn 'Arabi identified with creatures. According to him, divine essence is absolutely unknowable and transcendent. The only connection creatures have with It is through attributes/names that are declared to be so many veils (al-hujub) upon divine essence, simultaneously covering and disclosing it. Ibn 'Arabi adopted the Mu'tazilite stance that attributes are identical with the divine essence. The creatures are manifestations of the names of God. Ibn 'Arabi expressed this in a characteristic manner, that "there is nothing in existence but His names." (10) It is not merely that God has manifested Godself to human intellects in creatures but, rather, that human beings themselves are the greatest of divine self-manifestations. This sophisticated conception of divinity made it possible for Ibn 'Arabi to be more considerate toward trinity. At one point he referred to trinity as an example that explains essential divine unity in spite of the multiplicity of divine names: My Beloved is three although He is one, even as the (three) Persons (of the Trinity) are made one Person in essence. (11)

Reynold A. Nicholson, the translator of these lines, read in them and in their commentary supplied by Ibn 'Arabi an attempt at showing the uniformity of Christian Trinity and Islamic Unity. (12) It seems, however, that, although one can find elsewhere in Ibn 'Arabi's writings evidence for such a conclusion, the passage in question does not warrant such a reading. Palacios's reading of it as a mere analogy seems to be closer to the spirit of the text in question. However, there are limitations to this reference to trinity as analogy as well. Ibn 'Arabi's own comment on the verse quoted above is that "number does not engender multiplicity of substance as the Christians say regarding the persons and then say that God is one." (13) It seems that, beyond the principle that number does not imply multiplicity, trinity cannot serve to explain the relationship of divine names to divine essence, since Ibn 'Arabi himself insisted time and again that they are mere relationships, not "entities."

Trinity

Coming to trinity, we first notice an important structural principle of Ibn 'Arabi's thought, which bespeaks of a semi-Pythagorean interest in the number three and which in our opinion is also related to his views on the doctrine of trinity. This principle is triadic systematization. This feature is obvious from his reflections upon the triadic structure of the letters of the Basmalah, (14) in view of the presence of three divine names in it (Allah, al-Rahman, and al-Rahim), (15) the triadic appearance of Holy Ka'bah in the first sight, (16) and the triadic nature of reality behind three names of the Qur'an: majid, azim, and karim. (17) The number three is given a cosmic significance. Ibn 'Arabi spoke of the dependence of creation upon the number three, which he considered to be the fast compound number. (18) He held that God bestows existence through three realities, namely, God's He-ness (huwiyyah), God's attentiveness (tawajjuh), and God's word (kalimah). (19) The scriptural basis of this claim is brought out more clearly in Fusus with reference to Qur'an 16:40: "Whenever We do will something, We do no more than say: 'Be!' and it is." Ibn 'Arabr here highlighted three words--"We" (al-dhat), "Will" (iradah), and "Say" (qawl)--as denoting three realities involved in the divine act of creation already mentioned. (20) The cosmic significance of "three" does not end here but continues to characterize the creature as well as corresponding to essence, will, and word; like wise, in view of the triadic nature of a deductive argument and repercussions for knowing God. (21) The following of a conclusion from two premises was likened by Ibn 'Arabi to the act of creation involving three realities, so he ended up claiming that "the origin of the cosmos is trinity." (22)

"'Three' is the first of odd numbers, from this name (al-fard) became manifest whatever has become manifest from among the entities of the possible ones. (23) No possible thing has become existent from the one but has become existent from plural and the smallest compound number is three and it is the odd." (24) Ibn 'Arabi is perhaps the only Muslim mystic- philosopher to have given trinity such a sympathetic treatment. One might be astonished by this, but there is nothing to warrant the conclusion that "he borrowed Trinity from Christianity" (25) to weld it with his mystical doctrines, since he knew that patches from Christianity were not going to help legitimize his views. This is moreover the case since Ibn 'Arabis apparent source regarding trinity is the Qur'an and Arabic language, and he does not refer to any Christian authority.

In any case, Ibn 'Arabi attempted to analyze the aspects of truth and falsehood in this doctrine and found excuses for its upholders, even ways of ultimate salvation. The springboard for his discussion of the Christian doctrine of Trinity is Qur'an 5:73: "They are unbelievers (laqad kafara) who say 'God is the third of the three.'" The first important move Ibn 'Arabi made in his interpretation of this verse was to emphasize that the label the Qur'an applies to Trinitarians was "unbelievers" (kafirun), not "polytheists" (mushrikun), (26) who, according to the Qur'an, deserve eternal damnation. Second, he interpreted the word "kafir" literally as meaning "the one who covers," so the Trinitarians are so since they cover the first with the second and the second with the third. Third, he pointed out that something is wrong with the expression, "He is third of three." "Rather it is said that He is 'the third of two.'" After all, He is not of the same kind as that to which He is being ascribed in any sense, for nothing is as His likeness, and He is the Hearing, the Seeing (42:11). (27) So what is problematic is God's inclusion with a group as one of its members. This last remark is not very different from the orthodox Muslim theological stance, and Ibn 'Arabi considered this specific formulation of trinity a violation of divine transcendence.

The most explicit defense of trinity that Ibn 'Arabi presented is in its connection with his discussion of kinds of tawhid. The profession of three gods, according to Ibn 'Arabi, is clearly an instance of polytheism, but he did not equate trinity with polytheism. (28) According to him, it is rather another kind of tawhid, namely, the "oneness of composition." (29)

While committing trinity to the profession of oneness of composition and presence of oddness and thereby making room for it, Ibn 'Arabi had in the corner of his mind the divine saying: "He is odd and He loves the odd." (30) Accordingly, the profession of oneness is also of two kinds or, in Ibn 'Arabi's terminology, belongs to either of two presences: the presence of oneness (hadhrah al wahdanoyah), and the presence of oddness (hadhrah al fardaniyyah). That is to say, there are two possible ways to profess divine oneness: pure oneness, and composed oneness. The Muslim tawhid, so to speak, belongs to the former one, while the Christian Trinity belongs to the latter. Even though the latter is not the pure oneness, it is still a profession of oneness. Since the number three is the first odd number, (31) a believer in trinity still has the advantage of deviating only one degree from pure oneness. This explanation does not exhaust the meaning of tawhid al fardaniyyah. In one of his shorter treatises, Ibn 'Arabi identified it as the tawhid of Moses, Muhammad, and all the prophets, while calling the other tawhid that of the disobedient followers of Muslim community. (32)

It is necessary to look at how Ibn 'Arabi viewed multiplicity and unity as far as the nature of God is concerned, because this is one of the core issues in the Muslim-Christian discussion of unity and trinity. There is no doubt that the cornerstone of Ibn 'Arabi's thought is the Islamic doctrine of oneness of God (tawhid). His doctrine that has become famous as "oneness of being" (wahdat al wujud) is but a mystical version or the esoteric core of this same doctrine. A unique feature of Ibn 'Arabi's thought is that, instead of considering multiplicity an illusion, he related it to the divine reality. His guiding metaphysical principle was that "nothing appears in existence that does not have a root in the Divine reality." (33) Since multiplicity is a feature of existence as it appears to us, it must also have a divine root.

According to the first principle of Islam, God is one. Ibn 'Arabi took the very bold step of adding that God is One/Many (al wahid al kathir). (34) He applied this term in the framework of Essence-Attributes discourse. Essentially, God is one but has many names, and these names require the objects in which their properties or meanings should be manifested--hence, the plurality of created objects. "There is nothing but Allah, the necessary existence, the one in as much as His Essence, the Many in as much as His names and His rulings." (35) Still, these names are not substances but only relations between God and the world. Therefore, the entities of created nature do not multiply the divine essence, so we must not say that God is one or many but that God is One/many. (36)

In order to separate the Divine essence from this attribution of relational multiplicity, Ibn 'Arabi at one point equated One/Many to Manifest/Nonmanifest (al zarhir wa al batin). This shows again that multiplicity pertains to God inasmuch as God manifests Godself and not as God remains Nonmanifest. Hence, multiplicity belongs to the names/attributes aspect of the Divine Side (al-janib al ilahi).

In his discussion of trinity or multiplicity, Ibn 'Arabi did not refer normally to life and wisdom, because these are intransitive so do not require objects, which makes them irrelevant from the point of view of cosmogony. Moreover, Ibn 'Arabi's reference is to the transitive attributes. We see that he emphasized repeatedly the relational nature of divine attributes and divine names, as well as the seedbed of multiplicity in the divine presence and in the world--and he did this apparently to forestall reified divine multiplicity.

Though it is difficult to say that Ibn 'Arabi's interpretation of trinity would be acceptable to Christian authorities, as far as the Muslim-Christian dialogue on trinity is concerned, however, there is no doubt that Ibn 'Arabi's position is a breakthrough. (37)

Conclusion

The purpose of this brief exploration was to introduce and explain Ibn 'Arabi's uniquely positive treatment of trinity against the background of his own metaphysical and hermeneutical principles, rather than connecting them to his so- called pluralism. We also did not frame the issue in any particular theoretical discussion of the doctrine. However, it seems appropriate at least to point to one of the possibilities for such framing, though leaving the question of implications open.

In his work La Grande Triade, (38) Rene Gurnon criticized the occidental attempts to assimilate Christian Trinity and Oriental ternaries, such as the Hindu Trimurti or the Far-Eastern triad of T'ien Ti Jen (Heaven-Earth-Man). We know Gurnon is not a particularly fashionable name in contemporary academic circles. However, his aforementioned work comes foremost to mind in view of its direct relevance. Further, quite contrary to what one would expect of an advocate of religious pluralism, we find that Gurnon here forcefully criticized the attempts to assimilate purement et simplement oriental ternaries and triads to Christian Trinity by simply ignoring the essential differences. So, a reference to this particular piece might go some way toward correcting the general impression.

In the first chapter, Gurnon asserted that, before "thinking of" assimilating two temaries belonging to two different traditional forms (that is, metaphysical systems or religions), one should make sure that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two and that they both pertain to the same level (niveau). Having differentiated through a painstaking comparative analysis of trinity and far-eastern triad, in the second chapter, he emphasized that, even when one has made sure the one-to-one correspondence between ternaries across the traditions and their being on the same levels, it is necessary to establish a clear distinction between different genres of ternaries. Gurnon himself did not mention these conditions as obstacles to making cross-traditional comparisons of triadic structures. Indeed he showed how such comparisons can be reasonably taken up within the prescribed parameters.

In Ibn 'Arabi's treatment of trinity one has a precedent case of such comparison that might be looked at in light of criteria laid down by Gurnon. One dimension of such investigation could be the nature of the connection between the Christian Trinity and various kinds of ternaries that Ibn 'Arabi brought in to accommodate Christianity. The question is whether this should be interpreted as a simplistic confounding of ternaries belonging to two different levels or whether there is a possibility of some more charitable interpretation. Another question concerns the nature of other ternaries themselves, whether they are artificially constructed and simply brought in due to their being ternaries without paying any attention to the way their members are mutually related. When, keeping these questions in mind, we recast a look at relevant passages from Ibn 'Arabi, we seem to come across a complex situation. It is clear that for Ibn 'Arabi the concern of accommodating trinity or at least making it understandable from the Muslim esoteric point of view takes precedence over all other concerns, including attention to details.

Qaiser Shahzad

Department of Aqidah and Philosophy

International Islamic University

Islamabad, Pakistan

(1) See s. H. Nasr, "The Islamic View of Christianity," in Paul J. Griffiths, ed., Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes, Faith Meets Faith (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990), pp. 100-111.

(2) Leonard Lewisohn, "The Esoteric Christianity of Islam: Interiorisation of Christian Imagery in Medieval Persian Sufi Poetry," in Lloyd Ridgeon, ed., Islamic Interpretations of Christianity (Surrey, U.K.: Curzon Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), p. 127.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi, tr. Ralph Manheim, Bollingen Series 91 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969 [orig.: L 'Imagination creatrice clans le Soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabi (Paris: Flammarion, 1958)]).

(5) William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al- 'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989).

(6) Miguel Asin Palacios, Islam and the Divine Comedy, tr. and abridged Harold Sutherland, Islam and the Muslim World 4 (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1968 [orig., 1926]).

(7) Don Sylvester Houedard, "Ibn 'Arabi's Contribution to the Wider Ecumenism," in Stephen Hirtenstein and Michael Tieman, eds., Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi: A Commemorative Volume (Shaltesbury, Dorset, U.K., and Rockport, MA: Element Books, 1993), pp. 291-306.

(8) al-Futuhat (Beirut: Dar Sadir, n.d.), III:343 (hereafter, Fut.).

(9) Fut. II: 114.

(10) Ibid., II:303.

(11) Ibn 'Arabi, Tarjuman al-Ashwaq, XII.4, cited in Reynold A[lleyne] Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1967 repr. [orig., 1921]), p. 138, n. 3.

(12) See ibid., p. 116.

(13) Ibn 'Arabi, Dhakhair al-A 'laq Sharh Tarjuman al-Ashwaq, ed. M. A. al-Kurdi (Paris: Dar Babylon, 2005), pp. 53-54.

(14) "[E]very letter of the Basmalah is triadic corresponding to the levels of the worlds" (Fut. III: 126). Also see Ibn 'Arabi, Fusus al-Hikam (Beriut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1980), pp. 115-117.

(15) Fut. III: 126.

(16) Ibid., I:696. At Fut. IV:32, Ibn 'Arabi wrote that the actual structure of Ka'bah including hair is itself triadic; the cube emerges only if we consider the building as it stands presently.

(17) Ibid., III:129.

(18) Ibid., III:126.

(19) Ibid., III:276. Chittick explained "He-ness:" "It is God in as much as He is designated by the name 'He' (Hu), which is a pronoun designating absence and therefore non-manifestation" (Chittick, Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 394, n. 15.

(20) Fusus, p. 115.

(21) Fut. IV:32.

(22) Ibid., I: 103.

(23) According to Ibn 'Arabi, before God creates anything in the spatiotemporal world, it has the ontological status of being a "possible entity fixed in Divine Knowledge." It is this pre-existent entity to which God addresses the command "Be!" (Fut. II: 169-170.

(24) Fut. III: 126-127.

(25) This rather hasty conclusion was drawn by 'Affiffi in his commentary on Fucks. See his comments, Fusus, pp. 132- 133.

(26) See Fut. III: 126.

(27) See Fut. IV:306; see William C. Chittick, The Self Disclosure of God (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 179.

(28) Fut. III: 126.

(29) Ful. III:173.

(30) Muslim, Sahib Kitab al-Dhikr wa al-Dua: Bab fi Asma Allah (Riyadh: Dar al-Salam, 2000), p. 1166.

(31) See Fut. IV:32.

(32) See Ion 'Arabi, Al-Tadbirat al-ilahiyyah fi Islah al-Mamlakah al-Insaniyyah (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2003), p. 90. Some other Sufis, before and after Ibn 'Arabi, also considered this as the higher level of tawhid. See Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, Mishkat al-Anwar, ed. A. 'Affifi (Cairo: Al-Dar al-Qayymiyyah, 1964), p. 60; and Mahmud al-Farkawi, Sharh Manazil al-Sa'irin (Cairo: Ma'had al-'ilmi al-faransi li al-athar al-Sharqiyyah, 1953), p. 36.

(33) Fut. II:508.

(34) Ibn 'Arabi applied this term in other contexts as well. In Fusus, he seems to have been applying this term to anything having organic unity, as one person has many bodily organs. He also applied it to the world as a whole and then to God in view of the endless multiplicity of God's theophanies. See Fusus, pp. 183-184.

(35) Fut. I:703.