文章基本信息

标题：Optimal Tax Administration
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作者：Keen, Michael ; Slemrod, Joel
期刊名称：IMF Policy Discussion Papers
出版年度：2017
期号：January
出版社：International Monetary Fund
摘要：This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.