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标题：Equity versus Bail-in Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective
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作者：Caterina Mendicino ; Kalin Nikolov ; Javier Suarez 等
期刊名称：CEMFI Working Papers / Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros, Madrid
出版年度：2017
卷号：2017
出版社：Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros, Madrid
摘要：We examine the optimal size and composition of banks’ total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC).Optimal size is driven by the trade-off between providing liquidity services through deposits andminimizing deadweight default costs. Optimal composition (equity vs. bail-in debt) is driven by therelative importance of two incentive problems: risk shifting (mitigated by equity) and private benefittaking (mitigated by debt). Our quantitative results suggest that TLAC size in line with currentregulation is appropriate. However, an important fraction of it should consist of bail-in debt becausesuch buffer size makes the costs of risk-shifting relatively less important at the margin.
关键词：Bail-in debt; loss absorbing capacity; risk shifting; agency problems; bank regulation