文章基本信息

标题：A Solvable Time-Inconsistent Principal-Agent Problem
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作者：Chao Li ; Zhijian Qiu
期刊名称：Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
印刷版ISSN：1026-0226
电子版ISSN：1607-887X
出版年度：2018
卷号：2018
DOI：10.1155/2018/8512608
出版社：Hindawi Publishing Corporation
摘要：We consider the dynamic contract model with time inconsistency preference of principal-agent problem to study the influence of the time inconsistency preference on the optimal effort and the optimal reward mechanism. We show that when both the principal and the agent are time-consistent, the optimal effort and the optimal reward are the decreasing functions of the uncertain factor. And when the agent is time-inconsistent, the impatience of the agent has a negative impact on the optimal contract. The higher the discount rate of the agent is, the lower the efforts provided; agents tend to the timely enjoyment. In addition, when both the principal and the agent are time-inconsistent, in a special case, their impatience can offset the impact of uncertainty factor on the optimal contract, but, in turn, their impatience will affect the contract.