文章基本信息

标题：The Presence of a Powerful Retailer on Dynamic Collecting Closed-Loop Supply Chain From a Sustainable Innovation Perspective
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作者：Mi, Jackson Jinhong ; Huang, Zongsheng ; Wang, Kai 等
期刊名称：Sustainability
印刷版ISSN：2071-1050
出版年度：2018
卷号：10
期号：7
页码：1-17
出版社：MDPI, Open Access Journal
摘要：In this study, the presence of a powerful retailer in the dynamic collecting closed-loop supply chain is considered. The supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer who is responsible for the used-product collection. Specifically, we have considered three settings, that is, no channel leader, the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the leader. The steady equilibrium and the optimal control strategies are derived in different channel power structures utilizing the open-loop control strategy method. By the comparison of three models, we found that the system with manufacturer leading results in the lowest return rate in the three models. If the transfer price of the used-product is low, the presence of a power retailer would result in a higher return rate, which is beneficial for decreasing the market price for the consumers. When the transfer price is quite high, the scenario with no channel leader in the supply chain would result in a higher return rate. However, the numerical comparison results of the profit rate of the supply chain members indicate that both manufacturer and retailer prefer themselves to be the channel leader rather than the other channel member as the leader. This means that although the presence of a power retailer is beneficial for the collecting efficiency, it is not enough to increase the profit of the supply chain members. The manufacturer should transfer all unit cost savings to the retailer in the scenario of manufacturer leading and no one leading.
关键词：closed-loop supply chain; differential game; open-loop control strategy; retailer collecting; channel power structure; sustainability; sustainable innovation