摘要:Little is known about the drivers and effectiveness of personal as opposed to real loanguarantees provided by fi rms. This paper studies a dataset of 477,209 loan contractsgranted over the 2006-2014 period by one Spanish fi nancial institution consisting of severaldistinguishable organisational units. While personal guarantees are mostly driven by theeconomic environment as refl ected in fi rm and bank conditions, real guarantees are mostlyexplained by loan characteristics. In response to higher capital requirements imposed bythe European authorities in 2011, personal guarantee requirements increased signifi cantlymore than their real counterparts. Our results imply that personal guarantees can disciplinefi rms in their risk-taking, but their overuse can limit this positive effect and damage theirperformance.
关键词:banks; asymmetric information; real guarantees; personal guarantees;risk-taking; capital requirements.