文章基本信息

标题：Short Selling and Executive Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity
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作者：Wanlin Chen
期刊名称：American Journal of Industrial and Business Management
印刷版ISSN：2164-5167
电子版ISSN：2164-5175
出版年度：2018
卷号：08
期号：04
页码：1007-1021
DOI：10.4236/ajibm.2018.84069
语种：English
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：Based on the launch of short selling in our country as the background, using the data of the a-share listed company from 2007 to 2016 in China, we buil t the model and empirically proved the impact of short selling on the target company executive compensation contracts. And then we discussed how the different supervision mechanism and the management rights affected their relationship. This paper finds out that the implementation of short selling improved Executive Pay-for-performance Sensitivity of the target company. In the weak supervision mechanism of listed companies, short selling can significantly improve the Executive Pay-for-performance Sensitivity, while in strong supervision mechanism of listed companies, short selling can ’ t play a role; further from management right consideration, we found that in the higher management rights of listed companies, short selling can significantly improve its Executive Pay-for-performance Sensitivity, and in lower management rights of the listed company , short selling has no significant influence on management compensation contracts.
关键词：Short Selling;Executive Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity