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文章基本信息

  • 标题:Communication Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Player Games
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Anat Ganor ; Karthik C. S
  • 期刊名称:Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity
  • 印刷版ISSN:1433-8092
  • 出版年度:2017
  • 卷号:2017
  • 出版社:Universität Trier, Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Computer-Forschung
  • 摘要:

    We show a communication complexity lower bound for finding a correlated equilibrium of a two-player game. More precisely, we define a two-player N N game called the 2-cycle game and show that the randomized communication complexity of finding a 1/poly( N )-approximate correlated equilibrium of the 2-cycle game is ( N ) . For small approximation values, this answers an open question of Babichenko and Rubinstein (STOC 2017). Our lower bound is obtained via a direct reduction from the unique set disjointness problem.

  • 关键词:communication complexity ; correlated equilibrium ; Nash equilibrium ; Set Disjointness
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