期刊名称:International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues
电子版ISSN:2146-4138
出版年度:2017
卷号:7
期号:5
页码:216-224
语种:English
出版社:EconJournals
摘要:This study considers overinvestment and financial constraints as factors that associate with managerial incentives of firms conducting seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The results show that pre-issue overinvestment and financial slack are negatively related to the long-run performance of SEO firms. It implies that SEOs of firms with these two characteristics are driven by managerial incentive misalignment, resulting in their lackluster long-run performance after SEOs. In other words, overinvesting and financially unconstrained firms may conduct SEOs due to managers' empire-building desires. These results should remind the board of directors to prevent managers' equity financing from serious overinvestment and that long-run investors should avoid buying new-issue shares of firms with overinvestment and financial slack.
其他摘要:This study considers overinvestment and financial constraints as factors that associate with managerial incentives of firms conducting seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The results show that pre-issue overinvestment and financial slack are negatively related to the long-run performance of SEO firms. It implies that SEOs of firms with these two characteristics are driven by managerial incentive misalignment, resulting in their lackluster long-run performance after SEOs. In other words, overinvesting and financially unconstrained firms may conduct SEOs due to managers' empire-building desires. These results should remind the board of directors to prevent managers' equity financing from serious overinvestment and that long-run investors should avoid buying new-issue shares of firms with overinvestment and financial slack. Keywords: Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs); Overinvestment; Financial Constraints; Managerial Incentives JEL Classifications : G30, G32