文章基本信息

标题：Endogenous Timing in Contests with Group-Specific Public-Goods Prizes
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作者：Jong Hwa Lee
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2017
卷号：07
期号：06
页码：1660-1666
DOI：10.4236/tel.2017.76112
语种：English
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：I analyze the two-group contest with the group-specific public-goods prize when each player decides on the timing of their moves endogenously and individually. Unlike the previous papers, I show that free riders suffer a damage in the endogenous-timing framework because the decision on the endogenous timing adversely affects the behavior of free riders, by making them more egotistical.
关键词：Group-Specific Public-Goods Prize;Endogenous Timing;Free-Rider Problem