文章基本信息

标题：Passively-Strictly Strong Nash Equilibrium in a Preference Revelation Game under the Student-Optimal Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
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作者：Chengyue Li ; Takehiro Inohara ; Masahito Kitamura 等
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2017
卷号：07
期号：05
页码：1244-1254
DOI：10.4236/tel.2017.75084
语种：English
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：We revisit a college admission market and a related preference revelation game under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (SODA). Previous research has demonstrated the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium (SSN) based on either an iterative deferred acceptance algorithm (DA-SSN) or the core of a corresponding house allocation problem (Core-SSN). We propose a new equilibrium concept called passively-strictly strong Nash equilibrium (P-SSN). It rules out a kind of deviation called passively weak deviation which includes students who were threatened to deviate. Then we show two preliminary existence results about P-SSN. (i) If the DA-SSN and the Core-SSN are not equivalent, then neither of them is a P-SSN. (ii) If the matching determined by the DA-SSN satisfies a property called irrelevance of low-tier agents, then the DA-SSN is also a P-SSN.
关键词：Student-Optimal Deferred Acceptance Algorithm;Preference Revelation Game;Passively-Strictly Strong Nash Equilibrium